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Does Foundational ism Work?
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Timm Triplett, B.A.
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M.A., Ph.D., University of Massachusetts

Directed by:

Chapter
are stated.

I:

Professor Gareth Matthews

The tenets essential to any foundationalist
theory

These tenets make reference to the concept of a
basic

proposition.

Literature discussing and attempting

to

define this con-

cept is surveyed and assessed.

Chapter II:

The definitions surveyed are seen to make use of

the concept of epistemic justification.

external and internal

Two senses of justification-

are distinguished and discussed.

A definition

of basic propositions is offered using the external sense of

justification.

Chapter III:

A variety of theories, all satisfying the essen-

tial tenets of foundationalism, are distinguished.

Special attention

is given to Cartesian foundationalism and its relation to the other

theories distinguished.

Something is said about the motivation for

accepting Cartesian foundationalism.

Chapter IV:

A variety of criticisms of foundationalism are

assessed from the point of view of determining whether they are successful against Cartesian foundationalism.

It is shown that many cri-

ticisms are directed against tenets associated with but not essential
X

to

Cartesian foundationalism.

Other criticisms attack Cartesian foun-

dationalism more directly, but are shown
Chapter V:

to

be unsuccessful.

Critics allege that Cartesian foundationalism

requires the existence of "the given" and that
either the given does
not exist or it cannot provide the foundation
for knowledge that the

Cartesian foundationalist requires of it.
tics are assessed.

Chapter VI:
is assessed.

It

is

It

The arguments of these cri-

is concluded that they too are unsuccessful.

Chisholm's version of Cartesian foundationalism
found to be unsatisfactory in its attempt to

establish a bridging principle that would state the conditions
under

which a basic proposition justifies a nonbasic proposition.
Chapter VII:
pertinent

to

After considering some criticisms by Pollack

establishing foundationalist principles, a revision of

one of Chisholm's bridging principles is formulated and discussed.

It

is concluded that the revised principle can serve as a plausible com-

ponent of a Cartesian foundationalist theory.

No complete theory is

developed, but directions are suggested for future work.
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CHAPTER
WHAT IS FOUNDATIONALISM?

I

I:

I

BASIC PROPOSITIONS

shall begin with a general characterization
of

f oundationalism.

A more precise characterization requires a
defini-

tion of "basic proposition," and this leads, in
the present chapter,
to a survey of the literature attempting such a
definition.

The Essence of Foundationalism

Two tenets are common

to

all forms of foundationalism:

EFl:

There are basic propositions.

EF2:

Any justified empirical proposition is either basic or
derives its justification, at least in part, from the
fact that it stands in an appropriate relation to
propositions which are basic.

On the foundationalist account, justified propositions are hlerarchi
cally structured.

Lower level or basic propositions are self-

justified; they do not require Independent justification.

And every

other justified proposition is tied in to the structure supported by
these foundational propositions in that at least part of its justifi

cation derives from one or more basic propositions.

It thus forms

part of the higher level of this epistemic structure, and requires

support from the propositions at the foundations.

Contrast with Coherentism

Coherentism opposes both these central tenets
foundationalism.

of

Negatively, it denies the existence of basic
1

2

propositions, and it denies the hierarchical
structure of knowledge

posited by foundationalisra.

Positively, it holds, first, that every

empirical proposition is in principle liable to
the requirement that
it be given independent justification, even
if in some contexts justi-

fication of that proposition is not needed or called
for.

(As we

shall see, some moderate foundationalists accept this
tenet as well,

although it has traditionally been associated with
coherentism

.

Second, and more distinctively, coherentism maintains
that what justifies a proposition for an individual is its coherence
with the set of

propositions believed by that individual.

Aim of this Work

The above descriptions of foundationallsm and coherentism

— the

two major competing theories about the structure of episteraic

justification

are serviceable as first approximations.

obviously not precise or self-sufficient.
further clarification:

Many questions remain for

What are basic propositions?

tion do they bear to nonbasic ones?

They are

Just what rela-

What is meant by the coherence

of a set of propositions, and how and to what extent does coherence

work to confer justification?

Are there degrees of coherence?

My purpose in this work is to introduce more clarity into the

notion of a foundationalist theory of knowledge,
of this theory which

I

to defend a

version

shall call Cartesian foundationalisra against

both traditional and more recent criticisms that have been levelled

against it, and to present at least the fundamentals of

a

plausible

3

version of Cartesian foundationalisra.

This latter task will be based

closely on the work of Roderick Chisholm.

A precise description and

evaluation of coherentism is left to another and
more sympathetic
philosopher.

My purpose is not to compare and evaluate
foundational-

ism versus coherentism, but rather to get clearer
about what sort of
theory the former is and to carry on Chisholm's work
of attempting to

formulate a workable

I'd better not say "coherent"

— version

of

it.

The characterization of foundationalism above leaves
us with
two obvious questions:

\^at are basic propositions, and just what is

the epistemic relation they bear to nonbasic ones?

will be answered in the following chapter, where
of the concept of a basic proposition.

I

The first question

offer a definition

A partial answer to the second

question is reserved for the last chapter.

Basic Propositions in the Literature

I

shall first present some of the definitions of basic propo-

sitions that can be found in the literature.^

For the moment

I

shall

exclude Roderick Chisholm’s definition, which is the starting point
for the definition to be developed in Chapter II.

The first definitions

I

shall consider are useful in providing

an Intuitive notion of the concept of

a basic

proposition.

mention Important epistemic relations which themselves need

But they
to be

clarified, and when attempts are made to do so (by Cornman and Pastin)

difficulties emerge, as

I

shall show.

Other definitions to be con-

sidered are often unclear or include specific conditions that many

4

foundationalists would not accept as necessary or
even appropriate
conditions for a basic proposition.

An adequate definition should be

one which (i) provides a clear sense of how
to distinguish a basic
from a nonbasic proposition, (ii) provides an
understanding or explan-

ation of the concept of

a basic

proposition, and (iii) does not in-

clude conditions in the definition which are extraneous,

inessential,

or applicable only to certain forms of foundational
ism.

There is
these criteria,

a

certain tension between the first and third of

for different foundationalists hold different views

about which propositions are to count as basic.

Cartesian foundationalists wish

to restrict

those about a subject's mental states

memories, etc.

—his

For example,

basic propositions to

sensations, beliefs,

Other foundationalists would include among basic pro-

positions ordinary propositions about the external world.

Still

others would insist that the fundamental propositions of scientific

theory are basic, or at least have the possibility of becoming basic.

Given such differences, then, a definition which clearly and precisely
categorizes a certain type of proposition as basic will tend to run

afoul of the third criterion.

Certain foundationalists will object to

that type of proposition as basic and will regard the defining con-

ditions which determine this classification as inappropriate or
incorrect.

It would thus be very difficult,

if not impossible,

provide a definition which fully satisfies all three criteria.
one

I

shall propose fulfills (i) more fully than (iii).

does not,

I

to

The

However,

it

believe, violate (iii) as seriously as the other defini-

5

tions considered here which are vulnerable
to this problem.

Basic propositions are not always so called.

Among the works

to be cited we will also find them
designated "self-presenting states
of affairs,

first cognitions," "self-evident beliefs,"
and "self-

warranted beliefs.
trary,

I

Unless there is specific evidence to the con-

shall assume that the different terms are being
used to

elucidate the same fundamental concept.

General Characterizations

These accounts are all right as far as they go

— they

an initial intuitive idea of the concept in question.
fice only as general characterizations.

give us

But they suf-

They contain crucial epis—

temic terms which are themselves undiscussed and undefined, and thus
they have only limited use in helping us understand and distinguish

basic propositions.

The accounts of this type noted here are all

similar in emphasizing the self- justifying nature attributed

to basic

propositions and the claim that such propositions do not need independent justification or reasons in order to be justified.

Thus Michael

Williams
Let us, provisionally, define epistemically basic beliefs to
be beliefs on the basis of which other beliefs are justified
but which do not themselves require justification. We can say
that such beliefs are intrinsically credible.
(Williams, 1977,

p.

David Annis:
Basic statements have at least some degree of justification
independent of the support such statements may derive from

61)

6

other statements.
(Annis, 1978,

p.

213,

cf

.

also Annis, 1977,

p.

349)

and John Pollack:
(EB) P is an epistemologically basic
proposition relative to a
person S iff it is logically possible for S to
justifiably
believe P without having any reason for believing
P.

(Pollock, 1979, pp. 93-94)
As Pollock himself notes (p. 94), "this is
a bit vague without an

account of what it is to have

a

reason for believing a proposition."

For Williams' part, he would need to specify what it is
for a belief
to be justified without requiring justification.

would need to tell us what it is for

a

As for Annis,

he

statement to have justification

independent of the support of other statements.
Note that Williams' definition seems

beliefs which are basic.

to

imply that it is

This is a matter of contention.

Several

foundationalist theories maintain, for example, that it is not only

a

subject's beliefs, but also his experiences, which are basic for him.

Hence it would be better

to give a

definition that does not commit us

to the view that whatever is basic is a subject's beliefs.

tion in terms of basic propositions

allow us to add

a

,

A defini-

rather than beliefs, would always

clause to the effect that the proposition must be

believed by someone in order to be basic for that person, if further

consideration would reveal this

to be the case.

7

Incomplete Definitions

Before we discuss definitions which apparently
attempt

to pro-

vide relatively complete and adequate
characterizations of basic

propositions, it is well to say something about
the discussions of
basic propositions by William Alston and Brian
Skyrms, for these

discussions are quite extensive and detailed.

However, neither of

their definitions can be considered complete and
satisfactory from the
point of view of explicating foundationalism.

It does not appear to

have been the Intent of either philosopher to provide
such explication,

these definitions were given merely as necessary steps to
other

goals
In "Self-Warrant:

A Neglected Form of Privileged Access,"

Alston offers the following remarks and definitions in

a

discussion of

"self-warranted" beliefs:
(2) Belief b is self-warranted =df b is warranted just by
virtue of being b (being b is sufficient for b’s being
warranted )

(Alston, 1976b, p. 257)

Alston fills this out with a "more illuminating" remark:

...

a belief will be self-warranted ... by virtue of some
of its features rather than others.
If my belief that I am
now feeling tired is self-warranted, it is not by virtue of
its being a belief about a psychological state or even about a
[conscious state] (not all such beliefs are self-warranted),
but by virtue of its being a belief of a certain person that
he is currently in a^ certain [conscious state]

(Ibid., pp. 257-258)

Alston then develops his definition as follows:

8

O) Belief b is self-warranted =df b belongs to a type of
beliefs, K, such that any K is warranted
just by virtue of
being a K.
(Ibid., p. 258)

and
(4) Beliefs of type K are self-warranted =df
Any belief of
type K is warranted just by virtue of being
a belief of type
K
•

(Ibid.)

Alston notes that

to avoid

triviality we must observe certain

restrictions in our choice of types."
what these restrictions might be.

But he does not go on to state

Hence, his definition is,

from the

viewpoint of an explication of the concept of self-warranted
beliefs,
incomplete as formulated.

However, his aim here is not to give an

adequate definition of self-warranted beliefs; it is rather to show in
what sense the specific types of beliefs he classes as self —warranted
are privileged-access beliefs.
Skyrms’

"The Explication of 'X Knows that P’" includes the

following definition and explicating comment:
(A) Conditions

for Basic Knowledge
R
X
(1)
(2) X believes that p, and his belief is not
based on evidence.
'p’

(3)

’p'

is true.

However, it is by no means clear that there is an appropriate
relation R that defines a class of basic statements for each
person such that the conditions of (A) formulate a sufficient
condition for knowledge and the entire definition formulates a
necessary and sufficient condition for knowledge
And
among philosophers who hold that there is such a relation and
only one, there is no general agreement as to what it is.
The issue of basic knowledge is the Pandora's box of
epistemology.
It shall remain closed during this discussion.
.

.

.

9

for significant questions about the
adequacy of [a previous
definition] can be asked without becoming
enmeshed in
questions about the existence or nature of
basic knowledge.
(Skyrms, 1967, pp. 374-375)
It is the relation R that would define
basic statements.

Skyrms does not attempt to explicate it.

Condition (2) of (A) could

not, of course, serve as the sole account of
basic statements, nor

could It be conjoined with (3) only, for true belief
that is not based
on evidence may simply be a lucky guess.

This would hardly constitute

basic knowledge or even basic justification.
Skyrms' aim here is to characterize basic knowledge, which

introduces issues and complexities not always relevant to the
charac-

terization of basic propositions themselves.

The concept of basic

knowledge is broader than that of basic proposition, and Skyrms does
not wish to generate the additional complexity that an explication of
the latter would entail.

Definitions of Aune, Lehrer, Will

There is

a class of

definitions of basic propositions that

requires of them "indubitability

"incorrigibility."

,

"

"irrefutability," or

Thus Bruce Aune:

... to attain knowledge of the actual world [on the foundationalist account], you must ultimately have premises whose
truth is acceptable independently of any inference and whose
status is accordingly Indubitable. Only by having such premises can you gain a starting point that would make inference
worthwhile
(Aune, 1967,

p.

41)
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Keith Lehrer (1974,

p.

76) includes in his specification of

the foundationalist’s required tenets
the views that "a basic state-

ment must be self-justified and must not
be justified by any non-basic
belief

and that "a basic belief must either be
irrefutable, or,

if

refutable at all, it must only be refutable
by other basic beliefs."
And from Frederick Will, we have:

There is a class of claims, cognitions, that are
known in a
special direct, certain, incorrigible way; and all
epistemic
authority resides in these.
(Will, 1974, p.

142)

[These] first cognitions [are] sure items of original
knowledge that could serve as the origins for other items
because they themselves had no origins, and hence none
that

could possibly be mistaken.
(Ibid., p. 144)

Essential to this foundatlonallst] view of the justification
or validation procedure is a certain asymmetry in the relation
between justifying grounds and justified conclusions which
renders the grounds both incapable of being validated by the
conclusions and immune to revision by them. However difficult
it is to maintain this incorrigibility in some phases of
knowledge, it is necessary to the hierarchical conception of
the sources and transmission of validity that is represented
in this view.
[

(Ibid., p. 158)

These anti-foundationalists may be excused from holding
f oundationalists

to

the view that basic propositions must have such a

high epistemic status as appears to be intended by words like
"incorrigible."

For the two most Influential foundationalists of this

century appear to have held that basic propositions have the property
of being certain, a concept often related to that of incorrigibility.
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We have from C.I. Lewis his well-known
claim "if anything is to be

probable, then something must be certain"
(C.I. Lewis, 1946,
cf.

also ibid., p. 182 and C.I. Lewis,
1956, pp. 310-312).

p.

186;

And

Roderick Chisholm attributes certainty to the
propositions he later
identifies as "self-presenting" (cf. Chisholm,
1977,

p.

11).

Indeed, it may well be that basic propositions
turn out to

have the property of certainty or of incorrigibility.

But it seems

inappropriate to work such concepts into the definition
of basic propositions (neither Chisholm nor Lewis does).

This should be something

that should be discovered to be the case, if true, rather
than made
true by definition.

For it may well be that a consistent and workable

foundationalist theory can exist which assigns no higher epistemic
status to basic propositions than that of being justified.

We should

not at any rate set conditions that will exclude such theories a

priori

.

It is true that Lewis has an argument in support of his claim

that if anything is probable, something must be certain (cf. Lewis*

passages cited in the preceding paragraph).
and other such arguments,

But with respect to his

the most appropriate course in defining

basic propositions would seem to be to exclude incorrigibility-type

requirements from the definition.

Then if any of these Lewis-type

arguments should prove to be sound, we can always add that basic propositions have this additional property not contained in the original
definition.

Also,

the view of basic propositions as certain or

incorrigible derives from the Cartesian forms of foundational ism.

But

as already noted, there are other forms of foundationalism which take.
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for example, some ordinary propositions
about the external world to be
basic.

Such propositions might be less
plausibly claimed to be cer-

tain or incorrigible than Cartesian
propositions about

mental states.

a

subject's

It would be unfortunate if certain
forms of founda-

tionalism were ruled out because of an
idiosyncratic definition of
basic propositions.

There is an additional difficulty with Lehrer's
definition.
It seems too strong to require without
further explication that a

basic statement "must not" be justified by any
nonbasic statement.

Even if Cartesian propositions such as that expressed
by
pain

turn out to be basic for

by other propositions,

behaves.

is in

such propositions may be justified

for example,

those about how

S

appears and

And if basics are about the external world, these can obvi-

ously be justified for
ly,

S,

"S

as when,

S

for example,

not only by direct means, but also indirectS

comes to believe that he is standing

before an object that is red not because he directly sees

a red apple

but because another person tells him that a red apple is on the table

behind the opaque object that obstructs S's view of the apple.

For

these reasons a definition such as Williams', which makes the weaker

claim that basics do not require independent justification, seems

to

be more acceptable than Lehrer's definition.

Definitions of Butchvarov, Quinton, Kekes

I

shall now consider a more miscellaneous set of accounts.

Panayot Butchvarov

's

is interesting

in that it denies the possibility
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of a full characterization of
basic propositions:

terize them would be to impugn their
basicness.

to

fully charac-

In discussing

self-evident beliefs," Butchvarov acknowledges
that:
It is a fact that sometimes we know
certain truths without
appealing, or even being able to appeal,
to any other truths,
and that we regard a claim to such
knowledge as justified as
supported, as having a basis, and not at all
as an expression
of a mere true belief.

(Butchvarov, 1970,

p.

62)

But Butchvarov denies that there could be
a method for determining

which beliefs are self-evidently true.

Such a method would challenge

the allegedly self-evidential character of the
beliefs in question,

according to Butchvarov.

For this method would amount to

a

proof of

these self-evident propositions when their character is
that they can
be known without proof (cf. ibid., p. 62).

Butchvarov seems to mean by

a

method for determining which

beliefs are self-evident not only a subjective rule which the individual can apply to his specific beliefs but also any objective charac—
ts^^ization or definition of self-evident beliefs.

skepticism is based on a misunderstanding.
proposition

p is

evidence of

p.

Any proof that a specific

self-evident is not incompatible with the selfFor such a proof would be an epistemic argument

directed at justifying, not

self-evident.

In either case, his

p itself,

but the proposition that p is

Suppose, for example, that the proposition that

pain is self-evident to
is self-evident to S,

S.

S

in in

We can of course ask why this proposition

and we may develop a theory of epistemic justi-

fication to explain this.

Now on Butchvarov

's

account,

it would seem

Ill

Just as mistakes and errors are more
conspicuous ways In which
the possibility of malfunction exhibits
Itself, so the posslbility of malfunction Is Itself but
one aspect of the general
possibility that is represented in
incorrigibility
Like
of sensory discrimination
exhibit their liability to change, improvement,
deterioration,
and obsolescence in the dependence they
exhibit at all points
upon individual and social needs and the
conditions under
which these needs are filled.
.

(Will, 1974,

p.

.

.

207)

Although Will distinguishes incorrigibility from
certainty (cf. Will,
1974,

pp.

206-208) he lists both these epistemic properties
as among

those required by the foundatlonalists' basic
propositions:

There is [according to the foundationalist] a class
of claims,
cognitions, that are known in a special direct, certain,
incorrigible way; and all epistemic authority resides in
these.
The philosophical question of the epistemic status of
any claim is always a question of the relation of that claim
to this class of first cognitions.
A claim can be established
to be a genuine example of knowledge, or at least a claim
worthy of some kind of reasonable adherence, only if it can be
disclosed to be, if not a first cognition itself, in some
degree authenticated by one or more of such cognitions.
(Will, 1974, p.

142)

Will then attacks foundatlonalism on the grounds that these epistemic
properties do not in fact belong
sitions (Will, 1974, Ch.

/,

cf.

to

"first cognitions" or basic propo-

especially pp. 196-211).

In a similar vein, Lehrer sets up stringent epistemic stan-

dards which, at least in an early chapter, he asserts that any basic

propositions must meet:
a basic belief must either be irrefutable, or, if refutable at all, it must only be refutable by other basic
beliefs.
.

.

.

(Lehrer, 1974,

p.

76)
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that admitting the need for such
a theory would establish that
the

proposition expressed by
after all.
that

is in pain"

is not self-evident for S

For if a theory is necessary to
justify the proposition

is in pain,

S

"S

evident to anyone.

then presumably that proposition is
not selfIt does not epistemically support
itself.

It

requires the epistemic theory to buoy it up,
as it were.
The mistake in this example is,

I

believe, the assertion that

the epistemic theory is necessary to justify
the proposition expressed

by

S

is in pain.

It is not this proposition that requires
the sup-

port of an epistemic theory.
and immediately evident to

S

This proposition may well be as directly
as it ever could be.

Rather, what an

epistemic theory might be called in to support would be
the proposition expressed by ”'S is in pain' is self-evident to S."

contrary to what Butchvarov seems

to assume,

Thus,

to call for a philosophi-

cal explication of the concept of self-evidence or basicness is
not to

inpugn the alleged self-evidence or basicness or any specific

proposition.

(For a more detailed look at the sort of assumption

Butchvarov may be making here, see the discussion of Peirce and Aune
in the section on "Iterative Foundationalism" in Chapter IV.)

Anthony Quinton refers to basic beliefs as those that are both
ostensive and intuitive (1966,

p.

62).

Quinton defines these terms as

follows
By an intuitive belief is meant one which does not owe its
truth or credibility to some other belief or beliefs from
which it can be inferred.
(Quinton, 1966,

p.

58)
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Ostensive statements are
statements whose meaning is not explained
in terms of
other statements already understood.
.

.

.

(Ibid., p. 60)

The characterization of basics as intuitive
seems itself to
involve some difficulties.

Is p basic simply because it "owes
its

truth" to the entailing proposition
p
basic.

Also,

I

&

q?

Then every proposition is

am not sure it is wise to lump together so
readily the

concepts of truth and credibility.

A proposition may "owe its truth"

to various causal factors combined, perhaps, with
general scientific

laws.

These factors may well be entirely unknown, and what
the pro-

position

owes its credibility" to may be another matter entirely.

Another difficulty with Quinton's account is the additional
requirement that basics be ostensive.

This seems as otiose as the

additional requirement that they be incorrigible.

Quinton's account

leaves the existence of basic propositions open to attack on grounds
that might be irrelevant to the notion of basic propositions that many

foundationalists have in mind.

The question should not be,

whether basic propositions have some primitive meaning

.

I

believe,

The essential

character of basic proposition has to do not with any linguistic properties they may or may not possess, but with epistemic properties

with how they function as justifiers.
are also linguistically primitive.^

Now it may turn out that they
But that is something to

discover, not to impose by definition.

assume without argument that

a

It would seem rather rash to

proposition such as that expressed by
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S

IS in pain" or by "S is looking
at a red object" could not be
a

basic justifier unless it were also
a proposition "whose meaning
is
not explained in terms of other statements
already understood."

The

fact that a given proposition is basic
for a certain person at a cer-

tain time does not seem to entail in any
obvious way that that person

must lack other background knowledge, such as
explanations of the
meanings of the concepts contained in the basic
proposition (cf.
Chisholm, 1977,

p.

John Kekes'

33).
"A New Defence of Common Sense," contains
two

accounts of basic propositions:

Other beliefs rest upon basic beliefs in the sense that
the
truth-value of basic beliefs is independent of the truth-value
of other beliefs, while the truth-value of other beliefs
depends on the truth-value of basic beliefs.
(Kekes,

1979,

p.

115)

A belief is basic if and only if it has four characteristics:
it is universally held, unavoidable, a necessary condition of
action, and the likelihood of its truth cannot and need not be
Increased by additional evidence.
(Ibid., p. 116)

The first characterization seems mistaken in its reliance solely on
the metaphysical notion of truth-value and not additionally on some

epistemic notion.

In any case, Kekes would have to clarify what it is

for the truth-value of one proposition to depend upon that of another.

There seems to be the same sort of difficulty here as was already
noted concerning Quinton's definition:

truth-value" on

p & q,

which entails it?

does p "depend for its
If it does,

p

would not be

basic on Kekes' account, nor would any proposition be basic, since
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each has an entailing conjunction.

If p does not

so depend on
p 5 q,

then Kekes needs to Include appropriate
exclusionary clauses In his
def inition.
It would not seem enough to simply
exclude entailment and

other deductive relations, for the concept
of truth-value-dependence
remains problematic.

On what does a general, derivative
proposition

such as that expressed by "All stars are hot"
depend for its

truth-value?^

Perhaps it depends ultimately on fundamental
yet

highly complex laws of particle physics, laws which
may yet be
undiscovered.

Few if any foundationalists would wish to regard
such

undiscovered laws as the epistemlcally basic justifiers for
our

knowledge that all stars are hot.

Or perhaps the truth of this propo-

sition depends on the Individual causal histories of each star.

This

account too would seem to disqualify the common varieties of
f oundationalism,

which take propositions about the individual's mental

states or ordlnar7 singular propositions about the external world to
be basic.

Accounts of truth-value-dependence developed along either

of these lines would seem to be unwarrantedly restrictive.
9

main point

to

But the

be made here is again that Kekes has not proposed any

account of this concept, and thus his first definition remains

unclear
Kekes' second definition states four conditions which a basic

proposition must satisfy.

Some of these conditions ("unavoidable," "a

necessary condition of action") seem unclear and are not elaborated
upon.

Also, the conditions seem to be geared toward Kekes' own sped-
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fic account of basic propositions.

Essentially he has in mind to

defend as basic those propositions which
G.E. Moore described in his
"A Defence of Common Sense" as "truisms,

opinion)

I

every one of which (in my own

know, with certainty, to be true"
(Moore, 1966, p. 100).

The list Moore gives includes such
propositions as the proposition
that the Earth has existed for many
years before Moore was born, that
for many years large numbers of human
bodies have been alive on the

Earth, and so on.

It

is of

course entirely appropriate for Kekes to

provide a definition that singles out those
propositions he regards as
basic.

But to the extent that other foundationalists
do not agree

with Kekes' list of basic propositions, his definition
will not be
adequate to those other theories.
quate to

a

For example, it will not be ade-

version of foundationalism which restricts basic proposi-

tions to those about a subject’s mental states.

Hence it cannot serve

as the broader and more inclusive type of definition we are looking

for
It is not even clear that Kekes’

second definition does the

job for his own categorization of basic propositions.

One might

argue, for example, that whether a proposition is universally held has

little to do with whether one knows it to be true with certainty.

Suppose just one person sincerely believes that he is the only human
among millions of clever machines.

Also, one might argue that addi-

tional scientific evidence could increase the likelihood of a proposi-

tion such as that expressed by "The Earth has existed for many years."
In any case,

this again seems to be a definition which is
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unclear In many specifics and inapplicable
to many Important varieties
of foundationalism.

Dofinltions of Cornnian and Pas tin
It may be helpful at this point to take
stock before pro-

ceeding with the next set of definitions.

An interesting intuitive

account of basic propositions has been offered
by Williams, Annis, and
Pollock,

to

the effect,

in Williams'

formulation, that

a

basic propo-

sition is one that is justified without itself requiring
justification.

But it is not clear from this rather general
account

what it means to say that a proposition is so justified.

Just what

are the conditions under which a proposition has such
epistemic

independence?

The other definitions we have thus far considered have

not given a clear answer to this question, and have frequently
imposed

additional conditions that seem inappropriate or incorrect.
I

shall next consider two definitions that are directly con-

CGtned with the intuitive idea of Williams, et al
basic propositions as independently justified.

James Cornman and Mark Pastin

— attempt

precision into this intuitive notion.

. ,

that portrays

These definitions

— by

to bring more clarity and

If these important analyses

fail, they fall in more subtle ways than do the previous attempts.

Indeed,

I

do not believe it is possible to state categorically that

these analyses fall (or that they succeed).

Rather,

I

think we must

say that whether they succeed depends on what concept of justification

one has in mind.

This will lead us to Chapter II, where

I

shall argue
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that there are (at least) two distinct
concepts of epistemic

justification.

In order to evaluate fully these
definitions of basic

propositions, we must go some way toward
elucidating these different

concepts of justification.

For the present,

I

shall only consider one

intuitive but quite plausible notion of
justification and show that

given this sense of justification, the
definitions of Cornman and

Pastin do not succeed.

I

shall then go some small way toward a clari-

fication of this notion of justification and of the
related but
contrasting notion of justification.

However, a full explication of

this distinction is beyond the scope of the present
work.

James Cornman's definition is as follows:^
is self-justifying (justifies itself) for S at t
=df
p is
justified for S at t, and it is false that it would be
justified for S at t, only if it were to be justified by some
relationship it has to some other statement or group of
statements.
p

(Cornman, 1978, p. 230)
It seems to me that there is an intuitive and plausible sense

of

p

justifies q

under which the following can serve as

example to Cornman's definition.

Suppose that

p

a

counter-

is the proposition

expressed by 'S is in pain," the sort of proposition that many foun-

dationallsts would want to count as basic.

Suppose that

is the pro-

q

position expressed by "S is in pain and all stars are hot," presumably
a nonbasic

proposition for

proposition.

S

since one conjunct is a general, nonbasic

In order for p to be basic on Cornman's definition,

following subjunctive conditional must be false:^
SC:

If p were

justified then there would be some

justifies

p.

q

which

the
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According to the current accounts of the
semantics of subjunctive
conditionals (cf. Stalnaker, 1968,

D.

Lewis, 1973), SC is true if,

in

the nearest possible world(s) in which
p is justified, it is true that

there is some

e^^

that in

q

which justifies

p.

Now it seems plausible to maintain

possible world in which p ("S is in pain") is
justified.

It IS true that q ("S is in pain and all
stars are hot")

For

q

entails

justifies

p.

and if we take "q justifies p" to mean
something like

p,

if It is reasonable to accept
q then it is reasonable to accept p,"

or "if

is

q

true then p is likely to be true," then it seems
we would

have to take entailment relations as justificatory
relations.

Indeed,

entailment relations would seem to be particularly strong—
perhaps the
strongest possible— justificatory relations.

Again,

I

do not mean to

suggest that this is the only way to understand the concept of
justification.

Indeed, it is not, as

I

shall show.

Here

I

wish to

suggest only that on one fairly plausible and intuitive reading of the
concept of justification, q justifies

because

q

justifies

entails
p.

p,

p

in every possible world

and hence in any world in which p is justified,
q

But if this is so,

then the subjunctive conditional

noted above is true, and thus p is not basic for

S.

A natural response to this counterexample would be to exclude

entailment relations from justificatory ones.

The justification rela-

tion would still be used in roughly the same intuitive sense of one

proposition making another more likely or reasonable, but here
entailment relations would be specifically excluded.

would look for, for example, inductive confirmation of

Instead one
p.
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Unfortunately, there are also counterexamples
to this

emendation.

If we go to the nearest possible
world(s)

proposition expressed by
a good deal of

"S

is in pain"

is true,

in which the

we are likely to find

inductive evidence for that proposition.

writhing in agony, for example.
very close to bursting.)

S

may be

(In the actual world his appendix
was

Or we will have considerable evidence
from

S’s verbal behavior or the statements and
tests of the doctor.

that this evidence is,
to the rest of us.

so we are presuming,

(That

S

available to

S

Note

as well as

does not need this inductive evidence to

establish that he is in pain is not to be taken into
account under the
definition and the concept of justification we are
presently
considering

see the discussion of Pastin below and the dialogue
that

begins Chapter II for further consideration of the view
that independent justificaiton is not necessary in order for a basic
proposition
to be justified.)

cases at least,
S

And we would probably be Inclined to say, in many

that this evidence in itself is enough to justify for

the proposition that

S

is in pain.

Of course,

when we go to the nearest possible world in which
find no Inductive evidence at all:

festations of a mild headache, or

S

S

it is possible that
S

is in pain, we

exhibits no behavioral mani-

stoically bears a migraine.

So

indeed some propositions might count as basic on this interpretation
of Cornman's definition.

But the foundationalist is unlikely to let

behavioral manifestation of pain be

a

determinant of basicness.

the proposition expressed by "S is in pain" is basic for

S,

If

it should

be so whether the pain in question is a mild headache which engenders
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no behavioral manifestation or
a ruptnred appendix which
generates all
sorts of readily available evidence.

Note that although

I

have constructed these counterexamples

with the Cartesian foundatlonalist
view of basic propositions as inner
mental states in mind, counterexamples
could be easily constructed
using any foundatlonalist view of what
ought to count as a basic

proposition.

The procedure is simply to pick an
example of a proposi-

tion that is basic according to that
version of foundationalism, go to
the nearest possible world in which it
is true, and point out the

inductive evidence that is almost always likely

to

exist in that world

that epistemically supports the purported basic
proposition.

These counterexamples suggest, as an emendation,

subjunctive to a necessary conditions analysis.

a move

from a

The idea is that none

of this troublesome inductive evidence is necessary
to justify the

proposition that

S

is in pain.

it is truly a basic proposition,

evidence.

This proposition is, or should be if

justified independently of that

The inductive support is not necessary in order that the

proposition be justified.
This is just the sort of definition Mark Pastin first considers in his "Modest Foundationalism and Self-Warrant:"®

Proposition p is self-warranted for person S at time t: (i)
p
is warranted for S at t, and (il) not necessarily if
p is
warranted for S at t, then S has inductive evidential support
for

p at

t.

(Pastin, 1978, p. 283)

This definition too is defective, as Pastin himself notes.
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Cons ider
is in pain or the moon is round.

S

P»

For the Cartesian foundationalist
who wants to restrict basic
propositions to subjective statements directly
verified by the subject’s

immediate experience,
Suppose that

S

p

should not be considered a basic
proposition.

is not in pain,

but that the proposition expressed
by

"The moon is round" is justified for

terminology).

position

Suppose that

p above.

basic for

S,

for

S

S

("warranted" in Pastin’s

reasons from "The moon is round" to pro-

For the Cartesian foundationalist,
p should not be
S

derives all his evidence for it from a nonbasic

proposition plus logical reasoning.

But p

basic according to the

above definition, for it is not necessary that
whenever p is justified
there is some q which does not entail
p and which justifies p (or

which provides "inductive evidential support for p").
justified by

r:

S

is in pain.

logically independent

q

For p may be

It is not necessary that there be any

which justifies

so p is basic by the above

p,

definition (cf. ibid.).
This is not, of course,

foundationalist.

Consider

a

a

problem only for the Cartesian

foundationalist who holds as basic,

the external— world proposition that
is red.

S

is seeing an object that

The same problem will arise here when we form a disjunction

of this proposition and some clearly nonbasic proposition, e.g., the

disjunction expressed by

"S

is seeing an object that is red or the

theory of evolution is more reasonable than creationism."

Pastin proposes a revision of the above definition that he
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believes will avoid these difficulties,

He begins with a preliminary

definition of an "epistemic system:"

-let us consider the notion of a set of
propositions
constituting an epistemic sysj^. The
elements of an episteP’^opositions of the forms "p is warranted
for S
(abbreviated W(p,S,t) ), "p provides
inductive evidential support for q for S at t"
(abbreviated "I ( p,q S t ) " ) and
p provides deductive evidential support for
q for S at t"
(abbreviated "D(p,q,S,t)") where S and t
are held constant.
set of propositions R of the appropriate
forms constitutes
an epistemic system if, and only if, it
is logically (or
metaphysically) possible that there be a person
S and a time t
such that for all propositions
(i) W(p,S,t) e R iff
p and q:
W P,S,t); (li) I(p,q,S,t) £ R iff
I(p,q,S,t); and (iii)
D(P>q,S,t) e R Iff D(p,q,S,t) ... An epistemic
system
R is the epistemic system of a person S’
at a time t' if
and
on y if, letting S = S', and t = t', all
the elements of R are
.

.

,

,

,

t

rue

.

(Ibid., pp. 283-284)

Next Pastin defines the notion of an epistemic
subsystem:

Next let us consider the notion of one epistemic
system R’
^ subsystem of another epistemic system R with resect
a specified element or set of elements' E of~R
(abbreviated
R' Subst R on E"). R' Subst R on E if, and onTy if, R'
can
be obtained from R by first eliminating E or the members
of E
from R and then eliminating n
>_ 0 other elements of R.

^

(Ibid., p. 284)

Pastin next considers minimal subsystems:
we should focus on those subsystems of a person S's
epistemic system R at time t with respect to an element (or
set of elements) E such that these systems would be attributable to S at t on the assumption that his condition at t be
changed only as required on epistemic grounds by the fact that
E (or the members of E) is eliminated from his epistemic
system.
I shall call such subsystems minimal subsystems for S
at _t
R with respect to E.
.

.

.

(Ibid., p. 286)

This allows Pastin to formulate

a

new definition of self-warrant:
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Proposition p is self-warranted for
person S at time f S's
epistemxc system at t, R is such that:
(i) w(p,S.t) c'r and
subsystem R' fot
at t

S

(Ibid

.)

of

The crucial second clause of this
definition might be restated as
follows:

Consider all those subsystems which
eliminate only proposi-

tions about the inductive evidence
for

p

(and those propositions also

required epistemical ly to be eliminated).
lack W(p,S,t)?

If so,

p is not

Does every such subsystem

self-warranted.

If not,

p

is

self-warranted
Unfortunately, these emendations do not seem to
be immune from
the sort of counterexample the original definition
was subject to.

Consider again the earlier counterexample:
p:

S

is in pain or the moon is round.

Consider then, relative

to S's present epistemic system,

all those

subsystems which eliminate propositions providing inductive
support
for p.

Such subsystems would presumably eliminate propositions about

astronomy relating to the nature of the moon, and propositions about
S's behavior, facial expressions, and avowals.

(Pastin's definitions

would also require the elimination of those propositions which must be
removed "on epistemic grounds [due to] the fact that E (or the members
of E) is eliminated from his epistemic system.")

Let us label this

set of subsystems F.

Note that all the inductive support for the simpler proposition

r:

S

is in pain,

will have been removed in all the subsystems of
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r.

How

„U1

than fare?

r

It It functions as the basic
proposition

It is supposed to be (on
Cartesian

grounds— for nonCartesian

foundationalists, analogous examples
could be used to make the same
point), then it should be that even
though all the inductive support
for it has been removed, it is still
warranted for S at t.
If this

were not the case, then

r

would itself be a counterexample to

Pastin’s latest definition.

For it could easily be shown that
this

presumably basic proposition is not basic
according to the definition.
So we must assume that W(r,S,t) remains
in at least one of the

subsystems in T.
a

subsystem.

removed.

But if so,

then surely W(p,S,t) also remains in
such

Recall that only inductive supports for

p

have been

supports p not inductively, but deductively.

r

warranted if

r

is.^*^

So p will be

But if W(p,S,t) remains in some epistemic sub-

system that has been shorn of its inductive support for

p,

basic proposition according to Pastin's latest definition.
not basic.

then p is a
But p is

This was just the problem with the earlier definition

Pastin rejected.

When the proposition expressed by
proposition expressed by

S

"S

is in pain"

is true,

the

is in pain or the moon is round" may not

be a serious counterexample to Pastin’s definition.

on the sense of justification being employed.

This depends,
For in one sense

of justification, one might well acknowledge that a proposition

entailed by

a

basic proposition would also be basic.

definition of basic propositions
expressed by

"S

I

According to the

shall propose, the proposition

is in pain or the moon is round" will be basic when

28

the .proposition expressed by ”S
Is in pain" Is true.

This will be a

natural result of the concept of
Justification employed In that

definition.

Whether the proposition expressed by

"S

is in pain or the moon

is round" constitutes a counterexample
to Pastin’s definition is

unclear, since he does not specify in
enough detail what he means by

"inductive evidential support," and thus it
is unclear which concept
of justification he is working with.

There is, however, another difficulty with
Pastin's
definition.

This concerns the method for determining which
proposi-

tions are basic, given Pastin’s definition.
and detailed work,

it

is to be carried out.

In spite of his precise

is still an open question just how this
method

And the possible methods that suggest them-

selves do not appear, upon examination, to do the job
required.
For example, when testing the basicness of

p:

S

is in pain or

the moon is round, Pastin says we should consider those
subsystems

which eliminate inductive evidential support for

p,

and everything

else that must be eliminated on epistemic grounds by the removal of
this support.

consider?

What subsystems precisely does this lead us to

One suggestion is that we consider the subjunctive state of

affairs of what S's epistemic system would be if his actual epistemic

system did not include any inductive evidential support for

p.

That

would presumably require going to the nearest possible world(s) in
which there is no inductive evidential support for either the

proposition that

S

is in pain or the proposition that the moon is

29

round.

But such worlds might be so
different from the actual world

that S’s epistemic system would
change so significantly from his

actual world epistemic system that
the former could not be used
to
make the appropriate epistemic
evaluations of the latter. To
illustrate, suppose the proposition
that

actual world.
basic for

S

is in pain is true

in the

Pastin’s method is supposed to show
that it is also
But the possible worlds approach
will send us to worlds

S.

in which there is no inductive
evidential support for the proposition
that

S

is in pain.

Now if in the actual world

S

with a ruptured appendix, generating all
sorts
support for the proposition that

S

of

is in pain,

is in the hospital

inductive evidential

it may well be that in

the nearest world(s) in which there is no
inductive evidential support

for the proposition that
all, and W

(

S

S

is in pain,

S's appendix never ruptured at

is in pain," S,t) does not occur in S’s minimal

subsystem, contrary to what Pastin's definition would
require if the

proposition that

S

is in pain were to be basic.

(This is, of course,

essentially the same objection we had to Cornman’s definition.)
So the possible worlds approach will not work for Pastin here.

There is perhaps another methodology that could be employed to deter~
mine whether

a

proposition is basic according

to

Pastin's definition:

instead of comparing possible versus actual epistemic systems, one

might compare and examine two epistemic systems without regard

to

whether they are possible or actual, but simply with regard

the

to

epistemic considerations which determine which propositions are

warranted in the respective systems.

But a similar problem would seem
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to arise here.

We would be comparing one
epistemic system where, say,

the proposition that

is in pain is warranted for
S,

S

with another

which lacks all inductive evidential
support for the proposition that
S

IS in pain and also

lacks whatever must be rejected
on epistemic

grounds because of this change.

whether W

(

S

is in pain,

We would be asked to determine

S,t) in this second system (the
subsystem).

Having just the two sets of propositions
by which to make this
determination, it seems we would be inclined
to deny W("S is in pain,"
S,t) in the subsystem, having seen all the
inductive support for it

eliminated.

It

seems then that we need the experiencing
subject to

ground the beliefs, but when we think again of
what the actual subject

would be warranted in believing if there were no
inductive support for
his belief, we are likely to judge that the
proposition that

pain would not be warranted for

S

S

is in

because he would not in that case be

in pain.

One could avoid this dilemma by insisting that W("S is in

pain," S,t) be held constant in both subsystems.
that the proposition that

proposition.

S

This would assure

is in pain comes out as a basic

But it would do so by fiat.

Any proposition could be so

treated
It seems then that Pastin's definition has both formal and

methodological problems.

Let us note, however, that the type of coun-

terexample which gave rise to Pastin’s attempt to improve on the defi-

nition he first considered only works as
a

a

counterexample if we assume

concept of justification where "p justifies q" means roughly "p
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makes q more likely or probable."

As we shall see, the coun—

terexamples to Cornman's definition
and to Pastin’s first definition
will not necessarily work if other
concepts of justification are

employed

Concluding Reflections on this Approach
to Defining Basic Propositions

Most of the definitions we have thus far
considered— including
those of Cornman and Pastin-have included
statements or attempts to

explicate the intuitive notion that
is justified,

a basic

proposition is one which

capable of justifying other propositions,
but not itself

in need of independent justification.

Given the concern and interest

that has been shown this Intuitive notion, it
is natural to ask why
this notion is so popular.

reasoning— the same line

I

believe that there is a natural line of

of reasoning that leads

foundationalists to

posit basic propositions in the first place— that gives
us this

intuitive notion of basic propositions.

The following considerations

may help to bring this line of reasoning out.
We recognize that some propositions derive their justification

from other propositions.

For example, the proposition that families

in Love Canal have unusually high rates of chromosome damage is

justified for me by the proposition that
effect in two or three newspapers.

I

have read reports to this

Hence the justification for the

foraer proposition is derived from other propositions.
indirect, nonbasic.

It is
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But what of the proposition that

position is true)?
me?

I

am in pain (when this pro-

What proposition independently
justifies it for

For the foundationalist. or at
least the Cartesian sort of

foundationalist, there is no independent
justification for it.
is only the fact,

or proposition,

that

I

am in pain.

There

That proposition

justifies itself— or, on some accounts,
needs no justification.
Again, what independent evidence would

what evidence

co^

proposition that

1

I

I

marshall-in order

have to marshal 1— indeed
to

justify (for myself) the

believe Socrates is mortal?

It’s not clear in this

case that independent justification by me
is even possible, yet surely
the proposition is justified for me.
1977,

pp.

(Cf.

Chisholm’s discussion,

16-22.)

On grounds such as these, the case for basic
propositions is
built.

Propositions such as those expressed by

believe Socrates is mortal

"I

am in pain" and "I

are said to be justified for the person

expressing them even though they do not themselves require
independent
justification.
I

Such propositions are said to be basic.

believe that this is the sort of reasoning that led Cornman

and Pastin to their definitions of basic propositions, and one can see
the naturalness of adopting this approach.

Now as

I

have already

noted, the definitions of Cornman and Pastin have not been decisively

refuted.

The counterexamples work only on the prior assumption of a

specific concept of justification.
is

It

is controversial whether this

the appropriate concept of justification to use in this context.

There is an alternative concept of justification which does not entail

33

the falsity of Cornn.an-Pastln
type definitions.
I

In the next chapter.

shall discuss ho» these two
concepts of Justification
differ.
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Notes to Chapter

I

For similar or equivalent
characterizations of the essential
tenets of foundationalism see
for example, Chisholm
(1964, p. 263),
Annis (1977, p. 345), Lehrer
(1977
pp. 17-18), Pollock (1979,
p. 93 )^
Sosa (1980, p. 5).

^
170), Lehrer (1974, p. 100), Will
(1974
nn
197-iqft>
°
hold this view that all empirical
propositions require independLt
justification may or may not be
coherentists
Of those notL above
Lehrer goes on to develop a coherence
theory of justification* Will’
does not
Quine-s and Sellar’s influentia/remarL
(1^ t^^a^ove
citations) about the revisability in
principle of any proposition—
emarks which seemed to deny that any
propositions were bLic— led to
coherentism, and Quine and
Sellars
Senarrthemse^r'
themselves have been regarded as
coherentists.
But this
challenged, for example by Cornman
Uy/8,
(197r''pr'249-25^’'^''r'^^
pp. 249 252), who regards them as moderate
foundationalists.
moderate varieties of foundationalism
that share some views
with coherentism will be discussed in
Chapter III.
^econd positive tenet see, tor example,
Oninfnn (1966,
Quinton
pp 56-57), Rescher (1974, p. 201) (here also called
the network model ), Lehrer (1974,
p. 154; 1977, p. 18), Bonjour
(1976, p. 283), Sosa (1980, p. 18).
(Only the middle three among
these authors advocate some form of coherentism.)
Lehrer argues that "weak" foundationalist theories
which
assert no more than the essential tenets of
foundationalism (Lehrer's
are roughly equivalent to my EFl and EF2)
"fail to distinguish themselves from coherentism in a fruitful manner"
(Lehrer, 1977, p. 17).
But the distinction only collapses, Lehrer notes
further on (cf.
ibid., p. 18), if basic beliefs are explicated
in a way that essentially involves reference to their relation to nonbasic
beliefs.
If,
on the other hand, basic beliefs are basic because
of some intrinsic
feature of the belief, the distinction can stand (cf. ibid.).
The
definition of basic propositions which I offer in Chapter II
does not
refer to a basic proposition’s relation to a nonbasic belief.
Lehrer seems already to be considering nonessential tenets of
foundationalism when he restricts his discussion to basic beliefs, as
though whatever is basic for a subject must be a belief of that
subject. On some foundationalist accounts a basic proposition need
true of a subject, not believed by him.
Lehrer also assumes
that a basic belief is self- justified
as opposed to being an
unjustified justlfier. By a self— justified belief Lehrer appears to
mean a belief which stands in the same relation to itself that two
nonbasic beliefs, one of which justifies the other, stand to each
other. Again, there are foundationalist accounts which do not require

p.

*

.

,
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propositions be self- justified
in this sense

datlcLllst

euher

of

CCf

The f^un-

thet

this theory

^L^U

they are not sell^ns^lfled"

and coher:: -^:
credible (ri

htj

\

rL

fou^Ltlonalls.
f°™datlonallsm' s acceptance of Intrinsically

Ptopoaition. on this account. Is
justified by Its relation
justified for the Individual,
The specUlc reLuor
the proposition's coherence
with ?h^!! ^
V ,
Coherence Is a necesLry and sufflclenr
condition for a proposition's being
Justified (Lehrer:
"a belief Is
justified if and only if it coheres
with other beliefs in a specified
Pthe foundatlonllst, coheren e
leLITo

^

Y

“

T

""" ""
J-tlfioatlon. As
II'"*
justification,
a basic proposition Is not justified
other propositions, a fortiori It Is
not iusMfieH
by coherence relations.
These general remarks will become clearer
when the distinctive
features of specific foundatlonalist
theories are discussed (cf. especially the definition of basic propositions
in Chapter II and the
taxonomy of foundatlonalist theories as
outlined in Chapter III).

slalM^ ooIli; I
mii
relation to
y Its ?»rlf

In Sellars (1973), a distinction is made
between interpretations of basic propositions as nonconceptual sensory
experiences on
the one hand and as conceptual renderings (or
"takings") of that
experience on the other. But Sellars does not give a
general definition of basic propositions in either of these senses
(cf. especially
p. 616).
Armstrong (1973) considers the possibility of
non-inferentlal beliefs" that would be "initially credible" or
®^lf~®vident
but he does not give a definition of these latter
terms, on the grounds that non— inf e rent! al beliefs are unlikely
to
have such properties (p. 157). He goes on to develop an account
of
when non-inf erential belief constitutes non-inf erential knowledge
(pp.
162-183).
This account, although cast as a definition, is irrelevant
hsre, since Armstrong does not define the concept of non-inferentlal
belief itself and he does not develop, or apparently accept, the idea
that such beliefs are initially credible or self-evident.
C.I. Lewis (1946, p. 182) anticipates Chisholm's definition
with the remark that, for what is directly given "there is no distinction of what determines truth from any justifying ground of the
affirmation." Sellars (1979, pp. 171, 172) offers two accounts of
,
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"self-presenting states of affairs
Chisholm's definition.

which appear to be based on

Some critics of foundationalism
argue that sinrp anv Kqo-;
proposition must be linguistically
primitive (in Quinton's sense tLt
understanding on other propositions
alrLdv
und^r^
candidates typically offered as basic
proposit?onf
sitions (e.g.,
;
p
the proposition expressed by
"S is in pain") are not
p imitive in this sense, they are not
in fact basic.
This argument
will be discussed in the last section
of Chapter
^

r

IV.

assuming here that the proposition
that all stars are
hot is nonbasic, which would seem
to follow from all foundationalist
theories that have thus far been proposed.
If perchance a founationalist theory took this proposition
to be basic, one could make
the same point against Kekes using an
example of a proposition that
was nonbasic according to that theory.
.

^For consistency with my notation, I have
substituted "p" for
S" for "s" in Cornman's definition,
I have also made minor
typographical changes.
X

and

^In this statement and the discussion that
follows, I suppress
reference to persons and times when no unclarity
results from doing
so

®The phrase inductive evidential support" in
this definition
is obviously meant to exclude what Pastin calls
(p. 284) "deductive
evidential support and hence excludes the entailment
relations that

troubled Cornman's definition.
Pastin s discussion would profit from an explication of
what
he means by "Inductive evidential support." It is clear
that he
intends a proposition such as that expressed by "S is in
pain" not to
require inductive evidential support, even when this empirical
pFoposition is warranted or justified.
In this and the subsequent definition I have substituted "n"
^
for "P".
9

The text has "in" following "that" at this point.
this to be a typographical error.

I

take

^®One might hold that this will not be so if S fails to notice
the entailment relation between r and p.
In one sense of warrant or
justification so-called internal justification this is so, and it
does provide a way around the difficulty.
But Pastin clearly does not
have this notion of justification in mind.
If he did, he would have
found no difficulty with the first definition he considered. This
definition too is acceptable if one has in mind the internal sense of
justification or warrant. Pastln's usage suggests that by "p warrants

—

—
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q" he »ould mean roughly
that the truth of
p makes mote llkelv or
inoreases the probability of
q, whether S notices ^1^0' not!
See
ow or details on these two
senses of

justification.

CHAPTER
WHAT IS FOUNDATIONAL ISM?

II:

II
JUSTIFICATION AND

THE DEFINITION OF BASIC
PROPOSITIONS

Two concepts of justification-internal
and extetnal-are

distinguished and discussed.

The latter concept Is then used
to

define basic propositions.

A Dialogue on Justification

The difference between the two concepts
noted can be brought
out by imagining a disagreement over
a Cornman-Pastin type definition

—a

disagreement based on these two different
understandings of the

nature of justification.

In the following dialogue, A defends the

Cornman-Pastin type definitions as the proper
approach for characterizing basic propositions.
A:

B

disagrees.

To say a proposition
p is basic is simply to say,

first,

that it is justified and second, that there is no
other

proposition
B:

q

which justifies it.

That's no good.
pain.

Suppose p is the proposition that

am in

May this not be justified for me not only, so to

speak, directly, but also indirectly?

am quite aware,

I

That is, suppose

I

through consciousness of my own internal

mental states and sensations, that
pose

I

I

am in pain.

But sup-

am also justified in believing that proposition on

the basis of what we may call external evidence
38

— the

evi-
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dence objectively available to
any ordinary observer in
the situation.

I

notice myself in a mirror, for
example,

and note the swollen lump on
the side of my head.

friend describes the bicycle
accident
the bump.

I

A

was in that led to

observe my own behavior— the facts
that

I

I

report a headache, frequently call
for aspirin, etc.

Surely this external evidence alone
is enough
the proposition that

I

am in pain.

to

justify

My friend, for

example, having access only to this
external evidence, is

surely quite justified in believing that

I

am in pain.

To

deny this would amount to embracing
skepticism about other
minds.

This external evidence, then, can be conjoined
to

form a proposition q which apparently does
justify p for
me,

for

I

do take note of this evidence as well as
the

internal or direct evidence.

But if q does so justify
p,

then p is not basic according to your definition.
OK,
q

to

I

grant that you could use all that external evidence
justify p for you.

to use it.

p

But

the point is you don't need

would be justified even if you didn't use

any of that external evidence, whether that external evi-

dence is there or not.

That's not what justifies

p.

p

justifies itself.
B;

Wait a minute.

Are you suggesting that if

external evidence for

arrive at

ray

p,

but

conclusion that

I

have all that

I

don't happen to use it to

p,

then that external evi-
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dence doesn't justify p?
A:

If you don't use that
evidence,

evidence doesn't.
justify
B:

It's potential evidence.

But that external evidence

It doesn't

d^

justify

p.

Granted, you

All the same, it constitutes

overwhelming evidence for

p.

iJhat

more do you want?

But just constituting evidence in
some potential way isn't

enough, no matter how "overwhelming."

q

doesn't justify p

for you in that case.

You have to actively make the con-

nection between

— you

q

and p

tes evidence for p,
B:

The

p.

There's no need for it in this
case.

p.

don't have to use it.

A:

then p justifies

have to

s^

that q constitu-

in order for q to justify
p for you.

You're just mistaken about justification.

Even if

I

do

not myself make the connections between the
external evi-

dence available to me and the proposition that

I

am in

pain, still, that external evidence justifies the
proposi-

tion for me, for

I

do have access to this evidence and it

does make the proposition reasonable to believe.

doesn't matter whether

I

It

actually use the evidence to

arrive at the conclusion that I'm in pain.

The evidence

justifies the conclusion in any case.
A:

No,

that's not what justification is like.

passive relation like that.

It's not a

One proposition justifies

another for someone only if that person puts the two
together and is aware of the connection between them.

If
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you do not

^

any external evidence to
arrive at your

conclusion, the evidence does not
In tact justify the

conclusion.

And if,

m

addition, you do not

ne^

any such

evidence In order for a proposition
to be justified for
you,

that proposition has no distinct
justlflers and so Is

basic

Neither A nor

B wins

this argument.

an ambiguity in the concept of
justification.

justification seem

to

be emerging,

expressed, in this dialogue.

\^at it reveals is rather
Two distinct senses of

intuitive and rather vaguely

Clearly, if the idea of basic proposi-

tions is to be more fully explicated,
we must look into the concept of

justification.

Justification

I

believe that the concept of justification is
one of the

central concepts of epistemology.

(Of course I am distinguishing

epistemic or cognitive justification here from moral
justification.)
It is the one purely epistemic concept in the
traditional definition

of knowledge (the concept of truth belongs to metaphysics;
that of

belief to psychology).
f oundationalism

And we have seen how our attempt to explicate

has led to the need to discuss the notion of

justification.
I

shall not attempt to set forth a full-fledged theory of

justification.^

While

I

shall be concerned with how certain proposi-

tions (basic ones) justify others (nonbasic ones),

I

shall not be con-

42

earned vrtth the notion of
justification In general, nor with

developing a complete and adequate
theory of justification.

Of the

two concepts of justification
Introduced In the above dialogue.

I

shall be primarily concerned only
with one of them, and shall
attempt
to define basic propositions
In terms of that concept.

I

shall,

however, try to say enough about
both concepts to make clear that

there Is a distinction.

helpful

to

This.

Indeed. Is my next task, and

I

find It

begin It by asking In what way a
proposition's being

justified Is related to Its degree of
reasonableness or credibility.

Eplstsmic Scales and the PriinltivG
"More Reasonable Than"

When we say one proposition justifies another
we are inclined
to say that the first makes the second
evident, or reasonable,

warranted, or credible.

However, this is only to "clarify" one

obscure concept with others which are at this stage
equally obscure.
Let us therefore consider the relation between
justification
and the perhaps more fundamental notion of credibility or

reasonableness.

We can imagine, as Chisholm does, an epistanic scale

which evaluates a proposition according to how reasonable it is to
believe it.

At the neutral point of this scale, a proposition has

neither positive nor negative epistemic value.

Typically, the propo-

sitions at the neutral point of the scale will be those for which we
have no evidence one way or the other.

Above this point stand those propositions which the evidence
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favors.

That is.

the available evidence
points, however slightly,

towards such a proposition being
true.

Chisholm has detailed the

various grades of reasonableness,
but there Is no need here
to go Into
the details of the various
categories he delineates. These
will be
discussed in Chapter V. However,
It Is Important here to
recognise
that there are different degrees
of reasonableness.

Some reasonable

propositions are more reasonable to
believe than other reasonable
propositions.

The more reasonable ones will be
placed on the eplste-

mic scale higher above the neutral
point than the less reasonable

ones.

Similarly, there will be grades

b^

this neutral point, with

those which are only slightly unreasonable
placed closer to the

neutral point than highly unreasonable
propositions.

This picture of an epistemic scale uses
the concept "more

reasonable than" as a primitive.

The concept "reasonable" may easily

be defined in terms of this primitive as
follows:
DR;

=df it is more reasonable to believe
p is reasonable
that p than to believe its negation.

(Compare Chisholm's definition of "h has some presumption
in its

favor," 1977,
as well as

p.

8).

DR contains, of course, the undefined "believe,"

more reasonable than," but the former concept is not

essentially an epistemic one.

It is more properly defined by theories

within psychology and the philosophy

of mind.

Whether all epistemolo-

gical concepts and theories can be explicated in terms of the one pri-

mitive "more reasonable than" is
attempts

to

a

difficult question.

Chisholm

base a good number of central definitions and principles
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in epistemology on this
one primitive.

attempt Is successful, however,
and

I

I

do not believe that his

believe that It Is necessary

to

introduce additional primitives
before one can accommodate
a successful epistemological theory.
believe that the term "more
reasonable than" does satisfy
the requirements, for a
useful primitive concept, of
simplicity and
I

intultlveness.

Even without a definition. It
Is obvious that the pro-

position that Reagan Is President
In 1982 Is at this time more
reasonable than the proposition that
he will be President In 1986.
I„ many
cases In which two propositions
are eplstemlcally compared. It
Is
clear which one is the more reasonable.

Justification and the Evident
What is the relation between the concept
of justification and
that
is

of.

reasonableness?

It seems clear that to say that a
proposition

justified is to say that it has some positive
epistemic status.

ranks above the neutral point on the
epistemic scale.

It

But how high on

the scale does a justified proposition rank?

One natural response might be to say that a
justified proposition must be evident.

The evident is regarded as a position modera-

tely high on the epistemic scale— not, perhaps, as
reasonable to

believe as that which is certain (the top of the scale),
but signifi-

cantly more reasonable

sumption in its favor.

to

believe than that which merely has some pre-

One relatively serviceable way of

characterizing the evident is

to

note that it is that epistemic status
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which is high enough to allow
a proposition

to be known,

should other

specified conditions also be
satisfied for that proposition.

More

significantly, In order for a
proposition to be evident for a
subject,
some sort of epistemic activity
would seem to be required of the
subject.

That is,

evident to

S

the data that serves to make
some proposition
p

must at some point and in some way
be noted by

appropriately applied to

p.

^ evidence

conclusion that

p,

p

for

and

All the necessary evidence for
p may

exist right under S*s nose, as it
were.
the evidence

S

p,

But unless S takes note of

and applies it appropriately to
the

may not be evident to

S,

even if he believes that

It IS here that we run into difficulty
with the position that
if a proposition is justified for S,

then it is evident for

S.

The

above characterization of the evident recalls
A's characterization of
the necessary conditions for a justified
proposition.

But B’s alter-

native characterization of justification is not as
strong as A's
characterization, and would presumably not require that
to S in order for it to be justified.

could be justified by some

q for S

p be

evident

B's position was roughly that
p

if q (presumably itself

justified

for S) simply made p more likely in some objective or external
sense,

whether or not

S

was aware of this connection between
q and

would not be evident

to S on this account,

p.

p

even though it might be

justified for him.
It is clear that we must explore in more detail what these two

competing senses of justification are.
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Two Concepts of Justif iraM’ nn

Ordinary talk about justification
appears

to be capable of

being analyzed into two essentially
different notions.

On the one

hand, there is the objective
or externalist sense of the
concept,

defended by B.

According to this view, a justified
proposition p is
one which the available evidence
warrants accepting, whether or not
the subject makes use of the
evidence to arrive at conclusion
p.
the other hand,

On

there is the subjective or internalist
sense,

according to which the subject's belief
that

p

his appropriate use of the evidence
available.

must be the result of
(I

speak here of

ordinary justification, ignoring for the
moment basic propositions

which would not require such evidence in order
to be justified.)

Further details and a better understanding of
the distinction
can be brought out by considering the following
example:

Sherlock

Holmes and Dr. Watson are confronted with a very
difficult case.
squire is dead.

An apparent homicide, but the clues are few.

The

A

letter opener (the murder weapon), a few bits of testimony,
dust on
the squire's riding boots, although it was a rainy day,
no clue as to

motive.

Holmes and Watson gather in what details they can.

"Very

little to go on," mutters a discouraged Watson, "What can it
all point
to?"

"The butler, my dear Watson,

the butler."

Holmes and Watson here have, at least prior to Holmes'
revelation, quite different relations to the proposition that the

butler did it.

It

is

justified for Watson in the first, or exter-

nalist sense, but not in the
second. Internalist, sense.
But for
Holmes, it Is justified In
both senses.
We can Imagine that Holmes
and Watson have exactly the
same evidence available to
them, but that
Holmes has,

*ere Watson

has not, put the evidence
together In an

appropriate way.
This simple example may give
rise to the objection that what
It Illustrates Is not a
distinction In types of Justification
but

another sort of distinction.

It might be thought

that the proposition

In question differs for Watson
and Holmes In its degree of evidence,

or reasonableness, or in the fact
that Holmes believes It and Watson

does not, or because Holmes has
brought deductive reasoning to bear
on
the empirical evidence presented.

But the difference here is not that
Holmes has more evidence
for the proposition than Watson does.
the same evidence. 2

By hypothesis,

they both have

Nor is the proposition more reasonable for

Holmes to believe than for Watson to believe.

The evidence, which for

both is identical, does support the proposition
that the butler did
it.

Watson has not done all that he could have done,
epistemically

speaking.

Given his evidence, the proposition is just as reasonable

for him as for Holmes.

Nor is the difference simply that the proposi-

tion is evident to Holmes, and not

to

Watson.

fact, but what could be the basis of it?

This difference is a

As we have seen it is not

simply that there is some increase in the reasonableness of the propo-

sition for Holmes over its reasonableness for Watson.
reasonable for both to believe.

It cannot be this,

It is equally

then,

that makes

48

the proposition evident to
Holmes, and not to Watson.
Is it simply then that
Holmes

does not?

No,

^

believe, and Watson

for the mere fact of belief
on Watson's part that the

butler did it would not necessarily
put him in the same position
as
Holmes. Watson may have come
to his belief for an unrelated
reason,
or for no reason at all.

Watson

s

We would not in such a case
wish to call

belief justified in the strong
sense in which it is justified

for Holmes.

It

is not even clear that belief
is a necessary condition

for justification in this strong
sense.

Holmes might have the essen-

tial realization that makes the
proposition that the butler did it

justified in the strong, internal sense
for Holmes, and yet he may

withhold belief for some reason, or for
no reason at all.
Perhaps the difference between Holmes and
Watson is Holmes’

-

Pledge that the butler did it, and Watson's
lack thereof.

-

account too is unacceptable.

But this

Let us say, indeed, that Holmes does

know, for the butler did not do it.

He is the victim of a frameup by

Moriarty, and Holmes does not discover this until
the next story.
Still, Holmes is in a superior eplstemic position
to Watson.

It still

makes sense, as a way of explaining this superiority,
to say that the

proposition that the butler did it is strongly justified for
Holmes,
but only weakly justified for Watson.

Justification, even in the

strong sense, need not amount to knowledge.

The strongest and most interesting objection is that Holmes
does indeed have additional evidence that Watson lacks.

Holmes has

noticed certain relations between the evidence presented that Watson
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has failed to see or overlooked.

Holmes,

It might be Imagined,
Is a

better or quicker reasoner, and
has taken several deductive
or Inductive steps, or some complex
combination of them.

And this leads to

his more privileged epistemic
position.

There is something to this,
but it is not correct to say
that
Holmes simply has more evidence
or data at hand than Watson
and that
this is all there is to his strong,
versus Watson's weak,

justification.

Is it reasonable for Holmes

to assume

deductive and inductive reasoning
apply in this case?

reasonable for Watson to assume this.

that rules of
It is likewise

Perhaps Holmes is aware of the

relevance of certain conditionals, such
as "If the windows of the
butler’s bedroom were sealed shut, he
could not have done it."
Suppose then Holmes does believe this
conditional, notes its relevance
to the situation, and uses it to form
his conclusion about the

butler's guilt or innocence.

Does not this internal detective work

grant him new evidence that is beyond that which
Watson has?
Perhaps it does, but then we are faced with the
same problem

with regard

to

the proposition cited as Holmes’

"additional evidence"

as we were with the original proposition that the
butler did it.

For

if it is this intermediate proposition that Holmes
first grasps,

rather than the proposition expressed by "The butler did it"
directly,
what is to distinguish his grasp of it from Watson's lack of
grasp,
since, again by hypothesis,

they have the same evidence for it, and

since it is equally reasonable for both of them to believe?
Finally, one might develop an objection along Wittgensteinean
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lines

to

the effect that the

concept— required by our initial

hypothesis-of two people having the
same evidence

is simply

incoherent.

An individual's evidence
base would presumably be
unique
to that individual and in
principle nondupllcatable
But even if the
case could be made that there
is such an incoherence,
this would not
.

adversely affect the view that
there are two distinct senses
of
justification. Perhaps Watson and
Holmes can never have exactly
the
same evidence.
Then disregard Watson and just
consider Holmes. At
some point he acquires the insight
that the butler did it.

earlier, he lacked it.

A moment

Instead of comparing Watson and
Holmes, one

may compare Holmes before and Holmes
after.

Then all the points made

above for a distinction between internal
and external justification

apply as before.

Holmes before is justified in the external,
but not

the internal, sense.

Holmes after is justified in both senses.

The

supposition is not necessary that two people
can have the same
evidence.

These considerations, it seems to me, force
us to recognize
that in order to explain how a proposition
becomes evident to a

person, we need a new eplstemic category that is not
reducible to

reasonableness or degree of reasonableness.

We can correctly say that

the proposition that the butler did it is evident to
Holmes, and not
to Watson.

This marks the distinction.

But a proposition’s being

evident is not simply a matter of its being reasonable
high degree on the eplstemic scale.

to a fairly

Something significantly more is

involved than a quantitative increase in the degree of reasonableness
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when a proposition becomes
evident.

Is.

I

The concept that adequately
describes Holmes' eplstemlc
state
believe, best described as as
type of Justification,

distinguished from justification In
the external sense.

It Is the

fact that Holmes' belief Is
justified In the former sense that
makes
the proposition that the butler
did It evident to him.
Justification

in this sense Is not.
of reasonableness,

I

believe, reducible to reasonableness
or degree

although justification In the external
sense does

seem to be so reducible.

The Two Concepts in the Literature

Three recent works seem to have made the
same distinction as
that made above between external and
Internal justification.^

While

other terms are used to mark the distinction
(and in still other works
the same terms are sometimes used to mark
different epistemic

distinctions

cf. note 4),

these three works, at least,

seem to have

in mind the same distinction that is made here
between internal and

external justification.

In "Are Epistemic Concepts Reducible to

Ethical Concepts?" (1978), Roderick Firth even uses

a

Watson-Holmes

example to make his distinction between "propositional warrant"
(external justification in our sense) and "doxastic warrant" (internal

justification)
This distinction between propositional and doxastic warrant
is dramatized if we now suppose that Holmes shows Watson the
mud and gives him all the other relevant evidence he has,
without telling him what conclusion he has drawn from it.
In
one important respect a change has occurred in Watson's
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Slr'iFrr“"”-r““
oachman did it, we cannot
therefore conclude tha^
u
Watson, like Holmes, is warranted
in believiL
<-

that

^

hlH
belieff might

rL

p-positi^

warranted in believing p.
But Wat^n's
not be based rationally on
the evidence.
(Firth,

1978, p. 218)

Firth does not significantly
elaborate on the dlstlnction-no
definitions are provlded-but It Is
Interesting to note that his Implication
here Is that a doxastlcally warranted
belief Is one that is "based

rationally on the evidence."
In

A Plethora of Epistemological
Theories" (1979), John

Pollack says no more than Firth about
a distinction between
warranted'

and "justified" propositions, yet it
seems clear that he

is referring

to,

in our sense, external and internal
justification

respectively;

There is a distinction between being justified
in believing P
and believing P unjustifiably when you have
adequate justification available to you but have not made the right
connections.
For example, a man might have but systematically
ignore adequate evidence for believing that his
wife is
unfaithful to him. However, when his mother, whom he
knows to
be totally unreliable in such matters and biased
against his
wife, tells him that his wife is unfaithful to him,
he
believes it on that basis. Then he is not justified in
believing that his wife is unfaithful to him despite the
fact
that he has adequate evidence available to him to justify
that
belief. We might say that the proposition is warranted for
him, but he is not justified in believing it.
To say that P
is warranted for S is to say, roughly, that S has good reasons
whether he believes P for those reasons or not. Conversely,
to say that S is justified in believing P is to say not only
that P is warranted for S, but also that S’s believing P some-
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how 'derives from' the way
In which It

1s

warranted

(Pollack, 1979,

pp.

103-104)

It is perhaps not as immediately
obvious that Marshall Swain

has this distinction in mind in
Reasons and KnowledvP (1981),
but I
believe examination of the following
passage will show that he does:

The present concern is to
emphasize an important distinclon between the reasons upon
which a person's belief that h
is based and other reasons a
person may have which are relebelieving that h.
It often happens that

believing that h on the basis of R
is not justified for S.
This can happen even though S has
some other set of reasons,
R
such that If S s belief that h had
been based upon those
reasons
then S s belief that h would have
been justified.
When this happens, S's belief that h
is not justified and S
does not have knowledge. Let us consider
an example.
Suppose that Frank and Laura are tellers
in a large bank,
ach of them is efficient, responsible,
knowledgeable about
banking transactions, and well liked by
fellow employees.
It
is the stated policy of the bank that
such employees can
expect to be promoted to higher positions in
due time.
So,
Frank and Laura each have reasons upon which
a belief that*
they will be promoted would be justified.
Let us suppose
moreover, that each of them does expect to be
promoted.
Frank, however, suffers from the illusion that
the president
of the bank, who happens to be his uncle,
will do anything to
keep him on the premises in order to maintain
peace in the
family.
His belief that he will be promoted is based on
these
reasons.
Secretly he believes that efficiency, responsibility, and such things have nothing to do with
promotional
decisions. Laura, on the other hand, is also related to
an
officer of the bank but believes correctly that such facts
do
not influence her employers’ promotional decisions.
Laura's
belief that she will be promoted is based upon her belief
that
she is efficient and responsible as well as upon beliefs about
the bank s policy.
We may say of Laura that she knows she
will be promoted, but we may not say this of Frank. The
reasons for which Laura believes she will be promoted are also
reasons upon which that belief is justified. Frank’s belief,
however, is based upon something other than those reasons that
would justify his belief.
,

(Swain,

1981, p. 37)
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believe that Swain is here
In effect pointing out
the distinction
between external Justification
(which Fra* has) and internal
justification (Which only Laura has).
He has added the twist
that Frank does
In fact hold the same relevant
belief Laura holds.
This would be akin
to the point made In my
example above that Watson could
have all the
I

evidence that Holmes has, believe
Irrationally or on the basis of
irrelevant reasons that the butler
did It. yet not be Internally
Justified In believing that proposition.

If we Ignore the compli-

cating consideration of Frank's
Irrational and coincidental belief
In
the right thing," we have here.
It seems, a situation In which

Frank's belief Is externally but not
Internally justified, and Laura's
belief is both internally and externally
justified.

Swain does not use these terms, and indeed
reserves the term
justified belief
belief.

'

for what we would call an internally
justified

He then goes on to develop a full theory
of justification

where by "justification" he appears
what

I

to have

in mind the concept of

have called internal justification (cf. ibid.,
Chapter 4).

Use of the Two Concepts in the Present Work

If there is indeed such a distinction between
external and

internal justification, how is it to be applied to the task
at hand of
defining basic propositions?

simpler one

The first of these concepts is the

external justification has to do with reasonableness to a

certain degree on the episteraic scale.

It would be a difficult enough

task to provide an adequate definition of external justification

— no
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such attempt will be made
here
nere.

define Internal justification.

Tr
it unnia
would k
be considerably harder
to

First of all It would have
to Include

the concept of external
Justification, as Internal justification
Is

external justification plus
"something more."

Secondly,

It would be

difficult to Isolate and define
what that "something more"
Is.
Whether Swain has adequately done
so In Reasons and Knowledge
I am
not In a position to judge. A
critique of his book-length analysis
of
justification would take us too far
afield.

What

I

justification.

shall do instead is rely on the
concept of external

After giving a general account that
attempts to

clarify this notion.

I

shall define basic propositions in
terms of

this concept alone.
It will be recalled that the
Cornman-Pastin type approach

seemed a workable one if we had one concept
of justification in mind,
but not the other.

The concept that seems to work with this
approach

is that of internal

justification.

Recall that the counterexamples to

those definitions relied on the assumption that
"external" evidence

which the subject may not have actually used in coming

to believe a

proposition nevertheless justified that proposition for the
subject.
If we were using the concept of internal justification,

would not go through.

these examples

Hence the Cornman-Pastin approach as so far

developed is not adequate given the present task of defining basic
propositions in the externally justified sense.
basic propositions at the end of the chapter,

I

When

I

come to define

shall base my defini-

tion on the quite different approach of Roderick Chisholm.

But first
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It

Is helpful to

look more closely at the
concept of external

justification.

External Justification

When we say that a proposition
Is Justified tor a person
In
the external sense, we are saying,
roughly, that the proposition
Is

reasonable enough that the person
would be In good eplstemlc standing
It, on the basis of the available
evidence, he believed that

proposition.
did It,

We say Watson Is justified In
believing that the butler

In this external sense of
justification, because he has the

data available to come to the conclusion
that the butler did It.

Given his available data, the conclusion
is reasonable, even If Watson
doesn't arrive at it.
Two questions arise from this rough sketch:
The first is "How

reasonable must a proposition be before it can
be justified in this
external sense?

The second is, "Just what constitutes evidence
which

is available to a person?"

Presumably, a proposition that merely has some
presumption in
its favor is not strong enough, epistemically speaking,
to be

justified for a person, even in the weaker external sense
of

justification.

A plausible minimal condition for an externally justified pro-

position might be set at that level required for

a

proposition to be

evident, were that proposition justified not only in the external
sense, but in the internal sense as well.

A proposition,

then,

can
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be justified in the external
sense only once it has attained
the level
of reasonableness by which
it could, at that level of
reasonableness,
be an evident proposition.
Let us use a Chisholmian term
in a

slightly non-Chisholmlan way by
saying that at this level of
reasonableness a proposition is "beyond
reasonable doubt." Hence, while
agreeing with Chisholm that
doubt yet not evident.
a

I

a

proposition may be beyond reasonable

would disagree with him in holding
that such

proposition is not less reasonable than an
evident propos ition.5
The second question gets at the heart
of the notion of an

externally justified proposition.

The idea is that such

a

proposition

is highly reasonable for a subject
to believe.

He ought to believe it

insofar as he is following his epistemic duty.

But just what is it

for a proposition to be so reasonable?

In one sense it would seem that all and only
true propositions

are reasonable to believe.

If my epistemic duty is to believe those

propositions which are true, then

I

would seem to be in epistamically

good standing (at least) in believing those propositions.

And if the

external sense of justification refers to those propositions
which

would be in epistemically good standing in believing whether
actually do so or not. then apparently

I

I

am (externally) justified in

I

believing all and only true propositions.

Clearly something has gone wrong.

I

should not be epistemi-

cally required to believe those true propositions of whose truth
have not the faintest suspicion.

And

I

I

should not be called justified

in believing them, even in the external sense.

IVhat

is needed

is a
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recognition that justification, even
in the external sense,
requires
some reference to the individual's
epistemic situation, to his
intellectual abilities and to the
data that is actually available
to
him as opposed to that which is
available in principle, or not at all.

How do we demarcate that evidence
which is available to
given individual in

a

given situation?

I

a

believe that this is one of

many circumstances in which we are
intuitively quite clear about the

applications of

a

concept in the majority of situations
and can thus

be said to understand the concept,

even though at the borderlines of

Its applicability there are many situations
in which it is not clear

whether the concept applies.
are cases in point.

Concepts such as "bald" and "person"

It seems to me that the concept of

that evidence

which is available to a person follows a similar
pattern.

It is

pretty clear that when Watson bungles the case, and
just can't see the

conclusion that the evidence he has taken in clearly points
to, we

will say that the conclusion is epistemically available

to him,

that

it is reasonable for him to believe and indeed that it
is justified

(externally) for him.

But we will not say that the special theory of

relativity, which he, in 1891 and untrained in physics, couldn't have
had the foggiest notion of, is reasonable for Watson to believe, or

externally justified, for such a theory is not epistemically available
to him.

That there is a distinction to be made between evidence which
is available to a person and propositions which are not epistemically

available should therefore be clear.

But it is not a particularly
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precise distinction.

There will be borderline
cases where It will be
difficult to say whether a certain
proposition Is epistemlcally

available

to a subject,

and hence whether it and
other propositions

are justified for that subject
in the external sense.
It is helpful to give examples
of just how evidence might

proceed from being merely available
and not evident to a subject
to
being actually evident to that
subject.
If my contentions are
correct, this improvement in the
epistemlc status of a proposition
ca n
take place even though no new
empirical evidence has been admitted
and

even though no additional deductive
calculations or other calculations
or reasoning have been undertaken.

This discussion, although it does

take us somewhat into the realm of
the internally justified, does help
us more clearly demarcate the realm
of the externally justified.

Wittgenstein has brought

to philosphers'

attention, though for

quite different reasons, certain phenomena which
we may characterize
as "seeing as" phenomena.
as a duck,

now as a rabbit.

His duck-rabbit drawing^ can be seen now

Even more familiar is the foreground-

background ambiguity in a drawing which allows what is
first (usually)
seen as a vase to be seen as two silhouetted faces when
what was initially seen as foreground is seen as background.
I

believe that a subject’s sudden realization, in such a case,

that what he is looking at can be seen as depicting two faces in

silhouette is a new epistemic condition that cannot be explained by
reference to any additional empirical evidence that has been acquired
nor by reference to any deductions or other reasoning processes under-
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taken by the Individual

.7

If so,

this shows that this feature

distinguishing external from Internal
justification can occur even at
the level of immediate observation.
Concerning this level of immediate
observation, there are,

I

think, examples more typical than
pattern recognition of the distinc-

tion between evidence which is
merely available yet not evident,
hence
externally but not internally justified,
and evidence which is both

available and evident to the individual,
and hence internally
justified as well.

It

is illustrated,

for example,

in those cases

where empirical data is, or is not "noticed,"
and hence is or is not
evident.

Once again this difference will not be
explainable in terms

of more data or inference.

In one such case, a clock’s continual

ticking may cease to be noticed by the subject,
and so cease to be
evident.

This phenomenon itself is brought to our
attention on occa-

sion when a clock stops ticking and we are suddenly
aware of the new

quiet and of the fact that the clock had been ticking.

In some fairly

subliminal sense, then, the sound does, apparently, register
with us.
But it is clear that we often can sit through an evening
in the pre-

sence of a ticking clock or chirping crickets without ever
noticing
these phenomena.

Afterwards, if asked if there had been a clock in

that room, or crickets on that evening, we may be at
to answer.

a

complete loss

In such cases it does not seem at all appropriate to say

it was evident to us that a clock was ticking or that crickets were

chirping.

Thus whatever subliminal awareness there may be, it does

not appear to be sufficient to make these propositions evident.
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This ju ggests that we may mark
the difference between
the
externally and the Internally
justified as the bringing of a
proposition to conscious awareness.

been brought

to

When non-evldent, a proposition
has not

conscious awareness.

When evident, it has been raised

to his level.
I

believe that this does demarcate
the difference when we are

discussing propositions about Immediate
conscious perceptions, but not
when we are discussing other types
of propositions, for such
propositions, it is generally accepted,
may be evident. Indeed known,

even though they are not propositions
which the subject Is at chat
time consciously aware of or considering.
It is, I believe, certainly the case
that all types of

propositions, not just those concerning sensations
and observation,
can take on this dual aspect of being on
the one hand externally

justified yet not evident, and on the other hand
both externally and

internally justified, or evident.

A subject may do all the reasoning

required, and still not "see” that the conclusion
follows.

He may

truly believe, and be aware, that he has promised to
meet Smith in the
local restaurant at

1

P.M. on Tuesday, and also that he is committed

to remaining at home on Tuesday at

1

P.M. to receive a phone call.

He

may believe and be aware that he cannot do both at once, and
he may be

expert in describing the logical relations between the propositions in
question.

But all this information may not yet have come together for

him in a way that makes it evident to him that there is
his schedule.

a conflict

in
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can say, then, that

a

proposition becomes externally

justified for a person when it
acquires that degree of
reasonableness
that marks it as being beyond
reasonable doubt, but that such
a proposition becomes internally
Justified only when it also attains
the status of being evident.

This heightened status does not,
as we have

seen, require the introduction
of any additional evidence or
of new

reasons to believe it.

Hence, the evident is not more
reasonable to

believe than that which is merely
beyond reasonable doubt.
is externally but not

That which

Internally justified may Include both
proposi-

tions pertaining to sensory observation
and propositions of a less

immediate and observational nature.

I

do not believe that

aU

sense-

based propositions are capable of being
externally yet not Internally

evident.

The proposition that

I

am in pain is,

I

believe, necessarily

such that if it is externally justified for
me, it is also Internally

justified for me.
It would thus seem that if one proposition
p externally justi-

fies another proposition q for a person at a time,
then both proposi-

tions are beyond reasonable doubt for that person at
that time (q must

have that status, as noted above, and it seems hardly
likely that
iri

justifying

q,

could have a lower epistemic status than q).

p.

Also, p

is evidence available to the person and that person must
have the abi-

lity to conclude that

q

from

p.

Is this all that is required?

for p and q must stand in some appropriate epistemic relation.
not just that p and q are both beyond reasonable doubt.

that p in some sense makes q beyond reasonable doubt.

It

No,

It's

is rather

It constitutes
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evidence for

Exactly how this condition
Is spelled out depends
on

one's theory of justification.

A probabilistic analysis
might say

that p makes q probable to a
specified degree.

One might also attempt

a subjunctive conditional
or a causal analysis.

It Is beyond the

scope of the present work to
develop a theory of justification.

Ueu

of such an analysis,

In

we must rely on the Intuitive
notion that

constitutes a good reason for accepting

q,

p

or that p makes q very

likely.

Where p is not a basic proposition,
we can also say that
externally justified for

S at

t

If and only If there Is some
q such

that q externally justifies
p for

Although

I

p Is

S

at t.

have here given a sketch of the concept
of external

justification rather than

a fully

developed theory, it is to be hoped

that what has been said is sufficient for
the purpose of defining

basic propositions.

It is to that project

that

I

now return.

The Definition of Basic Propositions

have attempted to show that the Cornman-Pastin type
approach

I

to defining basic propositions is successful only if
justification is

understood in the internal sense.

Our task, however,

basic propositions in the externally justified sense.

is to define

To accomplish

this it seems to be preferable to turn from the Cornman-Pastin

approach to the approach presented by Roderick Chisholm in Theory of

Knowledge

.

Chisholm's account of a basic or "self —presenting propo"

sition is as follows:^
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DBl:

Bpst =df Tpt & D(Tpt

->

Epst)

That is, to say p is basic is
to say it is true and
that necessarily
if It

is

true then it is evident.

While not like the "structurar

definitions of the previous approach.
Chisholm's definition does
appear to offer an approach that
can be acceptable to the
Cartesian
foundatlonallst at least. For the Idea
is that the mere truth of
p is
enough to make it evident, l.e.
it is immediately evident and
does not
require Intervening propositions or
eplstemlc stages in order that

it

be evident.

However, Chisholm's DBl in Itself will
not do, if the distinction between the externally and the
Internally justified is on the

right track.

DBl Includes the concept of the evident,
which is

appropriate to the internal, not the external,
concept of
justification.
justified.

"Externally justified" need not mean indirectly

It need only mean justified in the sense
of being beyond

reasonable doubt, as opposed to actually being evident.

Hence it

appears that we can appropriately modify DBl to:
DB2:

Bpst =df Tpt

&

DClpt

Rpst)

where R means "beyond reasonable doubt."
DB2 shall be understood as restricted to empirical

propositions.

In general,

I

am concerned here with the justification

structure of empirical propositions, rather than with that of logical
or analytic truths.

According to DB2, propositions entailed by basic propositions

will be basic, since they will be beyond reasonable doubt if the
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entailing propositions are.

(This will be so at least
when the

entailing relation Is a simple
and obvious one, e.g., the
relation
between p S q and p.
In a more complex case.
It may not be eplstanlcally available to a person
that one proposition entails
another. The
present discussion assumes a
relatively simple entailing relation
that
is

eplstemlcally available to the subject.)

Given DB2, a proposition

entailed by a basic proposition
can be beyond reasonable doubt,
and
hence basic, even if the subject
has not reflected on it or considered
that It Is entailed by another
proposition.

Hut this result is in

line with the fact that DB2 Is based
on the concept of external

justification.

This requires only that

a

proposition be beyond reaso-

nable doubt for the subject, and not that
It be considered by or evldent to him.
I

believe that one can distinguish "primary"
from "secondary-

basic propositions in this context, and define
a primary basic propo-

sition as one which is necessarily such that if
it is beyond reasonable doubt, then it is evident.

Secondary basic propositions,

then

would be, roughly, those which are entailed by primary
basic
propositions.

(Compare Chisholm's distinction in Theory of Knowledge

between the "self-presenting" and the "directly evident,"
1977,
22-24.)

However,

I

pp.

will not propose this as a formal definition.

Such a definition would depend on the concepts of the evident
and the

internally justified, which have been little discussed here.
It might be objected against DB2 that a perceptual proposition

which ought to be basic, such as that

S

is in pain, might be true but
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not beyond reasonable doubt
for S because S Is a child
who has not yet
learned a language and thus
does not understand the
concept of pain.
I a. not sure that
this Is a correct objection.
It ^y be that so„e
simple perceptual propositions
can be beyond reasonable
doubt for a

person even If that person does
not understand the concepts
contained
In the proposition In question.

Perhaps basic sensory evidence
Is

available even to a preconceptual
child.
sight a plausible contention; however,

obviously false.

I

I

This may not seem at first
am not convinced that It Is

will not try to argue that It Is
true, but

I

will

discuss In later chapters points that
have some bearing on this
issue
If the objection is correct,
however,

it is a relatively

simple matter to revise to:
DB3:

Bpst =df Tpt

&

Uspt

&

D[(Tpt

&

Uspt>>Rpst]

where U means "understands."

Although the difference is relatively minor, DB2
and DB3 cannot both be right.

Since DB2 is simpler, and since, as

I

believe,

nothing significant within the scope of this work
turns on the issue

between DB2 and DB3,

I

prefer to use DB2 in subsequent discussion.

must be recognized that it may ultimately be necessary
I

a

to move

It

to DB3.

believe, then, that for our purposes DB2 is satisfactory
as

definition of basic propositions.

How successful is this definition in meeting the criteria
adequacy noted at the beginning of Chapter I?
first two criteria quite well.

It appears

of

to meet the

The terms of the definiens are either
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wen

understood or defined (for
Chlshol.'s own definition of
"beyond
reasonable doubt" cf Chisholm,
1977, p. 7), so It should
allow us to
clearly distinguish basic
propositions from nonbaslc ones.
It also
.

helps us understand the concept
of basicness.

We see that a proposi-

tion Is basic because It Is an
Immediately reasonable one.

rather than its relations

to or

Its truth

,

dependency upon other propositions.
Is

enough to guarantee Its reasonableness.

This does seem to capture the

foundatlonallsts' notion of basic
propositions as the starting point
for knowledge, as propositions
which (because they are beyond
reasonable doubt) can justify other
propositions but which (because their
truth Is sufficient for their being
justified) do not require positing

further propositions which justify them
in turn.
It is only partially successful in
meeting the third

criterion— compatibility with foundationalists
what to count as basic propositions.

’

differing views about

The definition is certainly

broad enough to include those foundationalists
who deny that basics

are certain or incorrigible, hence it is
preferable in that regard to
the definitions of Lehrer et al., which seemed
to pose inappropriate

or irrelevant conditions that did not appear
essential to a definition
of basic propositions.

(At the same time,

the definition does not

exclude those foundationalist who do hold basics to be certain,
since
a

certain proposition is

a

fortiori beyond reasonable doubt.)

However, DB2 may be incompatible with some external world
versions of
f ounda t

ionali sm

.

Such foundationalists who hold that propositions

such as that expressed by "Moore has two hands" can be basic for

a
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person would not be able

accept DB2.

to

For such a proposition
™ay be

true but not at all reasonable
tor a person who does not
know Moore.

However, It does not appear
that

would have to reject HB2.

e;^

external world toundatlonallst

Many .Ight deny that the
above proposition

about Moore Is basic, and Insist
that what is basic is a
proposition
such as that expressed by "I
see Moore's two hands." And
that, they

might say,

such that whenever It Is true
It Is beyond reasonable

doubt for the Individual In
question.

I

an.

Inclined to think the

latter claim is Incorrect, but
that Is because

foundatlonallst.

I

am a Cartesian

Given the sorts of arguments that
external world

foundatlonallsts direct against Cartesian
foundatlonallsts. It would
seem that many of the former
foundatlonallsts would agree that the

proposition expressed by

"I

see Moore's two hands" fulfills the
con-

ditions of DB2.
So the exclusion of some foundationali
sts is a limited one,

and perhaps an inevitable one given the
tension already noted between
the first criterion and the third.

Nevertheless it does prevent me

from saying that DB2 is a definition that is
perfectly adequate to all
forms of foundatlonalism, and this is disappointing
insofar as

ray

task

has been to give a general characterization of
foundatlonalism that is

adequate to all its varieties.

On the other hand, insofar as

ray

is to clarify and defend a specifically Cartesian form
of

foundatlonalism,

I

believe that the preliminary goal has been

accomplished, for it seems

to

me that DB2 is an entirely adequate

definition for the Cartesian foundatlonallst.

task
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And insofar as this chapter
has not been entirely
adequate to
so.e versions of foundatlonalls™.
that deficiency can perhaps
be «de
up in part by discussing
and further clarifying
*at the various fonts
and varieties of foundatlonallsm
are.
That Is the topic of the next

chapter.
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Goldman,
What is Justified
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igasons and Knowledge, (1981). Goldman's
work
Is
s not
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useful for our purposes, because
he does not, in his
distinguish the two senses of justification
that are my
p imary concern here.
On Swain's recent work, see note
4 below.
Justification" (1976) is concerned with
exnlain^nri"
explaining how beliefs can be justified
on the basis of evidence.
In
Contextualist Theory of Epistemic Justification"
(1978) he develops
^
alternative to coherentitl ThT""
h
?
tism
and foundationalism.
His application of the concept of
justiflto contextualism parallels the
applications to coherentlsm and
In
to foundationalism noted above.
*

’

2x discuss a few paragraphs farther on
the Wittgensteinean
objection that this hypothesis— that Holmes
and Watson have the same
evidence is incoherent.

—

2
This objection has been suggested in conversation
with philosophers at the University of New Hampshire. I
have not seen a
suggestion in print that there is such an Incoherence,
and I am not
sure exactly what path a development of this
suggestion would take,
but it would seem to be based on comments of
Wittgenstein and Malcolm,
regarding difficulties surrounding the concept "the same."
See
Wittgenstein (1972, numbers 215-216, pp. 84-85; number
350, p. Ill)
Malcolm (1962, pp. 78-79).
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an Object
obiec?°'of
or natter’
pattern is seen now as one thing,
now as another
tsIL
Wlttgenstelnean "seeing as" phenomenon
(discussed
discussed in the text below) and
thus to have some bearing on
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distinction. But Smith does not note
suL”

S

Distinctions between types of
justification have arisen in
several discussions of the Gettier
problem.
None of these however
appear to be equivalent to our
distinction. Dreher (197l)’makrn
distinction between being justified in
believing" and "believing on
good grounds
(Dreher, 1974, p. 438).
Roughly, "the former can7ccur
when a subject has evidence that is
in fact false, the latter when the
evidence is true (cf. ibid., p. 432).
This is not our distinc^oL
I
am not concerned with whether what
is justified, or the justifying
false.
Lycan (1977), Lehrer and Paxson
(1969),
91970), and Harman (1973, Chapter
9), are concerned with, in
Lycan s terminology, "evidence one does not
possess." The concern
here is with otherwise justified belief
that is "undermined" by the
existence of evidence which the subject is
completely unaware of.
ese discussions presuppose, without
delineating, some distinction
between evidence one has in hand and evidence
for a contrary view
where the latter evidence is totally unknown
to the subject.
These
discussions appear to have in mind the distinction
noted later on in
the present chapter between evidence which
is available to a subject
and evidence which is not available, rather
than our more complex
distinction between the internally and the externally
justified.
The early causal analyses of justification by
Swain (1972,
1978) and Goldman (1967) do not appear to make our distinction,
although as noted above Swain's new account (1981) does appear
’to give
conditions for justification in our internalist sense.
Bonjour (1980) discusses "externalist theories of empirical
knowledge in terms that make clear that he has in mind something
quite close to our concept of external justification (cf. Bonjour,
1980, p. 55).
He also contrasts his externallsm with another concept
of justification which he does not spell out at all, but one
suspects
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to be 35
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The
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categories are artificial, and there will
inevitably be propositions
whose precise epistemic status will be
difficult to deteLiL.
^Cf. Wittgenstein (1972, p. 194).
the subject is told "These are the
rabbit's ears,"
or "TV,-!
This is the nose of a silhouetted figure,"
he may still not see
the new pattern.
The subject’s new realization is not
reducible to
new factual knowledge such as could be
pointed out in this way.
8 Cf.
9

Chapter V
Awareness

Chisholm (1977,

p.

22).

Originally labelled D2

.

1

Cf., e.g.. Chapter IV, "Basics and Background
Knowledge,"
"Defending the Given Without the Thesis of Nonpr
opos itional
Chapter VII, "EP4 and the Understanding of Concepts."
,

,

chapter III
WHAT IS FOUNDATIONAHSM?

HI; THE VARIETIES

OF FOUNDATIONAL ISM

some varieties of foundatlonallsm
are dlstlr^ulshed and
discussed, with special emphasis
on Cartesian foundatlonallsm.
The
philosophical motivations behind
Cartesian foundatlonallsm are

detailed, and an argument against
coherentlsm Is briefly noted.
The Need to Distinguish Different
Types of Foundatlonallsm

The essential tenets of foundational
ism, stated at the

beginning of Chapter

I,

provide only a bare sketch of a
theory—

sketch which working foundationalists
often flesh out with additional
tenets considered important adjuncts
to any "interesting" foun-

dationalist theory.
about the

^ntent

The essential tenets say nothing,
for example,

of basic propositions;

but a Cartesian

foundationalist will insist that basic propositions
can only be about
a

subject's mental states.
It is important to recognize such
"nonessential" foun-

dationalist tenets, not only because they are
considered important
aspects of foundatlonallsm by the formulators of
such theories, but
also because advocates of foundatlonallsm and their
critics alike

often misunderstand these varieties of foundatlonallsm
and their relationships to one another.

An advocate might fail to appreciate that
74
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in defending fhe existence
of basic propositions
he has done nothing
to enhance the
reasonableness of the specifically
Cartesian foun-

datlonallsm he thinks he has
established.

A critic of

foundatlonallsm, In attacking
phenomenalism, Carteslanlsm,
Iterative
epistemological principles, or
other views often associated
with
foundatlonallsm, might mistakenly
think he has refuted
foundatlonallsm
as such when he has said
nothing against Its essential
tenets.l And
both advocates and critics
of foundatlonallsm have,

I believe, failed
to realize with respect
to certain aspects of
foundatlonallsm that

there are additional alternatives
to those often thought to
be

exhaustive.

Hence the value of a systematic
classification not only

of foundatlonallst theories
that harc

^

proposed but also of some

of the more Important and
distinctive of those that could be
proposed.

Some Varieties of Foundatlonallsm
in Outline Form

Perhaps the clearest way

to

proceed is to outline some of the

most important varieties of foundationalism.

This outline will serve

as a handy reference for the more detailed
discussion of these

varieties in the following sections.
These variations on foundationalism fall into two
main
classes, related to the two essential tenets of
foundationalism.
First, different foundationalist theories put different
constraints on
the nature of basic propositions.

Second, there are different ways of

construing the relation between basic and nonbasic propositions.
The outline is as follows:
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I.

Constraints on nature of basic
propositions.
A.

B.

Content
1

.

2

.

Limited to propositions about
subjective mental states
Include external world
propositions

Epistemlc status
!•

Issue of
Must
b.
Need
Issue of
a.
Must
b.
Need
a.

2.

C.

2.

2.

Proposition can be basic only if subject
believes that
proposition
No such requirement imposed

Context dependence
1.
2.

II.

"p is basic" must itself
be basic
p is basic
need not be basic

Belief status
1.

E.

incorrigibility
be incorrigible
not be incorrigible

Iteration" requirements
1-

D.

certainty
be certain
not be certain

Impossible for a basic proposition to function
in different context as nonbasic
Possible
a.
Context dependency based only on different
subjects'
^LLfsi^ant relations to given proposition
b.
Context dependency based on major social,
cultural, or
conceptual change that makes different class of
propositions basic

Specifics concerning the relation between basics and
nonbasics
A.

Logical relationships (sources of justification of
nonbasics)
1.
2.

B.

Inductive and deductive only
Others besides these, e.g. basics justify nonbasics via
synthetic a_ priori epistemlc principles

Phenomenalist relationships
1.

Phenomenalism: nonbasics are logical constructs from sense
data
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C.

Denial of this (various
versions* direct realism,
scientific realism, etc.)

.

Extent of justification
1

.

2

.

Complete justification of
nonbasics by basics
rartial justification
for

JustU?cat"i"“°''*
efore

I

additional source of

proceed to discuss in detail
the varieties of foun-

datlonallsm here outlined, a few
general remarks are in order
on this
system of classification.
First,

the variants on foundationalism
outlined here are by no

means exhaustive.

alternatives.

I

have only meant to identify some
central

For example, other types of
foundationalism are

possible besides those listed as lAl and
IA2 (basics as restricted

to

subjective mental states versus basics as
including external world
propositions).

One might hold that only theoretical
scientific propo-

sitions can be basic.

It is not clear that anyone holds

this view,

but it can qualify structurally as a
version of foundationalism in

that it can meet the two essential tenets
of foundationalism.

Also,

there may well be other major categories (i.e.
at the level of

generality represented by the capital letters in the
outline) not
Included above which identify other ways in which
specific foun-

dationalist theories may differ.

And there will of course be

variations even within the most specific variants
outlined.

I

have here

For example, within category lAl, there may be various
ways
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o£ Identifying those
subjective mental states
considered to be basic.

Second, vAlle most of the
specific alternatives listed
within
a general category are
mutually exclusive (e.g. Id
and IC2: either
P Is basic" must Itself be basic
or It is not necessary
that It be
basic),

there are not very many ways
In which a commitment to
one specific type of foundatlonallsm
In a general category commits
one to
another specific type of foundatlonallsm
In a different general

category.

For example, a commitment to
a foundatlonallsm that

restricts basics to subjective
mental states (category

U)

does not

commit one to the view that basic
propositions are certain or Incorrigible (category IC) or to the view
that phenomenalism explains the

relation between basics and nonbasics
(category IIB).

In Chapter IV

I

will attempt to show in some detail that
this is the case.
For the present,

I

shall simply note that if indeed commitment

within one of the categories of the above
outline does not require
commitment within another category, then even
within the limits of
this outline there are potentially a large
number of theoretically

distinct varieties of foundationalism.

Two founds tionalists who agree

in restricting basic propositions to those about
subjective mental

states might disagree as to whether basics must be
certain, and so

advocate slightly different versions of foundationalism.

Or they may

also agree that basics must be certain, but disagree as
to whether a

basic proposition is one that is believed by the subject, and
so on.
In this way,

generated

schools within schools of foundationalism can be
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A plethora of logically
distinct versions of
foundatlonalls.
does indeed ^he It
difficult for the critic to
sweep away foun-

datlonallsm In a single stroke.
part,

But the foundatlonallst,

for his

is

faced with the task of
distinguishing his theory fr„n
the
other .yrlad posslhllltles.
He ^y fmd that the
specific coe^t.ents
which render his version of
foundatlonallsm distinctive and

interesting

h^

been challenged, and that
alternatives «,y be closer
to pure coherentism than
he would wish.

Relative Importance of These
Categories
for the Present Work

My main concern here is to defend
the possibility

dationalism of type

lAl— that

is,

I

This type of

will refer to as Cartesian
foundatlonallsm.

should note that Cartesian foundatlonallsm
as

I

Descartes' theory differs from what

foundatlonallsm in several important respects.

I

discuss and defend it

IS not a historically accurate
representation of Descartes'

knowledge.

a foun-

a foundatlonallsm which
limits basic

propositions to those about subjective
mental states.

foundatlonallsm

of

I

theory of

am calling Cartesian

Descartes apparently

held that the propositions that served as
his starting point were

absolutely certain. 3

He seemed to assume that the derived or
nonbasic

propositions were related by logical deduction to the
initial or basic

propositions.^

Most Importantly, Descartes did not use propositions

about sensory impressions as the direct bases for
specific propositions about the external world.

Rather he used the proposition that
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he existed, togethet
with Innate truths of
reason revealed by the
natural light, to deduce
the existence of God.
thence, again

deductively,

to

general and then ultimately
to singular truths
about
the external world.

Nonetheless, the term

Cartesian" Is not entirely
out of line

here.

Descartes did elaborate a
recognizably foundatlonallst
theory.
And his Initial skepticism
about the external world
and consequent
turn to subjective mental
states Is diametrically
opposed to the
external world foundatlonallsm
that Is the chief alternative
In this
category.
In addition to the Cartesian
foundationalist tenet lAl,

I

accept tenets IBla (basics as
certain), IC2 (no iteration
requirement), ID2 (no belief
requirement), IE2a (limited context

dependency),

HA2 (justification

and deduction),

relations not limited to induction

IIB2 (rejection of phenomenalism
and sense data), and

IIC2b (role for coherence relations).
concerned to defend these tenets.

But with one exception

That is,

I

I

am not

would not regard a great

deal of consequence to have been lost
should one or more of these

tenets prove to be Incorrect (unless of
course this could be shown to

entail the incorrectness of lAl as well).

The exception is IE2a.

This tenet is an important part of any
foundationalist theory
find of interest and worth defending.

I

In conjunction with lAl,

would
it

forms the theory that basic propositions are
necessarily restricted to
the class of subjective mental states.

allows different classes of propositions

The opposing doctrine, IE2b,
to

become basic as a result
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Of social or linguistic
change.

1

do not believe the class
of basic

propositions Is vulnerable to
such change, and It seems
to me that
foundatlonallsm as traditionally
conceived would be seriously
compromised were basic propositions
shown to be so vulnerable.
This Issue
Is discussed in the
"Conceptual Change" sections
of chapter IV.
The project of taking seriously
and defending

datlonallsm that combines tenets
lAl and IE2a
least Interesting and controversial.

Is,

a

foun-

If nothing else,

at

Coherentlsm became

a respectable
and frequently discussed theory
within modern analytic philosophy

after the demise of logical
posltlvlsm.6

while

would doubt that a

1

majority of analytic philosophers
today would class themselves
as
coherentists, it .ay well be that a
n^jorlty do now regard coherentist
and other critics of foundationalism
as having levelled decisive
criticisms against foundationalism as
traditionally conceived.

within about the last five years, there
has been

a

Recently,

perception that

these criticisms do not address more
moderate, less traditional versions of foundationalism. 7

Perhaps as a result, there has been
a ten-

dency to move away from both pure coherentlsm
and traditional

foundationalism, toward these more moderate forms
of
foundationalism. 8
in favor of IE2b,

Specifically, it has become popular to reject IE2a
the view that what are to be taken as the
foun-

dations of knowledge depend on the cultural or
linguistic context, and
can vary from place to place or time to time.

For other reasons,

James Cornman and John Pollock, who have been quite
sympathetic to

traditional foundationalism, have more recently come to prefer
more
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moderate theories that combine
foundatlonalist and coherentist
elements.9 Chisholm Is perhaps
the only prominent
contatporary philosopher who advocates one of
the more traditional forms
of
f ounda t ional i

sm • ^ ^

Xn general,
seneral
t-hot-a seems
there
to be a perception that
-l

the "extremes" on the
foundatlonallst-coherentlst spectrum are
very

likely If not surely false, and
that the truth Is to be found

somewhere in the middle.
This is an appealing perception,
but

I

believe that the

doctrine of moderation in all things
is questionable if it is
meant to
apply to epistemology. Perhaps
because of its appeal as a reasonable
compromise, the move to the moderates'
bandwagon is proceeding too
hastily, abandoning more traditional
foundatlonalist views—

specifically, views which accept tenets lAl
and IE2a— before they have

even been seriously challenged.

Foundationalism of the more tradi-

tional variety ought not at this stage to
be rejected, but it ought to
be regarded as a viable theory on a par
with other current theories

about the structure of epistemic justification.

what

I

This,

at any rate,

is

hope to go some way toward showing.
In the following sections

I

will briefly describe some of the

Issues Involved within each of the categories as outlined
and state

their apparent relation to Cartesian foundationalism.

with my emphasis on Cartesian foundationalism,

I

Then,

in accord

will say more about

this doctrine, specifically about the motivations for accepting
and

defending it.

The important subsidiary doctrine that the status of

Cartesian propositions as basic is not vulnerable

to socio— linguistic
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change will be discussed, as
noted above. In Chapter IV.
In explaining the outlined
categories,

I

am primarily con-

cerned vrith the theoretical
distinctions rather than with
determining
which If any philosophers have
actually held the views
categorised.
Some of the views categorised
are. as I have already
noted, those that
could be rather than have been
proposed. Also, some of the
views are
ideal types >*lch may or may not
fit well the often more complex
views
of specific philosophers.

However, wherever possible

I

shall try In

the notes to match these views
as categorized vrtth those of
actual

philosophers

——2£^te slan

and External World Foundatlonalism

The Cartesian variant of foundationalism
(lAl) asserts that
basic propositions are limited to those
about a subject's mental
states.

It does not say that

^

proposition about a subject's mental

states must be basic for that subject.

Nor does it say that any such

proposition must be potentially basic.

It says

proposition will be taken from this category

of

only that any basic

subjective mental

propositions
What constitutes a proposition that is about a
subject's mental states?

These are propositions about the subject's sensations,

emotions, thoughts, beliefs, memories, and intentions.

They must not

be confused with statements about the world external to
the

subject.

Thus,

the proposition expressed by "S sees a red apple"

might be taken to be about S's subjective mental state on the grounds
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that seeing Is a subjective
mental state.

Howevet. seeing, when It
Is

successful, has to be more than
a subjective mental
state.
As the
above sentence Is usually
understood (and as we will
understand it)
plies that there Is a red
apple which S observes.
Thus, It is as
much about the world external
to S as It Is about S's
mental states or
processes
In order to isolate the purely
subjective from the "mixed-

propositions we must restrict the class
of subjective mental
propositions to those which have no direct
implications about the state of
things external to S.
Such propositions can be expressed
in terms of
beliefs ("S believes he is looking
at a red apple"), how

something ("S takes there to be
appeared

to

a red

S

takes

apple before him"), how

S

is

("S is appeared to redly," or "S
is appeared to

red-apple-ly"), and in other ways ("S is
experiencing red-apple sense
data,
etc

.

"S's visual data present him with a
red-apple-appearance,"

)

The possibility of speaking in some such way
as this of purely

subjective experience presupposes that

a

distinction can be made bet-

ween what is given in experience and the external
world.

This possi-

bility has been challenged by those who hold that
it is Impossible in

principle to mark off

a

realm of the purely subjective, or that the

notion of the given in experience is incoherent.

These views will be

discussed in Chapter V.

On the external world account (IA2), propositions about the
external world, for example that expressed by

"I

see an apple," do not
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themselves require any further
Justification.
justified.

If one were to ask,

They are directly

"What Justifies the
proposition that

you see an apple?" the only
response could be. "Nothing
Justifies
except the fact that I
see an apple. "H

it,

^

IB

Eplstemic Status of Basi cs

Many criticisms of foundationalism
are based on the view that
no propositions, even those
about one’s

experiences, are incorrigible,

or that the propositions that
the Cartesian foundatlonalist
takes to
be basic cannot be epistemically
certain for the subject in question.

Such criticisms implicitly assume
that if a proposition is to be
basic, it must be incorrigible or
epistemically certain.

Sometimes,

definitions of these eplstemic values are
given, sometimes not.

Certainty is defined in a variety of ways.

Incorrigibility is often

defined in terms of the impossibility of
being mistaken. ^2

Ultimately, there may be no significant
difference between these
terms.

In any case, what never seems to be
recognized as needful is a

demonstration of why foundationalism. Cartesian or
otherwise, must be
committed to the view that basics have the high
eplstemic status in
question.

Granted, any form of foundationalism will have to hold
that

basic propositions are justified (in one or both senses)
and hence
that they have some positive eplstemic value.
on the surface at least,

But there is nothing,

that appears to logically require that basics

have the ultimate or highest eplstemic status, although this is
often

attributed to them.
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What Is necessary, if
Cartesian foundational Ism
Is to be
refuted by the certainty Issue.
Is 1) a definition of
certainty (or
incorrigibility, depending on td,lch
term Is being used to
attack foundatlonallsm), 2) a demonstration
that Cartesian foundatlonallsm
Is
committed to Its basic propositions
being certain (Incorrigible),
and
3) a demonstration that these
basic propositions are not
after all

certain (Incorrigible) In the sense
defined.

1

„iu

consider In

Chapter IV whether any critic of
foundatlonallsm has succeeded in
establishing these points.

IC

Iteration" Requirements

Another criticism of foundationalism
sometimes made is based
on the fact that the definitions of
basic proposition, the arguments

given for the existence of basic propositions,
the epistemic principles used to state the existence of basic
propositions or the ways
in which they are used to justify nonbasic
propositions do not them-

selves appear to be immediately justified.

The definitions,

arguments, and principles used by the foundationalist
are almost
w

always complicated and derivative, as far from being
directly evident
as the propositions of any modern analytical theory
in philosophy.

These facts seem, to many critics,

foundationalism.

to pose a

problem for

However, the problem turns out to apply only to what

William Alston has called "iterative foundational! sm"

This sort of

foundationalism requires that the proposition expressed by "p is
basic proposition" itself be a basic proposition.

Or perhaps it

a
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requires that the eplstemlc
arguments or principles of
the foundaticnallst be basic. It Is
difficult to tell, because
so tar as I
can determine, no foundatlonallst
explicitly states or Is clearly
commltted to Iterative foundational
Ism. 15 The use of
Iterative toun-

datlonallsm by these critics, and
Its relation to Cartesian
foundational Ism, are topics discussed
In Chapter IV.
ID

— Belief

Status

Foundatlonallst theories may differ
according

to whether they
Insist that In order for a
proposition to be basic for a subject,
It

must be believed by that subject.
basics must be believed.

Most accounts seem to hold that

An alternative account, and the
one which

I

discuss In Chapter VII as the most
plausible account, holds that a
basic proposition need only be true of
a subject, not believed by him.

On this account. It Is not only what one
believes that Is basic, but
also what one experiences.

(Strictly:

one experiences that would be basic.)

It Is propositions about what

Other non-belief accounts of

basics could be developed, but It Is the
experience-based account

which

I

take to be the most plai^slble and which

I

concentrate on.

Thus, criticism which held that basic propositions
cannot con-

sist of what Is believed by a subject would not touch
that variety of

foundatlonallsm which holds that basic propositions state

a

subject's

experiences without requiring that he believe these propositions

to be

true.^^
Both variants here are,

I

believe, compatible with Cartesian
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foundationalism.

The Cartesian may hold
that a subject’s
experiences

alone, independent!, of
his beliefs about the.,

which are basic for that
person.

fo™

the propositions

Other Cartesians .ay
insist that

propositions about the subject's
experiences do not becce
basic
unless and until the subject
believes the. to be true.
The

tt,o

variants would collapse into
one belief-based sche.e

if the following thesis
were true:
N:

Necessarily, if s has sensory
experience e. Chen
elieves that he has sensory
experience e.

S

This so-called naturalistic
theory of belief, derived fro.
Hu.e.l7
would not allow a proposition
to be basic in the Cartesian
sense

without also being believed.
(ID2) would not be viable.
in Chapter VII.

If

this were so. then the second
variant

These matters will be discussed
.ore fully

Here we need only note that there
appears to be

nothing within Cartesian Foundationalism
as such, in dependent of thesis N,

that is incompatible with either IDl
or ID2

IE

Context Dependence

Under what conditions is

a

proposition basic?

tion that is basic be in some contexts
nonbasic?

Can a proposi-

To deny this is to

affirm one version of foundationalism within
the above category.
a

Such

foundationalism would insist that the proposition
expressed by "It

seems to

S

that there is something red before him," for
example, must

be a basic proposition in all contexts.

To this rather inflexible foundationalism one may
compare

a
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mcr. flexible foundatlonallsm
(IE2a) which would still
Insist that all
basic propositions will
always he fro. a certain
general class of
propositions, e.g., the class
of subjective propositions
tor the

Cartesian foundatlonallst.

But It would also hold
that these proposl-

may be basic In some contexts,
nonbasic in others, depending
on
the eplste.lc conditions of
the .o.ent,
while recognizing, of course,
that the proposition expressed
by "It seems to S that
there Is

something red before him" can be
a basic proposition for
S, this version Of foundatlonallsm also
recognizes that the same proposition
may
be nonbasic for person T.

for T by S

s

For example. It may be Indirectly
justified

verbal report about his experiences.

Nevertheless, any

proposition that can ever be basic Is
drawn from a limited, unchanging
category, e.g. that of subjective
propositions about a person’s
experiences.

It

is this more flexible alternative
which I would

regard as the most plausible and with
which the theory discussed in

Chapter VII is compatible.
The third theory represented under heading
IE in the outline
IS one which holds that even the categories
from which basic proposi-

tions may be drawn are variable (IE2b).

In principle,

there is one

sub-version of this alternative which would hold that
at one given
time and place, basic propositions may be drawn from
different types,

depending on the epistemic context.

For example, both external world

and subjective propositions may be basic for the same
or different

persons at a given time, depending on the epistemic context.

Annis is the only philosopher

I

David

am aware of who may have developed
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such a theory

(

cf

.

Annl<?
nnls,

Q 77
1977.

^

^
especially

1

p.

351).

Certainly more
popular and influential
uentlal Is aa different
sub-version of this alternative
which states that what
functions
unccions as a
a hao-i.
basic proposition is
historically or culturally relative
erarive. Wha»y
.
r
What is k
basic
from
one cultural
perspective or historical era
a^y „ot be basic from
another such
perspective. Or perhaps It
Is scientific progress
that requires a
change In the propositions
that are basic for a culture
at a given
stage of scientific development. 18
A major tradition descending
from
(but not including) Kant and
asserting the cultural or
historical

relativity of categories is at
least compatible ulth this
version of
foundatlonallsm, even though this
compatibility is often unrecognized
and even chough in fact It has
generally been assumed that the
theories within this neo-Kantlan
tradition are Incompatible with

foundatlonallsm.

Most likely, those who assume
such an Incom-

patibility have In mind more traditional
versions of foundatlonallsm.
But there is nothing In principle
to keep theories of this

sort from being described as foundational.

They can retain the two

essential tenets of foundatlonallsm and
remain structurally Identical
to a more traditional theory that
accepts variants lAl and IE2a.
'-Ihether they

remain compatible with the spirit of
Cartesian founda-

tlonallsm Is another question.

I

doubt that a Cartesian foundatlon-

alist would feel he was making only minor
concessions if he found

himself forced

to

adopt this "shifting foundations" view.

The

Chlsholmlan theory discussed In Chapter VII of the
present work Is
incompatible with this view Insofar as the eplstemlc
principles there
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discussed are taken to be
universally true rather than
culturally or
historically relative. Nevertheless,
although these two different
types of foundatlonallsm are
Incompatible, from a structural
point of
view they both seem to be
properly described as foundational.

IIA— Logical Relationships
I

turn now from variations
on foundatlonallsm dependent
on

different notions of basic
propositions

to

variations dependent on

different accounts of the relation
between basic propositions and
nonbasic Justified propositions.
The first category to be
discussed
deals with the logical relationships
which might be said to exist between basic and nonbaslc propositions.
The two alternatives I

distinguish within this category are:
first, one which requires a
strict logical relationship-deductive

or induct Ive-be tween basics

and nonbasics .(IIAl), and second, one
which does not require such a

relationship (IU2).

(By an Inductive relationship

I

am referring to

one based on Induction by enumeration:

after a series of observations

one arrives at a probable conclusion.)

According to the first

alternative, a basic proposition must logically
imply (deductively or
inductively) the nonbasic proposition it justifies.

According to the

second alternative, the relation need not be one
of logical

implication.^^
There are,

I

suppose, a variety of ways in which the relation

between basics and nonbasics might be specified according
second alternative.

I

to

the

will mention here only the one discussed in
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Chapter VII.

On this vle„. basics
Justify ncnhaslcs In
accotdanca

with eplste.lc principles.

These principles, taken
to he necessarily

true, state the conditions
under >*lch a basic
proposition Justifies a
nonbaslc one. This "eplstemlc
principles approach" Is based
on that
of Roderick Chisholm.

Cartesian foundatlonallsm Is
compatible with either of these
alternatives. The Cartesian
foundatlonallst might hold that
Che
"objective" world Is a logical
construct from sense data or the
subject's experiences and hence
that a proposition about this
world

can be deductively implied by
a proposition about the
subject's

experiences.

Or he might deny this and
hold that the subject's

experiences Justify external world
propositions because of universally
true eplstemlc principles which
specify the conditions under which

such Justification occurs.

No Incompatibility exists between

Cartesian foundatlonallsm and either
position on the logic of Justlflcation relations.

IIB--Phenomenalist Relationships

Foundationalism is often associated with phenomenalism.

A

recent monograph uses the latter term to describe
all foundationalist
theories.

But phenomenalism is distinct from foundationalism,
and

this distinction ought to be kept clear.

The former is a theory of

perception which holds that propositions about the "external
world"
are logical constructs from sense data or some other
sort of men-

talistic entity.

On this view, statements about one's experience will
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deductively or analytically
entail ordinary stat^ents
about the physical world. A statement
by a subject that he
sees a red apple before
him Just means that he Is
having such and such sensory
experiences, or
that such and such sense data
are presenting themselves
to him.

That foundatlonallsm and
phenomenalism are distinct theories
should be clear. IJhat may not
be clear at this stage
is how a foun-

datlonallst could avoid being a
phenomenallst as well.

In Chapter IV

will try to show not only that
the two theories are distinct,
but
also that they are logically
Independent.
It Is quite possible to
I

accept foundatlonallsm while rejecting
phenomenalism.

Extent of Justification

The last theoretical division

I

shall consider distinguishes

between foundatlonallst theories which hold
that basic propositions
completely justify all nonbaslc justified
propositions (IICl), and
those which assert that nonbasics are justified
only In part by basics
and that some of their justification derives
from other nonbasics
(IIC2).

Theories of the latter type may go on to specify
the extent

or type of justification relations that exist
between basics and non-

basics and between nonbasics and nonbasics.

They may hold, for

example, that basic propositions are necessary but not
sufficient con-

ditions for each nonbaslc proposition being justified (IIC2a).

They

may hold. In addition to this view, that coherence relations
between

nonbaslc propositions provide an additional source
tion to basics propositions

— for

— besides

the rela-

the justification of nonbaslc
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propositions (IIC2b).

The second of the essential
tenets of foun-

datlonallsm only prohibits a
nonbaslc proposition's deriving

M

of

Its justification from
coherence relations or some
other relations
that have nothing to do .rtth
basic propositions.
Basic propositions

must have something to do

>rtth the

justification of

e^^

empirical

proposition.

There Is much that would need

to be

clarified In these

accounts were they to be adequately
developed.

And while It certainly

appears that Cartesian foundatlonallsm
Is compatible with any of
these
alternatives. It may turn out that
admitting coherence relationships
to any extent might have broader
Implications that would require the

Cartesian foundatlonallst to give up
much or all that he felt was

worth defending In his theory.

Criticism has been made along these

lines concerning Chisholm's allowance
of coherence relations In his
theory.

This criticism will be discussed briefly
In Chapter IV.
The Philosophical Motivation Behind
Cartesian Foundationalism

I

have said something about the variety of theories
within the

foundationalist framework.

In the next two chapters I shall attempt

to defend some of these varieties against criticisms
that have been

made in the literature before going on in the two concluding
chapters
to discuss specific theories of Cartesian foundationalism.
it might be asked,

is the motivation for all of

this?

But what,

Given that

I

not going to establish that Cartesian foundationalism is a superior

am

95

theory to

Us

coherentlst and moderate
fonndatlonaist rivals, why
choose this out of such a
wide array of alternatives
to discuss In
detain Something should be said
to motivate the discussion
on which
Che rest of the present
work Is based.
It seems to me entirely
adequate to say simply that
Cartesian

foundatlonallsm, in conjunction
with the view that the class
of basic
propositions Is not relative to
changing cultural or linguistic
conditions (IE2a of the above
outline), Is a theory which
has been
regarded as Important by many
philosophers and which has not
been
seriously challenged by Its critics.
This latter point of course
has
not yet been established, but
If It Is true, as I hope to
show In the
next two chapters, then that In
Itself seems significant to the
debate
on theories of eplstemic justification.
And If In addition It Is
true, as claimed above,

that there has been a recent tendency
to

discount traditional foundatlonallsm
without convincing argument In
favor of more moderate alternatives,
then It would seem that tradltional foundatlonallsm Is worthy of
reconsideration.

This seems to me sufficient justification
for examining the
theory In some detail.

merits of the theory.

It

says nothing, however, about the positive

Short of providing detailed arguments for It,

which Is beyond the scope of the present work,

I

can only briefly men-

tion some general reasons why traditional foundatlonallsm
(more
precisely, Cartesian foundatlonallsm Including tenet
IE2a) might be

considered preferable to Its alternatives.

It Is difficult to be cer-

tain of the reasons why a particular view Is Important to
a
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philosopher, but one can pick
up soma hints from the
work of
Cartesians such as Descartes
himself and Chisholm. These
hints, comblned with reflections on my
own philosophical concerns
as a Cartesian
foundatlonallst, give rise to the
following list of concerns,
each of

»hlch the Cartesian foundatlonallst
Is likely to feel needs
to be
addressed. The major alternatives
to Cartesian foundatlonallsm,
however,

fall to address one or more
of
1) Antl-relatlvlsm.

these concerns.

The concern here Is to maintain
that

there Is a way the world Is that
Is Independent of cultural
beliefs
and expectations, conceptual
schemes, language, and experience.
The

Cartesian foundatlonallst wishes to oppose
the radical relativism
which Insists that there Is no way the
world Is, there are only

culturally or Individually different ways of
perceiving and
conceptualizing
The foundationalist will not, of course,
as an epistemologist,

address directly the metaphysical issue posed
by ontological relati-

vism ("There is no way the world is"), but he will
address epistemolorelativism.

adequate.
another.
is.

)

(

Competing knowledge systems are all equally

It is impossible to evaluate one from the
perspective of

None can be said to objectively reflect the way the
world

He will try to establish that all justified propositions
are

adequately related

to

the actual world and that epistemological sets

of beliefs can be more or less adequate

worse

— epistemlcally

better or

depending on how accurately they reflect the way the world is.
One major problem the Cartesian foundationalist has with both
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coherentism and the more moderate
forms of foundational! sm
that reject
IE2a in favor of IE2b Is
that they at least leave
th^selves open to
form of relativism.
For the coherentist,
propositions are evaluated according to v*ether they
Internally cohere with the
other propositions within a belief systeo,.
How then is one belief
system to be

evaluated with respect to another
equally coherent but quite
different
belief system? It does not
seem to the foundatlonallst
that this
theory ties beliefs down to the
way the world Is In an adequate
manner. As to the "shifting
foundations" theory, this too Is
open to
the same problem.
How are we to evaluate the
different foundational
belief structures of different
cultures or different historical
eras?
Some advocates of these anti-Cartesian
theories explicitly

affirm relativism or strongly imply it.

Others, who may not have

said anything about relativism as
such, have been interpreted as

relativists .22
2)

Taking skepticism seriously.

dationalist takes skepticism as

a

The Cartesian foun-

challenge to be met.

That we have

knowledge is a proposition which, at least at
some point, needs
questioned and, if possible, explained and justified.

to be

It is

legitimate, it seems to me, to assume that skepticism
is false, as
long as one also attempts to explain how knowledge
is attained, and as
long as one holds skepticism as ultimately true if
such explanations

turn out to be unsatisfactory.
3)

problematic.

Taking the relation between experience and reality to be

Given my experiences, how do

I

know they reflect accura-
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tely a world external to
me?

reflected here;

I

Descartes’ specific concerns
are

could be dreaming.

I

could be deceived by an

evil genius, or made to
have these experiences by
sophisticated

neurophysiological techniques,

mat

eplstemlc principles,

If any, can
get me from propositions
about my experiences to
propositions stating
that I am Justified In believing
some proposition about the
external
world? The Cartesian founds
tlonallst will try to set up a
plausible

justificatory relationship between
propositions about one's experiences and chose about the external
world, taken as an Independent
and

objective world which Is the object
of our knowledge.
These last two concerns explain the
Cartesian foundatlonalist's dissatisfaction with external
world foundatlonallsm.

It does

not seem to the Cartesian foundatlonallst
that It Is appropriate, in

light of the skeptical hypotheses
generated by Descartes and others,
to simply Ignore the possibility
of skepticism and Insist that we do

have unproblematic knowledge of the ordinary
things we think we know.

Even If skepticism Is ultimately rejected, a
philosophical problem has
been posed, and a response to It that Includes
an explanation of why

skepticism does not follow seems required.
The reason the Cartesian foundationalist believes we
must

retreat from asserting that we have unproblematic, immediately
justified knowledge of ordinary external world propositions,
and that
it 1^

pemissible

to assert

that we have at least immediate justifica-

tion (if not knowledge) about our experiences is that propositions

about the external world, but not those about our experiences, are
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vulnerable to the skeptical
hypotheses 23
.

A word should be said
here.

In discussing motivations
for

Cartesian foundatlonallsm. about
the regress problem, which
Is taken
to be an Important argument
for foundatlonailsm.
The argument,

reduced to

Us

simplest form. Is that there
must be basic

proposltlons-unjustlfled justlf lers-because
otherwise an Infinite
regress is generated.

Such a regress
raoroco is
^
j
Ducn
absurd,
hence there must be
i

some end to the chain of
justification. 2^
I

do not find this argument
compelling.

It seems to me to

generate as many puzzles, and to be
ultimately as unresolvable, as
cosmological arguments based on the
supposed absurdity of an infinite
causal chain of events.

Cartesian foundational ism, or at least
some

form of foundationalism, may well be
the most adequate theory we have
about the nature of epistemic justification.

But I would be very

surprised if some version of the regress
argument ever proved this.
It should be recognized that arguments for
foundationalism can come

from other sources than the regress problem.

What’s Wrong with Coherentism?

As a final way of explaining the motivation behind
Cartesian

foundationalism,

shall quote a recent and, it seems to me, plausible

I

objection to coherentism.
the debate.

This does not, of course, close the door on

There may be a response to the objection, and in any case

there are other alternatives to turn to besides Cartesian

foundationalism.

I

am not intending to portray this as a decisive

100

refutation of coherentism. but
simply as a prlma facie
plausible
objection Chat can help explain
why a philosopher might
be motivated
to take foundationalism in
at least some form seriously.

tlon is Ernest Sosa's,

in

The ob jec-

The Raft and the Pyramid"
(1980).

among
Deiiets is open to an objection
belilTs
from alternative coherent
systems or detachment from reality,
depending on one’s
latter perspective the body of
beliefs
s held constant and the
surrounding world is allowed to
varv
P^’^apectlve It Is the surrounding
world
worirthft°T
that is held constant while the
body of beliefs is
allowed to vary.
In either case, according to
the
Justification for
any‘'be^^ef^

“““

Let us sharpen the question before
us as follows.
Is
there reason to think that there is
at least one system B’
a ternative to our actual
system of beliefs B, such that B'
contains a belief X with the following
properties:
in our present nonbelief circumstances
( 1 )
we would
not be justified in having belief X
even if we
accepted along with that belief (as our
total
system of beliefs) the entire belief system
B'
in which it is embedded (no matter how
acceptance
of B' were brought about); and
(il) that is so despite the fact that
belief X coheres
within B at least as fully as does some actual
Jnstified belief of ours within our actual
belief system B (where the justification of
that actual justified belief is alleged by
the
coherentist to derive solely from its coherence
within our actual body of beliefs B)
The coherentist is vulnerable to counterexamples
of this
sort right at the surface of his body of beliefs, where
we
find beliefs with minimal coherence, whose detachment
and
replacement with contrary beliefs would have little effect
on
the coherence of the body.
Thus take my belief that I have a
headache when I do have a splitting headache, and let us suppose that this does cohere within my present body of beliefs.
(Thus I have no reason to doubt my present introspective
beliefs, and so on. And if my belief does not cohere, so much
the worse for coherentism, since my belief is surely
justified.) Here then we have a perfectly justified or
warranted belief. And yet such a belief may well have relevant relations of explanation, logic, or probability with at
most a small set of other beliefs of mine at the time:
say.
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that I am not free of headache,
that I am In pain chat
someone is in pain, and the like.
If so, then an’ea^llv
coherent alternative is not far
to seek.
Let ever^^rinv
the splitting headache^exc^t
for
^
headache
Sth
tne
he belief
£ii:r?hat
that I do
have a headache, the belief
that T
n pain «th the belief that
1 am not in’paln,
thrLurf
hat
someone Is In pain with the belief
that someone Is not in
pain, and so on.
I contend that my resulting
hypotT^ical

n

system of beliefs, and yet my
hypothetical belief that
have a headache would not therefore
be justified.
(Sosa,

1980, pp.

I

do

18-19)
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Notes to Chapter III
^In Chapter IV I shall
be primarily concerned
with those critics of foundational ism
who, thinking they have
attacked foundationalism as such, or a
specifically Cartesian
foundationalism, have
actually attacked other tenets
often associated with Cartesian
foundationalism, but not essential
to that theory.

does not give a snecifnV

^

cne possibility that our
^L'po'sslbnjnL"^""’"
conceptual

.u.

basic.

Cornman

Sellars d"es\t Ua^r^ava'^pln^
framework based on observatiL^I

(s”xia?‘ri,i^;;p-3%rT3sr
cL?rtta?“thls'
case
Sellars
rhl lh

353-358r^

“

shlars

Is making thr«rr;psUi:e"
framework shift will occur.
In any
rejects the view that we sh^d now
regard
statements of science as basic (cf. ibid.,
pp.

Meditations, Descartes undertakes to
"withhold my
entirely certain and indubitable"
rD^c.rr
vol. 1, p. 145).
"I shall ever follow in this
road
[of withholding
withh^’d-^^ assent] until I have met
with something which is
certain, or at least, if I can do nothing
else, until I have learned
nothing in the world that is certain"
(ibid.
p. 149).
I^en Descartes arrives at the proposition
he uses to
econstruct his knowledge, he is quite explicit
about its epistemic
status:
I am, I exist, that is certain"
(ibid., p. 151).
^

“

’

f

[

Descartes claims to have adopted the geometer’s
method of
exact demonstration from known premises:
"Having aimed at writing
nothing at all in this Treatise of which I do not
possess very exact
emonstrations I am obliged to follow a similar order
to that made
use of by the geometers, which is to begin by putting
forward as premises all those things upon which the proposition
that we seek
depends, before coming to any conclusion regarding it"
(ibid., p.
140).
His proofs of the existence of God, and of the
general ’veracity
of our senses, are clearly intended to proceed
deductively from
established premises (which have come to include not only "I
exist"
but, more controversially, various general propositions
which
Descartes claims are evident by the natural light).
,
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5cf. Meditations III-VI
(ibid., pp.

lytic

157-199).

trJdUioTsel no^e'f orctplerj!^

the relation of logical
positivism
cite Neurath's "Protocol
Sentences"

to

cohereitlsr^ri^
"
0
^ ’,^ l\fP°ttant

(19?9

Foundation of KL'ledgf " l«f
"^i: L^l
on the other hand. alfhougi^f;e:b”f
what was interpreted (e.g., by
Schllch,

to

-rciifi:\er“S^

Ibid

.

"p!

2

S-^i)

:

%

Actually, Neurath'^ vLws Le
c oser to
of the moderate foundatlonallsts
*0
accept IE2b-the "sMftlne
foundations view.
(Cf. Neurath, 1959, especially,
203-205^)®

^

twe
those

pp.

-n/cb

example Alston (1976a and 1976c),
Annis (1976
(1978), Pastln (1978), Robinson
(1979)

^

and

(1981)

specific examples of this move
dationalism see note 18 below.

’Cornman (1978), Pollock (1979).
dationalist views see Pollock (1974).

to

n

Lld^ln

moderate foun-

For Pollock's earlier foun-

^^Chisholm (1977 and 1980).

foundationalists include Descartes himself and
Although, as noted above, there are
significant differences
be^een Cartesian foundational ism In the narrow
sense It is used here
and the actual views of Descartes, It
would seem that with respect to
the specific debate between Cartesian
foundationalists in our sense
and external world foundationalists,
Descartes should be classified
with the former. For Descartes, our judgments
about the external
world call for further justification, whereas
this is not the case
'^ith respect to our feelings and thoughts:
I am the same who feels, that
is to say, who perceives certain
things, as by the organs of sense, since in truth
I see light,
I hear noise, I feel heat.
But it will be said that these
phenomena are false and that I am dreaming. Let it be
so;
still it is at least quite certain that it seems to me
that I
see light, that I hear noise and that I feel heat.
That cannot be false; properly speaking it is what is in me
called
feeling, and used in this precise sense that is no other
thing
than thinking.
isholm.

(Descartes, 1911, vol.

Chisholm

s

1,

p.

Cartesianism is evident when he discusses what

153)
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4a

^
“£ Justificatory
•'")•
Propositions aLut
e«erLl wo'rlH^"®
for one can appropriately
ask one'f us'uLltl'orfor'ta??^"®
i^ication for holding that
proposition. This is not
thoughts and beliefs.
"Thinking and^bll
digm cases of the directly
evidLt" fChishor^

S

‘

i

cM.^....

'

^

..

,

:

Chl^hows p*U^,nt

„
TirLTf'.

U

foundatlonallsts, It
posslbir
Mo: e 5s
In
"Proof
of
an
External World"
cLlL ^taf^^e
hand,
and here
is another" can
an be
oe known
Known to be true
tr
without proof (Moore 1959 n
i/.A.
^
146, cf. also Moore, "A Defence
of Common Sense," 1966
Part l^
This
that G.E

L

4

founhtlonaiut ll^hha?

“Ite:e::5'"h'“t"P"“
servHs he taSls for'^T""
ampincal

justified and
knowledge. However, Moore only
says th^t 5: 5: ::t
PP°P<=
premise in turn in order
5:rht5 ^loof :f :: external world to
be a good one.
This is essenn ^
practical logic about how best to evaluaie^
propositions about
he external world without being
able to construct proofs of them
is
yet to adopt the external world
foundational ist view that it is
appropriate or even impossible to ever
ask for the justification for a
baste external world proposition.
Also. Moore does not talk
euLr
these essays about the structure of
known or justified
propositions. Thus it is difficult to assess
from them whether he is
a foundationalist of any sort.
external world foundationalists are Annis
nP 77
Swain (1981, cf. especially pp.
y\V-l->T^ Annis
44/228).
contextualist theory" (1977 and 1978) is essent ally a version of the "shifting
foundations" view (IE2b) that
asserts that in appropriate contexts (including
nonproblematic observational contexts) ordinary propositions about
the external world can
be basic for some observers ( cf
Annis, 1977, p. 351).

^

12 Cf.

e.g., Lehrer (1974,

p.

83).

Foundationalists who have held that basic propositions are
certain or incorrigible have included Descartes ( cf
1911, vol. 1, cf
note 3 above), Lewis ( cf e.g., 1946, p.
30), and Chisholm (cf. 1977,
p. 11).
These philosophers, in characterizing basic propositions
as
certain or incorrigible, have not worked these concepts into
their
definitions (if any) of basic propositions. (At one point Chisholm
did include the certainty requirement as part of his definition
of the
self-presenting. This is discussed in note 4 of Chapter IV.)
.
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^^Cf. Alston (1976c, p.
171).

above, note 4).
One might Infer ftom thl^
took his methodological
''
principles to be certain bur^hL"^
’
required that these be basic
as well arthr'rs
propositions he
^
identified as certain f
® =>'P'^«3ed by ”I exist,"
"I seem
feel heat!” etc )

to

from examination of passa-

ges

which eventually support a genuine
probability ” i e
flng!^!r Lsi
in _Mlnd and the World Order n’gss
in a passage which appears to
.3^2)
be making the same

point
his argument establishes
tne certainty of singular
thrLrt!!«ytf
!Lf’T propositions that serve as the data sut^
porting nonbaslc propositions to the
conclusion that it establlstes
the certainty of "antecedent general
truths" (emphasis mln^r Lw s
also speaks of the knowledge which
depends on . .
these
principles, as though Che eplstemlc
principles which determine e.g
which propositions are basic, are themselves
not only certain, but
foundational and basic.
Even in An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation
itself Terjic*
comments might betaken to imply iterative
assumptions.
In arguing
that nothing can be probable unless
something is certain, Lewis holds
that a basic proposition that is only
probable will allow us to say of
nonbasic propositions only that they are probably
probable. And this
leads, according to Lewis, to a circle or
an Infinite regress (cf.
Lewis, 1946, p. 186).
This again seems to assume that the epistemic
judgments of a foundationalist theory (e.g.,
propositions' such as
those expressed by "p is probable," "q is basic",
"r is evident,"
etc.) must themselves be certain.
In Chapter IV I will attempt ’to
show that there is no obvious circularity or infinite
regress in
holding such eplstemlc judgments to be merely likely
or plausible.
’^hat

.

’

Chapter I, Lehrer (1974, p. 76), Williams
(1977, p. 61), and Pollock (1979, pp. 93-94), seem to assume in their
defining statements of basic propositions that anything which is
basic
must be a subject’s belief, or at any rate that only such believed
basics can eplstemically support nonbasics. This assumption is then
used against foundationalism, e.g., when Pollock writes:
According to [foundationalism], all epistemic support derives
ultimately from what epistemologically basic propositions one

106

believes. Unfortunately,
one rarpl v Koi
gically basic propositions

eplstemolo-

at all.

Wlll (1974, p. 144), Annls
(1978 n
•’
230), and Pastin (1978
(1978, p.
p. 286') do
^™P°se such a restriction on
basic propositions in their Hpfi
22).
ChlLl™ is even expLclf
?•

"hen he formulates his eplstemlc principles statin, bo n‘
P-^oPO-tlons
justify nonbaslc ones le
does so li te?ms of
ban?""'
believed by t” s^bjec ^,cr.
J
e.g., ibid., principle C,
p. 78).
Cf. Hume,

^Tre atise

624).

of Human Nature (1888,

pp.

183-184,

18

view include

Wlttgensteln“r?hlloLphlcaj''f ^
V

v-L^Di;,

f°

se1v
^
have ?h:; b^::

(1563).

ana bellars
Empiricism and the
These authors probably did not
see them-

:o“i:?“;^:u:iH"acleJ,“^?ir;p!%^^i.,-^

iEE{:~~

coherentism has been made, rt may be
plausible to place such phllosophers as Quine and Sellars within
the former category.
(HoLver
f^plrlclsm" In "The Wohd
According to Quine
Ic«rIlnrto“'rr
Chapter IV.
On Cornman's Interpretation of
Sellars, cf. note 2 above.)
Works which are less directly tied to
epistemology, but which
nonetheless have been closely allied with
and perhaps itJLnced by
the epistemological views of Wittgenstein,
Quine, and Sellars, include
studies in the philosophy of science such
as Hanson’s Patterns of
iscovery (1958), Kuhn’s The Str ucture of
Scientific Revolutions
(1970), and Feyerabend’s Against Method
(1975).
Kuhn’s inflnpnri.i
book in particular has in turn had its
influence in epistemology
elping to make the "shifting foundations"
view, here interpreted as
paradigm shifts in the scientific community over
time, more popular
and accepted.

^

l^Among those who, whether foundationallsts
or not, seem to
assume the first alternative are Descartes
(1911, vol. 1, p. 140),
Quine (1969; cf. in the present work the Chapter
IV section "Can Basic
Propositions Be Properly Related to Nonbasic Propositions?"
for a
detailed discussion of Quine’s position), and Harman
(1973, p. 164).
Explicit recognition that the second alternative is available
to foundationalists is to be found, for example, in Chisholm
(1977, pp.
64-67) and Cornman (1978, p. 252).

^^Williams, Groundless Belief (1977; cf p. 1 for his
discussion of this usage). Ayer, in The Foundations of Empirical
Knowledge (1940) defends a phenomenalist version of foundationalism
.
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(1977,

useSoPhe

Pe™ concuPPence.-

P
23

Cf.

f

On P.:

spearor-Joie""'’ "I;

"iSclL

his position as relativistic
(Kuhn, 1970).

the passage from Descartes
quoted above, note 11.

2A

Cf. discussions of Chisholm
(1964 do
WUllap,s (1977, Chappep 3), and Foley
(1978).

261

2
’

ft
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chapter

IV

THE CRITICS OF FOUNDATIONALISM

I:

FROM

INCORRIGIBILITY TO CONCEPTUAL
SCHEMES
A variety of crltlclsns of
foundatlonallsm are assessed,

tron,

the point of view of determining
whether they are successful
against

Cartesian foundatlonallsm.

It

Is shown that some criticisms
are

directed against tenets associated
with but not essential
foundatlonallsm.

to

Cartesian

Other criticisms attack Cartesian
foundatlonallsm

more directly, but are shown

to

be unsuccessful.

A Plethora of Critics

Is foundatlonallsm false?

phers have thought so.

Has it been refuted?

Many philoso-

In some circles the received
opinion is that

W.V.O. Quine and Wilfred Sellars have dealt
the decisive blows that
have spelled the end of foundatlonallsm as
a viable theory.

1

Others,

using different approaches, have been equally
critical of

foundatlonallsm. 2
critics

However, there are a few who have criticized the

William Alston, for example, argues that critics of
foun-

dationalism have at best challenged

a few

tenets which have been asso-

ciated with foundatlonallsm but which are not essential
to

foundatlonallsm as such (Alston, 1976a, 1976c).

And James Cornman has

argued that, far from refuting foundatlonallsm, Quine and Sellars
have

actually taken foundationalist positions of a moderate sort (Cornman,
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1978.

pp.

249-251

).

A.

sa.e ll„e. however, new
crUlcls^s of

foundatlonallsm have emerged which
In some Instances avoid
the errors
pointed out by Alston. Most
significant here Is the work of
Michael
Williams (1977) and Laurence
Bonjour (1978).
the next

two chanters
P

)

T

Qhai
u
snaili try to show
that none of
i

critics of foundationalism has
refuted Cartesian founda tionali
sm

.

the
It

is Cartesian foundationalism
specifically, when allied with the
tenet

that the foundations do not
shift over time (tenet IE2a of
the Chapter
III outline), that I wish to
defend.
I would not consider
particularly interesting or successful
a defense that salvaged some
more moder-

ate form of foundationalism, along
the lines that Cornman says Quine
and Sellars adopt, while giving up
the "stable foundations" version
of

Cartesian foundationalism.

On the other hand,

I

shall not be con-

cerned to defend all the claims that
have been made by foun-

dationalists or that have been associated with
foundationalism,
provided that those claims are not essential

to

this version of

Cartesian foundationalism.
The present chapter will be concerned with a
number of dif-

ferent criticisms, while the subsequent chapter will
focus on the socalled myth of the given.

The topics of the present chapter, together

with the critic or critics mainly discussed within a topic,
are as
follows
The Certainty or Incorrigibility of Basic Propositions
(Lehrer, Will)

Foundationalism, Sense Data and Direct Realism (Dilman)
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p?opo*:f4'„:r(Q:f„e;
Iterative Foundational ism (Peirce,
Aune)

Are Basics Adequate

to

Support Nonbasics?

(Foley)

Conceptual Schemes and Conceptual
Change (Margolis
Lehrer, Armstrong, Quine, Sosa,
Sellars)
The Certainty or Incorrigibility
of Basic Propositions
A frequent criticism of founda
tionali sm has been that so-

called basic propositions do not or
cannot have the epistemic status

required of them if they are really to
function as basic propositions
Critics taking this line hold that the
foundationalists' basic propositions must have the high epistemic status
of certainty or

incorrigibility, and that they do not have
this status, or cannot be
proved to have it.
The concept of certainty is usually taken
by these critics to

mean having the highest possible epistemic status:

a

proposition is

certain if it is justified and such that no proposition
can be more
justified than it is. 3

Incorrigibility is usually taken

pability of being in error or mistaken.

to

mean inca-

As Keith Lehrer defines it:

S has an incorrigible belief that
p if and only if (i) it is
contingent that p and (ii) it is logically Impossible that S
believes that p and it is false that p.

(Lehrer, 1974,

Frederick Will takes incorrigibility in a wider sense,

p.

to

83)

mean not

just impossibility of error, but impossibility of justified revision:

Ill

blUty

of malfunction Is Itself
but one LSc^of
possibility that Is represented
in incorrigibility

^”Like
dlscrii;i;atlon

exMbir^eiriLMli'r'^"'":
liability to change,

improvement, deterioration
!„a obsolescence
K
;
and
in the dependence they
exhibit at all
upon individual and social needs
and the coiditl^ns
Which these needs are filled.
vwxxj.,

i^/4,

p.

zu/)

Although Will distinguishes Incorrigibility
from certainty (cf. Will,
1974, pp. 206-208) he lists both
these eplstemlc properties as among

those required by the foundatlonallsts'
basic propositions:

There is [according to the foundatlonallst]
a class of claims
cognitions, that are known in a special
direct, certain
ncorrigible way; and all epistemic
authority resides in
these.
The philosophical question of the
epistemic status of
any claim is always a question of the
relation of that claim

to this class of first cognitions.
A claim can be established
to be a genuine example of knowledge,
or at least a claim
worthy of some kind of reasonable adherence,
only if it can be
disclosed to be, if not a first cognition
Itself, in some
degree authenticated by one or more of such
cognitions.

(Will, 1974, p. 142)

Will then attacks foundationalism on the grounds
that these epistemic
properties do not in fact belong
sitions (Will, 1974, Ch.

7,

cf

.

to

"first cognitions" or basic propo

especially pp. 196-211).

In a similar vein, Lehrer sets up stringent epistemic
stan-

dards which, at least in an early chapter, he asserts
that any basic

propositions must meet:

... a basic belief must either be irrefutable, or, if refutable at all, it must only be refutable by other basic
belief s
(Lehrer, 1974, p. 76)
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Basic beliefs are basic
because they cannot be false;
their
truth is guaranteed.
p.

/g)

A central thesis of
foundationalism] is that beliefs whiVh
are Justified by basic beliefs
are safe frorsub
[

justified by basic beliefs might
be
basic beliefs themselves were
refuted.
In
^ foundation for justification,
Similarly’ Tf
bimilarly,
if the 1justification of basic
beliefs did not
guarantee their truth, then such
beliefs would be open to
refutation on the grounds that, though
they are selfjustified, they are in fact false.
If there is nothing to
ensure that such basic beliefs are
true, then, ipso ffctr
there IS nothing to ensure the
truth of those biTi^fTTf^y
justify.
Hence, they too are open to
refutation.

.r ^ t

^

(Ibid., p. 79)

Lehrer then characterizes this notion
of irrefutability more
precisely as the definition of "incorrigible"
noted above.

He

attempts to show that no empirical propositions—
including even

Cartesian propositions about one's mental
states— are incorrigible as
so defined

(cf.

ibid., pp. 83-100).

Others who have made similar criticisms of
foundationalism

include Delaney (1973,
(1974, pp.

121,

and Aune, (1967,

p.

240), Rescher (1974, pp.

702-704), Margolis

125-7), Cornman (1978, p. 252), Rorty (1979,
p.

41).

p.

171),

Not all of these authors regard such criti-

cisms as decisive against all forms of foundationalism,
and many go on
to defend what they consider to be more moderate forms
of

foundationalism.
The first question to ask about such criticisms is whether
they are accurate in attributing to foundationalism the requirement
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that basic propositions be
certain or Incorrigible.

an accurate attribution Is
It relevant here

to

Only 1( this Is

consider the validity

of these critics' arguments
that basic propositions are
not certain or

incorrigible.

Historically speaking, it does seem
an accurate attribution.
One

of Descartes'

most obvious concerns was with
achieving

certainty, not only in a set of
basic propositions, but in those
propositions derived from such a set.
In a sense of Cartesian foun-

dationalism which attempts to be fully
adequate

to

Descartes’ actual

views, the question whether basic
propositions are certain or incorri-

gible is surely relevant.

But I am not discussing Cartesian
foun-

dationalism in any such strictly historical
sense.
foundationalism, as

I

Cartesian

am using that term, insists with Descartes
that

propositions about the subject's mental states are
basic for that subject without insisting, at least not
explicitly, that these proposi-

tions be certain or incorrigible.

Is

there then some implicit

requirement that commits our Cartesian founda tionali
st to incorrigibility or certainty?

It does not appear so.

the Cartesian founda tionali st,

The only requirement that

in our sense, need add to the two

essential tenets of foundationalism is that those propositions
which
are basic for a subject be taken from the set of propositions
about
that subject’s mental states and sensations.

And all one can conclude

from these requirements is that a basic proposition be justified,
not
that it have some higher epistemic status.

William Alston makes just this point against Will’s criticism.
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He formulates Minimal
Foundatlonallsm^^ as follows:

Every mediately justified
belief stands ar

^

(Alston, 1976a,

This is roughly equivalent

to

p.

/

290)

the second of our essential
tenets.

Let
us add to this, as any founda
tionali st must (Alston's minimal
founda-

tionalism is

a bit

minimal), that there are immediately
justified

beliefs (i.e., basic propositions)
and, as our Cartesian foundationalist must, that these immediately
justified beliefs are about the
subject’s mental states and sensations.

I

do not believe that these

additions in any way alter Alston’s
conclusion against Will:
targets of Will’s criticism are not to
be found in
Minimal Foundationalism. What that
position requires of a
oundation is only that it be immediately
justified, justified
y something other than the possession of other
justified
e lefs.
And to say that a certain person
is immediately
justified in holding a certain belief is
to say nothing as to
whether it could be shown defective by someone
else or at some
other time.

m//

(Ibid., p. 291)

Nor is it

to

say,

one might add, that the belief is certain, or

incorrigible in Lehrer’s sense.
made by Pastin (1974,

p.

Points similar to Alston’s have been

709) against Rescher and by Goldman (1981,

p.

425) against Rorty.

Will, Lehrer, and other critics of foundationalism may
have in

mind Lewis’ claim that in order for anything

something must be certain

(

cf

Lewis,

to

1946, p.

be even probable,

186).

The critics of

foundationalism do not make this point, and it would certainly need

to
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be defended.

But even If It were to be
successfully defended, it

would not follow that

^

propositions would be those that
would

have to be designated as certain.
It is important to note too
that, while Descartes was
con-

cerned that not only basic
propositions but those derived from
them be
certain, modern founda tionali sts
have not taken certainty as the

Sua

of basic propositions.

propositions

to

be certain (cf.

^

Although Chisholm has taken Cartesian
Chisholm, 1977,

p.

U), certainty

not been a structural requirement
of Chisholm’s system.

has

Even if

Chisholm’s claim of certainty for Cartesian
propositions were shown

to

be in error, this would not require
the revision of any of his definitions or principles.

His definition of the self-presenting,
for

example, requires only that a self-presenting
or basic proposition be

evident for the subject (cf. ibid.,

p.

22).^

apply to the concept of Incorrigibility.

Similar considerations

While a self-presenting pro-

position must, by Chisholm’s definition, be true,
the subject whom
that proposition is true of has no epistemlc
guarantee of its truth.

The epistemic status of that proposition for him
is that of being
evident, and as Chisholm notes, a proposition may be
both evident and

false (cf. ibid.,

p.

15).

Other founda tionali sts who do not require certainty for their
basic propositions include Pollock (1974), Cornman (1978) and Pastin
(1978).

These philosophers would appear to go further than Chisholm

in saying not only that basic propositions are not defined as certain

but a.lso that such propositions are not in fact certain.
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What about the specific Cartesian
foundatlonallst theory discussed in the present work?

Clearly,

the definition I have
adopted In

Chapter II (DB2) does not require
certainty of a basic proposition.
It requires only that It
have the considerably lower
eplstemlc

status

of being beyond reasonable
doubt.

Nor does DB2 appear to require

incorrigibility In Lehrer's sense.

when p Is basic for
require chat when
that

p

S.

S

Since It does not require that

must have a belief that

Is basic for S,

S

p,

It can hardly

must have an Incorrigible belief

And since propositions which are
beyond reasonable doubt can

p.

and should be rejected when they
conflict with propositions with

higher eplstemlc status, DB2 seems

to

allow at least the structural

possibility that a basic proposition Is
susceptible
revision.

to

Justified

Thus, DB2 does not appear to require
Incorrigibility In

Will's sense either.

Of course,

basic propositions may turn out to

have such properties as certainty and
Incorrigibility after all.

The

point Is only that DB2 does not require that they
have these

properties

Foundatlonallsm, Sense Data, and Direct Realism

Founda tlonali sm has frequently been associated with the hypothesis that sense data mediate between the percelver and the
objects
of the ex-ternal world.

On this hypothesis,

objects are not perceived

directly .ectXlne directly perceives only sense data, not the objects
themseiv^,-"!
It

’e

is -easy to understand why this association has been made.
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Cartesian foundationalists have
taken subjective experience
as epistemically primary.
This is often thought of
as direct
knowledge.

external world is. by contrast,
known indirectly.

The

It might be dif-

ficult to imagine, given such
descriptions, how the founda
tionalist
could £vold positing sense data
or other phenomenological

intermediaries.

Sense data would explain what
is known immediately,

inferences from sense data what is
known mediately.
And yet it would be a mistake
to assume that the foundatlon-

alist is thus comitted

to

sense data.

It would be

just as mistaken to

assume that founda tlonalism is
inconsistent with direct realism-the

view that it is possible
objects such as tomatoes.

directly perceive ordinary physical

to

Thus. Michael Williams misunderstands
the

nature and commitments of founda tlonalism
when he says, after his
extended critique of founda tlonalism.
that his own "no-foundations"
view
179).

amounts to a defence of direct realism"
(Williams. 1977.
So

p.

too does Ilham Oilman seem to misunderstand
that when philo-

sophers (typically foundationalists. though Oilman
does not mention

foundationalism by name) speak of external world
propositions as being

mediately or indirectly known

.

this does not commit them to the view

that such propositions are mediately or indirectly
perceived

metaphysics of perception is

a

.

The

quite different issue from the episte-

mology of justification and knowledge.

It

is logically possible that

my perception of an apple can be direct even though my knowledge
that
I

am seeing an apple is indirect or mediated.

Oilman appears to think that the issues of whether an object
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Is directly known and
whether it Is directly
perceived are.

If not

numerically Identical, at least
so closely tied that an
answer to one
question will automatically give
us the answer to the other.
And he
feels that the sense-data
hypothesis obscures the correct view
that

ordinary objects are directly known
(and perceived):
The answer to the first question
’Can we know the truth of any
physical object proposition directly
and without inference”
Can we perceive physical objects
directly?’
’

leads to the
question
Whenever we perceive a physical object,
do we
always and necessarily perceive
sense-data?’
It is because we
imp icltly take the answer to the
second question to L“e"

(Dilman, 1975,

p.

88)

Note that Dllman’s two ways of formulating
the "first question" are

actually put in quite distinct ways— the
first in epistemological
terms of direct knowledge,

the second in metaphysical terms of
direct

perception.

Dilman goes on

to

argue that we do directly perceive ordinary

objects and, because of his equation of distinct
questions, believes
he has legitimately concluded that our knowledge
of such objects is

direct.

Indeed, part of his conclusion is put in epistemological

terms
I have argued that one can avoid skepticism,
that one can
admit and even Insist that we can and do often know directly,
non-lnferentially that before us stands a tree, or that there
is an ashtray before our eyes, without having to deny
that
these objects exist independently of being perceived, that if
we cease to perceive them this does not mean that they have
stopped existing, in the sense that this is true of our afterimages and our aches and pains.
How?
By recognizing that
when we look at trees and ashtrays what we see are these
objects themselves and not sense impressions; or rather by
,
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recognizing the confusion in
the idea

thfl^

(Ibid., pp. 94-95)

Note again that Dll^an's
conclusion that „e have direct
knowledge Is
derived from his claim that we
see trees, ashtrays,

etc. directly,

unmediated by sense impressions or
data.
But the claim that we have
direct knowledge of external
world

objects

clearly incompatible with Cartesian
foundatlonallsm.

For

the Cartesian foundatlonallst
(unlike the founda tlonallst who
holds

that external world propositions
are basic) holds that external
world

propositions are Justified (and hence
known) tor

a

subject only when

they stand In a proper derivative
justificatory relation to proposi-

tions about that subject's mental
states.

Hence such knowledge is not

direct but dependent on eplstemlcally
prior propositions.

These

Implications of Dllman's argument tor Cartesian
foundatlonallsm are
obvious, even If Dllman does not mention
foundatlonallsm by name.

The dilemma that seems to be posed for the
Cartesian foun-

dationalist may be summarized thus:
DA.

(1)

(2)

(3)
(4)

If Cartesian founda tionalism is true, then
propositions about the external world are justified and

known only mediately.
If external world propositions are justified and
known only mediately, then external world objects are
perceived only mediately and indirectly.
External world objects are perceived immediately and
directly.
Cartesian founda tionalism is not true.

Philosophers such as Dilman and Williams seem
truth of premise

2.

to assume

And if something like (2) is correct,

the

then direct
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realism is surely incompatible
with Cartesian foundational
ism.
I
believe, however, that no
successful defense of
(2) has been given
and that no incompatibility
between Cartesian foundational
ism and
direct realism has been
established.

What can be said In defense
of (2)?
that to say that
Is known.

a

Apparently Oilman feels

proposition cannot be known directly
Is to say It

If It can be known at all,
only by inference.

For the only
thing Oilman says that can be
construed as a defense of
(2) Is that
the subject does not make any
Inference from sense Impressions,
sense

data, or Internal mental states,
to ordinary physical objects:

... the idea chat whenever we make a claim about
such things
as chairs and tables we are making
an inference from our sense
of the chairs
and
aTtabJer::d,rb^''“a^'''”'”'°”‘®’
tables which produce these symptoms
In us is a confused
one.
It Is true, of course, that we
are sometimes deceived bv
our senses.
But this does not mean that we may
always
be
^
deceived ...
The case where we know Moore is lifting
his hands because
we can see him doing so quite clearly
is different from the
case where a blind man knows the same
thing from hearing Moore
say so.
As I argued, given that certain
conditions are
ulfilled e.g., that the light is good, our
eyes in order
and Moore not a conjurer— it is not
conceivable that we may be
mistaken and there is nothing that we would call
"making sure"
that what we see are Moore's hands.
This surely means
that in that case there is no inference from
what I see to
what I know.
If what I know is that Moore has lifted
his two
hands, then this is just what I see.
.

.

(Ibid

Inference thus seems

to

.

,

pp.

91-92

)

be the key to determining whether knowlege is

direct or indirect, according to Oilman.

If the knowledge of a par-

ticular proposition involves inference, it is indirect; if
it does
not,

it is direct.

Since we do not infer the existence of trees and
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ashtrays, we have direct
knowledge of
or them
tnem, and
anH ho
hence pCartesian foundatlonallsm Is not true. Or so
the argument would run.

Obviously, much hangs on what

DUman

means by Inference here.

take him to mean roughly
that an external world
proposition Is
inferred by a subject If he
consciously or unconsciously
reasons from
how things appear to him to
how things actually are in
the world.
In
this sense, I agree with Oilman
that simple external world
propositions are not ordinarily Inferred.
It takes considerable
intellectual
I

sophistication even

to

conceive of the idea of sense
Impressions or

how one Is appeared to as
something distinct from how the world

actually is.

Even when a subject has such
sophistication. It does not

seem that he normally reasons, however
unconsciously, from the

existence of sense Impressions to the
conclusion that something out
there Is causing those Impressions.

His belief that that Is an

ashtray Is not the conclusion of an argument.

On rare occasions, he

may make an inference, but only, it
would seem, when he has some

reason

to

doubt the accuracy or adequacy of his sensory
apparatus or

to suspect trickery,

etc.

But this does not in itself show that Cartesian
foun-

dationalism is incompatible with direct realism.
follow from the fact that

a

For it does not

known or justified proposition has not

been inferred that it is Immediately known or justified
(i.e., that it
is epistemically basic).

And it seems quite consistent for the Cartesian foun-

dationalist to say both that an external world proposition is unin~
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f erred

and involves direct
perception on the one hand, and
that it is
nonbasic on the other. How can
this be? Suppose that Smith
is in
fact looking at an ashtray,
and suppose that direct
realism is the

true theory of perception.

So Smith is directly
perceiving

the

ashtray, and not sense data or
other metaphysical intermediaries.
is he making any inferences
about the ashtray.

believing that he is looking at an
ashtray?
sorts of factors Uiat are independent
IS

and

SmM

^

as

Is Smith justified in

Well, that depends on all

Uie fact that direct realism

^ happens^ dj^^tly

perceiving th^

ashtr^.

Smith may not be justified because
someone he had good

reason

distrust told him, falsely, that he
was being tricked by

to

mirrors or hypnotism, etc.

Nor

The epistemic issues are independent
of

the metaphysics of perception issues.

Whether Smith is justified is

not a function of the fact that he is directly
perceiving the ashtray.

What is the basis for Smith’s justification,
or lack thereof?
This too is independent of the direct realism issue.

The Cartesian

foundationallst will say that in any case Smith’s
justification for an
external world proposition exists because of some relation
this propo-

sition has to propositions about Smith’s mental states or
about how he
is appeared to.

The external world proposition is not, on this

account, the sort of thing that can be immediately known or
justified.
It is epistemically more complex than that,

even if in normal cir-

cumstances the perceptual situation is the relatively simple and

straightforward one of direct awareness.

How can the Cartesian foundationallst who is also

a direct
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realist explain >*y the
eplstemlc situation could be
relatively
complex and mediated while
the perceptual situation
Is simple and
The reasoning here is
similar to the reasoning why
a subject
may have a belief that Is
true yet not Justified,
or a Justified
belief that Is not true. That
a subject is in
directly perceiving an ashtray is something
that Is not always known to
him, and

f^

his Justification for It, says
the Cartesian foundatlonallst,
is not
ediate or obvious.
It depends rather on other
eplstemlc factors.

Suppose again that the subject is
In fact directly perceiving
the
ashtray.
Our direct realist Cartesian
foundatloanllst will

acknowledge this.

But he will also note that
the subject could be

having similarly compelling experiences
even though he was not

directly perceiving the ashtray.
dream.

He could be having a very realistic

He could be a brain in a laboratory,
etc.

Now these possibi-

lities do not serve to "de Justify"
the belief for the subject.

But

they do serve, according to the Cartesian
foundatlonallst, to require

eplstemlc mediating steps^ that make the
proposition a Justified one
for the subject

these possibilities serve to show that
while the
w

e xperience

can be directly justified, the belief that
one is in fact

actually directly perceiving an ashtray is not
directly justified.
According

to

the Cartesian foundatlonallst,

it is appropriate to ask

what the subject's justification is for holding some
belief about the
external world
basis

all such beliefs have some distinct justificatory

while it is not appropriate

to

ask what the subject's justifi-

cation is for holding some belief about what seems to him

to be

the
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case or what he is now
experiencing.

But it need not follow
from this

that the subject cannot at
tl.es directly experience
the external
world.
Presumably, he Is when he Is
In tact lookln* at an
ashtray.
But he is not when he Is
merely dreaming that he Is
looking at an
ashtray.
(m such a case perhaps sense data or
sense Impressions will
make their appearance.) Such
a possibility represents
an eplstemlc
complexity that may well mean that
even In the direct perception
case
the subject does not have
direct or Immediate Justification
tor his
belief s
It

is in no way incompatible
with direct realism to suggest

that specified conditions must
prevail before a subject can be
said to
have justification for a belief
about the external world.
For
example, one might require with
Chisholm that the belief be without

ground for doubt (cf. Chisholm,
1977,

p.

76).

Epistemlc principles

might well state what these conditions are,
without thereby denying
that direct perception may well occur
under some of these conditions.

The conditions stated by such principles
would not necessarily include
the requirement that the subject make
inferences from his experiences
to conclusions about the external world.

Chisholm's principles would

again serve as examples here.
To return to the passage from Dilman most recently
quoted
above, it is Interesting to note that Dilman there
includes conditions

that a Cartesian foundationalist might want
we can know that Moore is lifting his hands:

to

include in stating why
the light is good, our

eyes are in order, Moore is not a conjurer, etc.

Dilman is attempting
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to explain here ho» „e
have

dl^ knowledge

that Moore Is lifting his

hands.

The Cartesian foundatlonallst
might well point ont that
It Is
not always Immediately
apparent that the light is
good, that onr eyes
really
l„ order, that Moore really
is trustworthy (perhaps
he Is
trying to trick us somehow the
way John Austin did when he
presented
his class with a stick half
In the water that looked
bent, and In fact

^

really was bent).

Given that we must first be
justified in believing

that trustworthy conditions obtain,
the Cartesian foundatlonallst

might insist contra Dllman that
knowledge that Moore Is raising
his
hands is not direct knowledge In
the sense of being Immediately
and
un problematlcally justified.

Is not

Dllman himself stating as much

when he states the conditions that
must obtain In order for us

to

directly p^ercelve Moore lifting his hands?
None of this of course shows that the
Cartesian founda tionalist is correct.

What it shows, it is to be hoped, is that
there is no

demonstrated incompatibility here between Cartesian
founda tionali sm
and direct realism.

Can Basic Propositions Be Properly Related to
Nonbasic Propositions?

Another criticism that Cartesian founda tionali sts have
met

with is how basic propositions can be related in the
appropriate way
to nonbasics so that the former provide the proper
justification for

the latter.

deductive nor

One specific criticism of this type has been that neither
(

enumerative ) inductive relationships could explain how
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basics justify ncnbaslcs.

Barring the truth of
phencenallst., state-

ments about a subject's
experiences do not deductively
entail statements about ordinary physical
objects.
And no aggregate of

experience-statements would seem
external-world statements.

to

provide Inductive support for

As Nicholas Rescher notes:

... no amount of claims in the language of
appearance—
however extensively they may reach
In terms of tow twLs
appear to me and what I "take
myself" to be seeing
1" any theoretically guarantoeihr*’result regarding what
teeable
is actually the case in the

appearaL:Thl
theses
sf; will fall short on the side
of objective content.
(Rescher, 1977, p. 703,
emphases omitted)

Rescher Is actually touching on a
host of issues in this passage, but
the problem of how one can move from
sense-based propositions to those

about the external world is clear enough.
W. V.

0.

Quine,

in "Epistemology Naturalized," also
feels that

foundationalist programs come

to

grief in through a failure to bridge

the gap between experience and the world:

Just as mathematics is to be reduced to logic,
or logic and
set theory, so natural knowledge is to be based
somehow on
sense experience.
This means explaining the notion of body in
sensory terms; here is the conceptual side. And it
means
justifying our knowledge of truths of nature in sensory
terms;
here is the doctrinal side of the bifurcation [of a
theory
into its meaning (conceptual) and truth (doctrinal)
aspects].
(Quine, 1969, p. 21)

Quine is willing enough
a

to

accept that the conceptual requirements for

theory of knowledge based on sense experience can be met.

Two

methods of conceptually explaining body in sensory terms would
be
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acceptable

to

Quine:

one alternative Involves
using

contextual definition to show
how for each physical
object sentence a
translation can be made to a
sentence about sensory
Impressions; the
second alternative Involves
the use of set theory to
reduce physical
Object statements to -some
subtle construction of sets
upon sets of
sense Impressions" that would
determine "a category of objects
enjoying Just the [desired] formula
properties ... for bodies"
(ibid., p. 73).

Quine thinks the first method
Is "unassailable,

while the second-though apparently
acceptable

Qulne-would probably be too drastic for
eplstemologlsts skeptical about the
ontology
of sets.
Such eplstemologlsts settle for
bodies outright over sets
(cf.

to

ibid.).
It is in its doctrinal aspect

that Quine feels the attempt to

base natural knowledge on sense
experience fails:
The mere fact that a sentence is
couched in terms of
observation, logic, and set theory does
not mean that it can
be pr oved from observation sentences by
logic and set theory.
The most modest of generalizations about
observable traits
will cover more cases than its utterer can
have had occasion
actually to observe. The hopelessness of grounding
natural
science upon immediate experience in a firmly
logical way was
acknowledged. The Cartesian quest for certainty
had been the
remote motivation of epistemology, both on its
conceptual and
its doctrinal side; but that quest was seen as
a lost cause.
To endow the truths of nature with the full
authority of immediate experience was as forlorn a hope as hoping to
endow the
truths of mathematics with the potential obviousness
of elementary logic.
.

.

.

(Ibid., p. 74)

Quine holds that this failure means that we ought

epistemology as traditionally conceived

—we

to

abandon

ought to abandon the pro-
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ject ot -justifying our
knowledge of truths of nature
In sensory
tents.
Instead we should -naturalize"
epistemology and regard It
as
the
chologlcal study of how
stimulation of the sensory
receptors

m

does lead to the subject's
construction of his picture of
the world.
Quine proceeds:
Such a surrender of the
epistemological burden to psycholoev
c^rcula?*"
restoZ:
If
validation
of the
gro::ds ®0£ empl L^rsc'Jrn^^L^l^^^f
psychology or other empirical
science in the valuation.
However such scruples against
circularity have little point
once we have stopped dreaming of
deducing science fro^
serva on.
If we are out simply to
understand the link

T

-

be-

advised to use any
that provided by the very
science whose link with observation
we are seeking
^ to
understand.

avallabirr?
ailable information, including

(Ibid., pp. 75-76)

Whether such a purely descriptive psychology
could ever
explain how propositions come
in any case,

to

be justified,

I

have my doubts.

the point here is to examine Quine’s

clams about

But

the

failure of traditional epistemology to explain
how justification of

natural facts and laws could ever derive from
sensory experiences.

It

seems to me that Quine is far too ready to
dismiss traditional episte-

mology for his naturalized sort without sufficient
evidence against
the traditional approach.

Here again there may be a historical point
criticisms.

to

Quine's

Descartes unquestionably, and Carnap possibly, sought

certainty not only in propositions about immediate experience,
but
also in those about the natural world.

There has indeed been concern
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^

a^ong traditional
foundatlonallsts with att«pts
to
fro. l..edlate experience.
But as we have already
seen In discussing
the issue Of the incorrigibility
or certainty of
propositions.
It is a mistake to assume
that certalnty-^hether
of basic or of nonbasic propositions— is an
essential requirement of a
founda tionali sm
that holds statements about
Immediate experience to be
basic.
Quine
is surely right (cf. Ibid.,
p. 74) that It Is a forlorn
hope to su^

^

pose that the truths of nature
can be endowed with the full
authority
of Immediate experience.
But this does not mean that
the truths of
nature' may not be Justified
or rendered evident by Immediate

experience.

And again this, rather than
eplstemlc certainty. Is all

that Is required by the Cartesian
foundatlonall st In our sense.

Quine Is also right that no number
or amount of sense
experiences can

jrl

^emselves Inductively justify generalisations

(nor, I would add, even singular
propositions) about the external

world.

Appearance statements cannot lend inductive
support

external-world statements.

to

Inductive support Is understood as a

relation between singular statements of a
certain type and generalizations of that same type, e.g., between
singular propositions about the

external world and generalizations about the
external world.

Induction in itself does not allow us to bridge the
gap between

appearance and the external world.

That

I

three successive days does not itself seem

conclusion that

I

was appeared redly to on
to

was looking at a red object.

make more probable the
And Quine is right too

that we can no longer dream of deducing science from
appearance
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statements.
But none of this provides
grounds tor giving up the
task of

iHitlfzlng external world statements
fr™ appearance statements.
Induction and deduction do not

exhaust the possibilities by
which one

proposition might justify another.

John Pollack has argued
that

meaning relationships themselves
can serve tor. In Quine's
terms, not
the conceptual but rather
the doctrinal aspects of
epistemological
theory:

meaning Is a function of
justification conditions rather than
truth conditions (Pollack.
1974, Oh. 1).
Another approach Is

available-one adopted by Chisholm and
used In the present work.
this

On

approach justification relations
between basic and nonbaslc

statements are given by eplstemlc
principles which state the conditions under which a basic proposition
justifies a nonbaslc one.
These conditions may well be, and are
In Chisholm's principles, for
example, entirely Independent of whether
the basic propositions deduc-

tively Imply or Inductively support
the nonbaslc propositions they
justify.

Thus,

It Is not an a priori requirement of
Cartesian foun-

dationallsm that basics provide Inductive or
deductive support for
nonbasics.

Those who abandon foundatlonall sm because
such support Is

not forthcoming do so prematurely.

Harman is another who seems

to

assume from problems with the

notion of deducing ordinary beliefs from more basic
beliefs that we
must move
a

to

a less traditional

epistemology that in his case embraces

coherentlst perspective (cf. Harman, 1973,

p.

167).

lar to those made above on Quine would apply here.

Comments simi-
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Iterative Foundational Qm
i

In his 1868 paper,
'Questions Concerning Certain
Faculties
Claimed for Man, Charles
Sanders Peirce notes that:

in fact
In

inM\sr:ir

invariably connected, so that
we can always In^ul-

.in:d''by':“^hfr!''
(Peirce,

1960,

p.

136)

Peirce has already explained his
use of "Intui tion.

^tuition here will

be nearly the same as "premiss
not itself
the only difference being that
premisses
and
concr
conclusions are judgments, whereas an
intuition may, as far as
Its definition states, be any kind
of cognition whatever
cognition not [determined by previous
cognitions] and therefore determined directly by the
transcendental objlct, irto
be termed an intuition.

r

’

.

(Ibid., pp.

.

.

135-136)

Peirce pretty clearly has in mind basic
propositions in something like
our sense when he speaks of intuitions.

Peirce then goes on to answer, in the negative,
his question

whether we have an intuitive power of distinguishing
an intuition from
another cognition.
have no

Peirce uses this conclusion to establish that we

intuitive self-consciousness," no "power of introspection,"

and finally that there is no cognition which is not
determined by a

previous cognition

(

cf

ibid., pp.

143-155).

This is effectively to

deny that there are intuitions or basic propositions.
Peirce does not mention the theory of founda tionali sm

,

but his

132

vle„s see. .o be easily
Interpreted as an attack on
foendatlonalls.,
and indeed they have been
so Interpreted as a
.ore or less successful
attack In Peirce’s Critique
of Foundational Ism” by
C. F. Delaney
(1973).

Peirce connects up his denial
of the existence of
Intuitions

with his first point— chat we
cannot Intuitively distinguish
intuitions from ordinary cognitions—
as follows:

s nee it is impossible
to know intuitively that
a given
cognition is not determined by a
previous one, ^he only way in
hypothetic inference from
oh^^
served facts.
But to adduce the cognition by
which a given
cognition has been determined is to
explain the determinations
•

.

.

explaining them.
For something entirely out of
fL
consciousness which may
sui^
posed to determlue It, can, as such,
only be known aL L^y"^
adduced in the determinate cognition
in question.
So, that to
suppose that a cognition is determined
solely by something
a solutely external, is to
suppose its determination incapable
f explanation.
Now, this is a hypothesis which
is warranted
under no circumstances, inasmuch as the
only possible justification for a hypothesis is that it explains
the facts, and to
say that they are explained and at
the same time to suppose
them inexplicable is self-contradictory.

S

(Peirce, 1960,

p.

153)

In the latter half of this passage,
Peirce seems to be making
the following argument:
PA:

(1)

(2)
(3)

If a cognition (or "hypothesis") is determined
solely
by something external, and not also by another
cognition, then its determination is incapable of

explanation.
If it is incapable of explanation, then it is
warranted under no circumstances.
If a cognition (hypothesis) is warranted under any
circumstances, then it is determined (at least in
part) by another cognition.

In order to keep as close as possible to Peirce's wording,

I

have not
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made this argument formally
valid; however, it could
be easily made
so

The first premise In
particular seems to call for
explanation,
'fhy would Peirce vrish
to assert It?
When Peirce speaks of a
cognition
being determined by an
"absolutely external" object,
he Is referring
to a "transcendental object"
(cf.

the first passage cited In
this

section), more or less equivalent
to a Kantian thlng-ln-ltself
the reach of our cognitions.

If

.

beyond

that Is the sole determinant
of a

cognition, then we can have no
cognition of this determinant,
hence
the original cognition remains
unexplained.
If we are to have any

explanation at all of a cognition. It
must be by yet another

cognition— an uncognlzable thlng-ln-ltself
could never serve

the

purpose
One might then ask why we need a
cognition (i.e., an explanation) of another cognition in order
that the latter be warranted.

At

this point Peirce’s initial claim stated
again at the beginning of the

passage quoted above seems to be relevant.

unless one knows what the determination of
tion cannot be warranted.

He apparently feels
a

cognition

is,

that

that cogni-

He does not explicitly make this claim,
but

It IS otherwise difficult to see what
else might constitute a defense

of premise

2

of his argument as reconstructed above,

here re-emphasize his point that the only way

or why he would

to know the

tion of a given cognition is to infer from observed
facts.

determinaWhy would

it be so important to know the determination of a
cognition unless

this were a necessary condition for that proposition being
warranted?
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But If Peirce Is assuming
chat we must know what
Che determination Of any warranted
proposition Is. then Insofar
as his argument
provides any ammunition against
foundational Ism, It provides
ammunition only against some version
of what William Alston
(1976c) calls
"iterative founda tionali sm:

ism

«rtaln argument against founda
tlonalCo require of fo^-

a foundatlonalist thesis
would have

Justified, but also that
the b2lever°be''lmmedl'’r
tne
believer be Immediately justified
In believing that thev
A position that does^equlre
rtls
wl mir
we
may call iterative foundatlonallsm.
(Alston, 1976c,

p.

171)

Iterative founda tionali sm requires
of a subject that if

a

pro-

position is basic for him, he must
not only be immediately justified
in believing it, he must also
possess some knowledge, explanation,
or

further justification that it is immediately
justified.

Alston posits

that this second-level epistemic
state also be a state of immediate

justification.

Peirce speaks instead of requiring that
the subject

have "knowledge" that a cognition is not
determined by previous cognitions (i.e.,

that a proposition is immediately
justified) or that the

subject have an "explanation" of the determination
of the cognition.

Although this seems slightly different from what
Alston has in mind,
the central idea is clearly the same:

diately justified for
expressed by

S.

It’s not enough that p be imme-

In order for that to occur,

immediately justified for S" would itself have

p is

have some relatively high epistemic status for
If Peirce

the proposition

s

to

S.

argument does indeed depend on some idea such as
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this,

then It only attacks Iterative
foundatlonallsm.

question for us then Is:

The relevant

-ust the Cartesian
(oundatlonallst be an

Iterative foundatlonallstl

The answer to that Is no.

Chisholm's eplstemlc principles
approach.

Consider again

These principles state the

conditions under which, when a
subject falls under those
conditions, a
given proposition Is justified
for the subject. Tte

^ aware

^

su^^

rtose

condl^^

Indeed, as

chapter VI, It would be very difficult
Indeed for
quainted with epistemology

to

a

I

^^

shall show in

subject unac-

know In all cases that the
appropriate

epistemlc conditions prevail.
One need not be a Chisholmian
epistemologist to avoid iterative foundational ism.

Indeed, noniterative founda tionali
sm seems to

embrace the most natural and simple
assumptions about the nature of
justification.

We commonly assume that children,
antifounda tional-

ists, and philosophically unsophisticated
adults can be justified in

believing at least some propositions.

If an eight-year-old knows

that

his parents are Catholics, then he has
justification for that belief.
We would still,

I

think, want to Insist that he possessed this

knowledge even if we found he had only the most
rudimentary concept of
epistemic justification, or no such concept at all.

We can often know

things without understanding why we know them, it would
seem.

The

Iterative founda tionali st would of course require much more
than

sophisticated concept of justification.

a

The subject would also have

to have the concept of a basic proposition or of a cognition
deter-

mined by previous cognitions.

It

seems natural to suggest that a sub-
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Ject need not have this level
of eplstemlc sophistication
In order to
be justified In believing
ordinary propositions. As
Alston notes:
•

•

dol
b?r
him

•

it is all too possible to
have adequate erounds for

f for'a^^lL^'"?

o^-^ved

adequate reasons for supposing
msure of himself, without being able
to spe^fv
of his bearing and behavior
provide
those
reLons"’" l^pSr^
P>'^;°®°P';‘ioally unsophisticated person
(and
many
of t^e An
sophisticated as well) may be amply
iustlfled in believing that there
justified
Is a tree In front of his
wide-open eyes, but not be able to
show that he Is so
justified
!
to

t
be

^

(Alston, 1976c, p.

178)

Alston's tree example reminds us that
much of what was said in
the previous section about the
possibility of a Cartesian foundation-

alist being a direct realist also goes
to support our current contention that a Cartesian foundationalist need
not embrace iterative

foundational ism:

a subject may in fact be directly
perceiving a tree,

but whether he is also justified in believing
that he is perceiving a

tree may depend on epistemic conditions unknown

to

him.

If he is in

fact justified, he would not necessarily know,
or be justified in

believing, that he is justified.
At any rate, there seems to be good reason to think
that

Cartesian and other foundationalists need not embrace iterative
foundationallsm.

If Peirce's argument were to

tell specifically

Cartesian foundationallsm, it would have

to

be shown that

Cartesian foundationallsm entailed iterative foundationallsm.
It must be remembered that we are here assuming that Peirce is

using his iterative claim

—we

cannot intuit that

a

given cognition is
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an intuition, and so such
an Intuition Is unaxplalnad
and unuattanted
-to substantiate precise 2 of his
argument as reconstructed above.
Certainly. Peirce could use his
claim to support the premise,
and he
mentions It just tdten he makes
his argument that all
cognitions are
determined by previous cognitions.
But he makes, so far as I
can see,
no specific connection between
his iterative claim and the
second preraise

of his argument.

But If Peirce Is not using this
claim here. It Is difficult to

see what can be said in favor
of premise 2.

premise

Indeed, we can say more:

unsupported seems to embody a simple
confusion between the
e xplanation for a proposition
and the justification of It, or
between
2

one event causing another event and
one proposition justifying another

proposition.

"The only possible justification for
a hypothesis," to

repeat one of Peirce's central claims
from the passage quoted above,
'is that it explains the facts" (Peirce,
1960, p.

Note that Peirce has here suddenly taken
tive first cognition a "hypothesis."

153).
to calling

the puta-

It does make sense to say in the

philosophy of science that any adequate hypothesis
must explain the

experimental facts.
general propositions

But such hypotheses are by their very nature

very high up in any epistemic structure the

Cartesian foundationalist would want

to

construct.

those undetermined by any previous cognitions
in this sense.

—would

First cognitions
not be hypotheses

When we consider what the Cartesian foundationalist

would take first cognitions

to

be,

the difficulties in Peirce's at

first sight common sensical claim become apparent:

Is

"S

is in pain"
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a

hypothesis for S?

native hypothesis?

Does It better explain the
facts than some alter-

What would these facts be?

Note also that Peirce has shifted
from saying that any cognition must have a determination
or explanation to saying here
that the

hypothesis explains the other facts.

That which explains need not

itself have an explanation.
Finally,

there is the central question
whether "p has

explanation" is synonymous with "p has

q

q

as its

as its justification."

Presumably, there are different ways
of explaining "S is in pain."

We

might be asking for a doctor’s diagnosis,
or for the events that led

S

to experience pain, or for a
neurophysiological analysis of the cause

of S

s

pain sensations.

"S has a ruptured appendix,"

got into a

"S

fight at the bar last night," or "S’s
C-fibers are firing," might all
serve, in different contexts, as acceptable
explanations for "S is in
pain.

But it seems doubtful that any of these
serve the role of

Justifying

S

is in pain"

for S.

Nor does it seem that

S

needs to

know that any of these explanatory statements are
true (he may have
been too drunk to remember the fight in the bar, for
example) in order
to be justified in believing that he is in pain.

Peirce may in response wholly abandon his iterative assumptions and simply assert that the various explanations for
"S is in

pain" serve as the justification for the sentence, whether
of them or not.

S

is aware

But it does not seem plausible to assert that these

explanatory sentences serve as
that

S

s

justification for the proposition

is in pain, not even in the external sense of justification if.
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for example, neurophysiological
evidence about C-flbers Is not
available to S.

Peirce was not the last philosopher
to criticise foundationalIsn,

on the basis of Iterative
assumptions.

sisted to the present.

Such criticisms have per-

In Knowledge. Mind and Nature.

Bruce Aune

writes as follows:
point of view of common experience,
there Is no
’i"
plausibility
at all In the Idea that
Intrlnslcali; acceptabir
Philosophers defending such preises fail to see this because they
always ignore the
situation in which an empirical claim
is
evaluated^
I have already given
arguments to show that introspective
claims are not, in themselves,
intrinsically infallible; they
may be regarded as virtually certain
if produced by a reliable
(sane, clear-headed) observer, but
their truth is not a consequence of the mere fact that they are
confidently made. To
establish a similar conclusion regarding the
observation
claims of everyday life only the sketchiest
arguments are
needed. Obviously, the mere fact that
such a claim is made
does not assure us of its truth.
If we know that the observer
is reliable, made his observation in good
light, was reasonably close to the object, and so on, then
we may immediately
regard it as acceptable.
But its acceptability is not intrinsic to the claim itself.
Thus, philosophers who, like G. E.
Moore, attempt to prove by direct inspection
that they have
hands do not proceed just by taking a quick look
at their
hands; they rather turn them over, look at both
sides, pinch
them, and the like.
The certainty they arrive at is thus
based on a whole group of observations, as well as
on numerous
tacit assumptions concerning the general reliability
of their
senses, the accuracy of their memories, the sort of things
hands are supposed to be, and so on.
I would venture to say
that any spontaneous claim, observational or introspective,
carries almost no presumption of truth when considered
entirely by itself.
If we accept such a claim as true, it is
only because of our confidence that a complex body of
background assumptions concerning observers, standing
conditions, the kind of object in question and, often, a
complex mass of further observations all point to the conclusion that it is true.
Given these prosaic considerations, it is not necessary to
cite experimental evidence illustrating the delusions easily

—

—
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brought about by, for example,
hypnosis to spp
taneous claim is acceptable
wholly on its own merits'^°
On
Orthe
the
contrary, common experience is
enMrpiv aa
Clear-headed .en nev^er
c^rselrif^
made without regard to the
peculiarities of Che agent and of
conditions under which It Is
produced. For

such mL the
determined
by’
lnfe?en^
Tf°^
take these standards of
acceptablht ®^“ously, we must
accordingly admit that the
rraH-^t*^
traditional
search for Intrinsically acceptable
empirical
ore^
^ ^
mises IS completely misguided.

*

“

(Aune,

1967,

pp.

42-43,

emphasis in original)
Aune, like many anti-foundationalists,
is here attacking the

possibility of Intrinsically acceptable
or basic propositions,

And

like Peirce, he does this by assuming
some version of Iterative

foundationalism, as William Alston has
pointed out
*

arguing that whenever
*-!
1
claim
(belief) is justified it is justified
by inference (by
relation to other justified beliefs); and
that would be the
denial of "There are directly justified
beliefs." But look
more closely. Aune is discussing not what
would justify the
issuer of an introspective or observational
claim in his
belief, but rather what it would take to
justify "us" in
accepting his claim; he is arguing from a third-person
perspective. Now it does seem clear that
cannot be immediately justified in accepting your introspective
or observational claim as true.
If I am so justified it is because I
am justified in supposing that you Issued a claim
of that
sort, that you are in a normal condition and know
the
language, and (if it is an observational claim) that conditions were favorable for your accurately perceiving that
sort of thing.
But that is only because I, in contrast to
you, am justified in believing that
(where what you claimed
_g.
is that
and where I have no independent access to
p) only
if I am justified in supposing that you are justified~in
believing that
My access to
is through your access.
It
is just because my justification in believing that
presupposes my being justified in believing that you are justified,
that my justification has to be indirect.
That is why I have
to look into such matters as conditions of observation, and
your normality.
Thus what Aune is really pointing to is the
necessity for "inferential" backing for any higher-level
1
a
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someone is justified in
believing
higher-level beliefs epistemic
b^iefL')
shows anything, shows that
no
epistemic belief can be immediately
tpiscemic
iustified
R„h
^ a
nothing to Show that the original
obsrrver^s ^r intrispe^t^r’
immediately justified. Hence
^
hifarguan
introspective
belLf
that

D

(I

-t

^le

circ^LLnces
(Alston, 1976c, pp.
ses in original)

168-169, empha-

To put matters in our terminology,
Alston is here saying that

Aune’s argument tells against neither
Cartesian founda tionali sm nor
external world foundational ism.

It may tell against iterative

foundationalism, for if Aune’s arguments are
successful, they show
that "epistemic beliefs," such as the
belief that p is justified for
S,

can themselves be only indirectly
justified.

But this is,

I

believe, only to be expected: epistemic
beliefs about when a proposition is justified for a person are high level
theoretical beliefs that

should not be expected to be basic or directly
justified.

And, as

Alston notes, this does not tell against the view
that perceptual or
introspective beliefs themselves are directly justified.

No reason

has been given by Aune for holding, nor does it seem
at all necessary
to hold,

that in order for, e.g., a perceptual belief to be
directly

justified, the epistemic theory which explains this (or the
epistemic

belief based on such a theory) must also be directly justified.

Alston notes above the error Aune makes in moving from the

question whether a person is justified in believing his own introspective or observational reports to the question whether others are
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justified in believing these
reports.

Let us call this the error
of

assuming a third-person
perspective, for others besides
Aune have ™ade
this error, and we will have
occasion to refer to It again.
We n^y conclude, then,
that neither Peirce's nor
Anne's argu-

ments appear

to

have refuted Cartesian
foundatlonallsm, and that It

does not appear that the
assumptions peculiar

to

Iterative toun-

datlonallsm need be embraced by the
Cartesian founds tlonall st.
Are Basics Adequate to Support
Nonbasics?

Although Alston rightly points out
that noniterative or
simple" foundatlonallsm Is a more
defensible form of foundatlonallsm
than Iterative foundatlonallsm, he
Is himself skeptical whether any

form of foundational! sm can be made
to work:

Although I am convinced that simple
foundatlonallsm is the
most defensible form of foundatlonallsm,
especially if it also
divests itself of other gratuitous claims
for foundations such
as infallibility and incorrigibility,
I do not claim that it
can actually be made to work. Though it
escapes the main
antecedent objection, it still faces all the
difficulties
involved in finding enough immediately
justified beliefs to
ground all our mediately justified beliefs.
And on this rock
I suspect it will founder.
(Alston,

1976c, p.

185)

Similar reservations are expressed by Nicholas Rescher
(1974, pp.
702-3

).

We have already seen that foundatlonallsm survives
the criti-

cisms that there are no deductive or inductive relations
between basic
and nonbasic propositions.

But this is not to say there remain no

problems in explaining the relation between basics and nonbasics.

The
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concerns of .Isfon and
Rescher .ay be .ore
speclfdcaUy deUneared as
two distinct problems:

=“PP°®C

p”;o1lt?oisf

basic propositions can
PHat a^cLs to"Lrba"slc

The first question vrtll be
addressed In Chapter VII.

The

second question embodies a
misunderstanding that once again
requires
too much of foundatlonallsm.
(I am not claiming that
either Alston or

Rescher is guilty of this
mlsunderstandlng-they may have had the
first problem in mind.) As we

have seen In stating the basic
tenets

of foundatlonallsm. It Is not
required that a nonbaslc proposition

derive all of Its justification
from basic propositions.

As EF

II

notes, each nonbaslc proposition
must derive at least some of Its

justification from some relation to basic
propositions (cf. chapter
above).

This recalls Chisholm’s statement that
"every proposition we

are justified In believing Is justified,

relation that It bears
85,

I

to

£^,

because of some

the directly evident" (Chisholm,
1977, p.

emphasis mine).

Now it could be claimed (and perhaps this
is the sort of

assumption Alston and Rescher were making) that
founda tionali sm must
commit itself to making all the justification accruing

propositions derive from basics.

s

nonbasic

To allow any other source of justi-

fication is effectively to abandon foundatlonallsm.

Chisholm

to

On this account,

system, which allows relations of coherence between propo-

144

Sltlons to help eplste^lcally
support those propositions,
could not be
considered foundatlonallsm,
or at least pure founds
tlonallsm. The
question whether Chisholm's
system is tmlv
byscem
^
truly foundational
has, for this
reason, been raised by Richard
Foley (1980).
This issue is beyond the
scope of the present work.

It may

turn out that coherence relations
can be entirely dispensed
with.
Even if they cannot, I rather
suspect that if a theory
maintains that
no nonbasic proposition has
any justification unless it
is supported
by one or more basic
propositions, then such a theory is
distinct
enough from coherentism to stand
as an Interesting alternative,
even
if it also allows coherence
relations to provide additional
support

once the basic propositions have
provided their essential support.
However, to adequately prove this
would require constructing a full
theory of founda tionali st justification
that contained a complete set
of principles which explained all
the ways in which an empirical, non-

basic proposition could be justified.

In the present work,

I

am con-

cerned only with the first or most fundamental
of such principles—
that explaining how a basic proposition can
make a very simple type of

external world proposition justified.

Given that the goal has been so

elusive in the past, it will be enough if we can
find

a

plausible

principle that bridges the gap between basics and
nonbasics.

This

does mean, of course, that even at the conclusion
of our work we will
not know if there is a viable and complete founda tionali
st theory.

For it may turn out that a complete theory requires coherence
relations among a proposition's justifiers, and that this will
destroy the
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theory's essentially
foundatlonallst character.
can only say, then, that
the present criticism of
foundatlonallsm may prove ultimately
to be a quite serious
one.
That there
will be no further discussion
of It here points to the
preliminary
nature of the present work.

Conceptual Schemes and Conceptual
Change
Some philosophers have held that
different cultures, or dif-

ferent historical eras, have or
could have widely different conceptual
schemes, and chat this fact Is
philosophically Important.

The concept

of a conceptual scheme Is explained
by Nicholas Rescher In "Conceptual

Schemes

:

Different cultures and different intellectual
traditions, to
say nothing of different sorts of
creatures, will, so it has
been widely contended, describe and explain
their experience—
their world as they conceive it— in terms
of concepts and
categories of understanding substantially
different from ours.
They may, accordingly, be said to operate
with different conceptual schemes: with different conceptual
tools used to
make sense of experience to characterize,
describe, and
explain the items that figure in the world as
best one can
form a view of it in terms of their features,
kinds, modes of
Interrelationship and interaction. The taxonomic and
explanatory mechanisms by which their cognitive business
is transacted may differ so radically that intellectual
contact with
them becomes difficult or impossible.

—

(Rescher, 1980,

p.

324).

We are also told that for those who have a different
conceptual scheme

from ours "The events and objects of the world of their
experience

might be very different from those of our own" (ibid.,

p.

323).

The relevant philosophical point that is made concerning this

146

Idea o, different conceptual
schemes Is made In several
different ways
by different philosophers.
«e will consider some
of the more Important Of these below.
I discern two
somewhat different
approaches-two

different morals that one Is
supposed

to

draw concerning foundatlon-

allsm (often In this context
called 'traditional
epistemology") when
one recognizes the possibility
of different conceptual
schemes.
The first approach is roughly
this.

culture's conceptual scheme Is

so

It could be that another

different from ours that "the
events

and objects of the world of
their experience" are not the
same as
ours.
If there Is such a radical
difference at this fundamental

experiential level, then surely we
are rash

to

assume that what we

regard as the basic raw data of
experience Is exactly so regarded
by
others.

They may not even make the
demarcations we do between

experience and the world.

The propositions we might take
to be foun-

dational and unchallengeable might look
this way only from our limited
perspective
The second approach is, again roughly,
to say that

our— or

conceptual scheme forms an interrelated
network of beliefs.

impossible

to

any

It is

get outside one’s conceptual scheme to
"objectively"

test a given belief.

So-called basic or experiential beliefs are
as

dependent on other beliefs as those beliefs are
on basics.
foundationalist approach that tries

to

So the

give epistemic primacy to

experiential beliefs is misguided.
These approaches are related

to

one another and to other cri-

ticisms of foundationalism, particularly to the so-called
"myth of
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the given." which

shall consider In Chapter
V.

I

arguments are offered.

But several distinct

One type. In line with
the first approach,

seems particularly concerned
with the differences between
cultures or
eras.
Another type (the second approach)
focuses on the claim that
the experiential part of ones
conceptual scheme Is dependent
on other
factual and even theoretical
parts, and cannot stand alone
In the way
the foundatlonallsts require.
I shall consider
both approaches In
turn.

——

Approach:

Cultural or Historical Relativity

The first approach may emphasize
either cultural differences
at one given time or differences
across time, in different historical
eras.

In "Skepticism, Foundational ism,
and Pragmatism" (1974), Joseph

Margolis emphasizes the latter in discussing
the significance of
"diachronic conceptual changes" (Margolis,
1974,

p.

127).

Margolis

claims to have uncovered "the fundamental
difficulty of Chisholm’s

foundational! sm" (ibid.,

There appear

to

p.

126).

be two elements in Margolis’

Chisholm’s foundationalism.

criticism of

The first is the claim that Chisholm’s

self-presenting or directly evident states (Margolis,
after Leonard
Nelson, calls them

cognitions") "involve a judgment" (ibid.,

p.

126).

By this Margolis apparently means that Chisholm would
regard his self-

presenting states as propositions.

view he attributes

to

Margolis in any case contrasts the

Chisholm with the view of Leonard Nelson in "The

Impossibility of the ’Theory of Knowledge’" (1973) that ordinary sen-

U8
scry perceptions do not
require concepts and are
not judgn^nts
(Nelson, 1973. pp. 8-9; cl.
KargoUs. 1974, p. U8).
since CHlsdol™
frequently refers to basic or
self-presenting states as
propositions
(=f., e.g. Chisholm. 1977.
p. 22).
seems that MargollS is
correct
here in his interpretation
of Chisholm.

u

The second and crucial element
of Margolls' criticism
is that
since these self-presenting
states are propositions,
there Is always
the possibility, based on
the Idea of conceptual
change over time,
that they are mistaken:

question that Chisholm's formulation
is
pen to challenge on the basis
of the "chance" of being
m staken that is, on the
basis of the significance of^
changes.
For, either Chisholm adheres
to Nelson s view of 1 cognitions"
(which seems not to be the
construes the apparent cognition as
involv^Lg judgment.
.; but if he favors the latter
Lehrer’s claim has force. Hence,
fountionalism ( that is, Chisholm's variety,
though not
necessarily Russell's) appears to be
subject to a fatal
weakness.
.

(Margolis,

1974, p.

127)

Lehrer had brought up the issue of conceptual
change in
"Skepticism and Conceptual Change" (1973) in
order

to

argue that "no

one ever knows for certain that any contingent
statement is true"
(Lehrer, 1973, p. 48).

as follows

The reason for this, according to Lehrer,
is

:

No matter how well entrenched a concept may
be in our
beliefs about the world, it remains always and constantly
subject to total rejection.
To obtain our objectives, scientific
or other, we may discard a concept as lacking a
denotation.
Any concept may be thrown onto the junkheap of discarded
concepts along with demons, entelechies, and the like.
Indeed,
some philosophers have even suggested that mental concepts
may
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one day meet that fate.

.

.

not apply to <*at »e think (TaL
Che tav\Lent ol ron^^^lro^a^^;

^ concept does

S

le^lTir.^t^h^rral'^”

Whatever contingent statement
you think
there is some chance, some
probabiH tv ^Vl 3 ^
state.ent’lacks a Uc“t o^n! ^He«:
tnere
“reta
is
JrL'r^h^^
some chance you are wrong.
,

’

(Lehrer, ibid., pp.

50-51)

However interesting the application
of the concept of conceptual change is to anti-founda
tionali st arguments, Margolis and
Lehrer
have not used it to make a
criticism of foundational ism. They
are
only making, in perhaps a more
sophisticated way, the point that the
foundationalists’ basic propositions are
not epi stemical ly certain or

incorrigible as required.

But as we have already seen,

the attribu-

tion of certainty or incorrigibility
to basic propositions is not a

structural requirement of Cartesian founda
tionali sm (in our sense)
generally, nor of Chisholm’s system
specifically.

Nevertheless, there is an interesting issue
raised here that
goes deeper than the criticism that basic
propositions are not

certain.

Rather than using the point about conceptual
change

to

attack the doctrine that basic propositions are
certain or
incorrigible, the critic of traditional founda tionali
sm might use the

conceptual change issue

to

press for a "shifting foundations" version

of foundational ism as opposed to the traditional "stable
foundations"

view that the types of propositions that can be basic are invariant
and not relative to culture or historical era.

Both views are com-

patible with Cartesian foundational ism in the narrow sense in which

I
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am using that term.

However, as

Cartesian foundatlonalism which

I

1

noted In Chapter III, the
type of
am Interested In defending
states

not only that basic
propositions are restricted to
those about subjective mental states, but also
that this restriction Is not
limited to a

particular historical or cultural

era.'^

What can be said, then, against
the "stable foundations" version of Cartesian foundatlonalism?
Clearly,
the critic will have to

give reasons for thinking that
shifts have occurred or will occur
In
the class of propositions from
which basic propositions are drawn.
Basic propositions will have to be
shown capable of being of one
type,
say subjective mental propositions.
In one era or culture, and of

a

distinct type, say singular theoretical
scientific propositions. In a

different era or culture.

Arguments to this effect are Indeed offered

by the critics of traditional
foundational ism.

Note that since the issue here is between
the stable versus
the shifting foundations views, more is
required of the critics of

traditional foundatlonalism than if the issue were
the epistemlc status of basic propositions (certainty or
incorribili ty versus some

lower epistemlc status).

If

the latter were the issue,

it might be

enough for the critics to show some metaphysical possibility,
however
remote, of a foundations shift.

A demonstration that such a shift

was, while not likely, at least possible in some sense
might be enough
to create the sort of metaphysical doubt that would
prevent us from

assigning certainty to basic propositions.

It might be enough.

not wish to make a positive claim to that effect.

The point

I

I

wish

do
to
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make Is that In any case
snch a demonstration of

a

bare metaphysical

possibility, while perhaps
effective In the certainty
Issue, will not
be enough to refute the stable
foundations view and establish
the
shifting foundations view.
If it could be shown
that there Is at
least some metaphysical possibility
that the shifting foundations
view
IS correct, this could most
likely be equally well demonstrated
for
the stable foundations view.

IJhat

is needed

for a strong argument

against the latter view Is positive
evidence that foundations shifts
have occurred or will occur. The
stronger Che evidence for this,
the
Stronger the case against traditional
founda tionali sm
The Electroencephalogram Argument

What evidence is there for foundations
shifts?
cephalogram or EEG argument can be used
evidence.
time,

to

The electroen-

attempt to provide such

It can be viewed as an argument for
foundations shifts over

from present basics as subjective mental
states to future

basics, after appropriate scientific developments,
as singular theoretical scientific statements.

The thrust of the EEG argument is that

in time these scientific statements will come to
have epistemic

priority over sensation reports.
as fo Hows

G.

Sheridan states the general idea

:

Situations are envisaged wherein it is claimed that the weight
of neurophysiological and other evidence, in the form
of

electroencephalogram readings, etc., would be enough to
discredit or override a person's honestly avowed report about
his present sensations or feelings.
(Sheridan, 1969,

p.

62)
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D.

M.

Armstrong offers a specific
example and argument:

r"-

.s

;r.‘
"
and inner experiences.
Suppose,
th^t I renor7
visual experience. The brain
technician is able to say 7rom
his knowledge of brain patterns
that (i) I am not lyinL Cii'i
y brain is in the appropriate state
for some other
experience; (iii) there are
disturbances in the brain proive awareness which wLld
account
account’^for"^
for my mistake.
On the evidence offered by
the techcian it ought to be concluded
that I have made a mistake.

tLT

(Armstrong, 1963,

p.

424).

The general conclusion, in the
event of such observations on the
part
of the brain technician, is
presumably that sensation reports
would

give way, in terms of epistemic
priority, to singular theoretical

statements of science.

A new type of proposition would
become basic.

Or, if one were an advocate of
coherentism rather than the shifting

foundations view, the general conclusion might
be that no propositions
are properly called basic.
But let us look again at the specific
conclusions Sheridan and

Armstrong make:

EEC readings "would be enough to discredit
or over-

ride a person’s honestly avowed report about
his present sensations or

feelings.

mistake.

It ought to be concluded that (the subject
has) made a

The question is:

who ought to conclude this?

would the EEG readings be enough
reports?

to

For whom

discredit the subject's sensation

The only answer that could be forwarded with some degree
of

plausibility is

the brain technician.

It might be held

plausibility that it is more reasonable for him

to

with some

believe that the

subject of the EEG reading has made a reporting error than

to

believe
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otherwise.

But that is not what is
at issue.

sub^

what the

What is at issue is

is most justified in
believing.

To shift the focus

to what the brain technician
or some other "outside"
observer is most

justified in believing is to make
the third-person error
that Alston
has pointed out.8 The Cartesian
stable foundations view being

challenged asserts that propositions
about a subject's sensations
are,
and will remain, basic
sub^. A proper challenge to this

^^

view must establish a situation
in which the proposition in
question
is not justified or basic for
the subject.

What the brain technician

ought to believe about the subject's
sensations is irrelevant.

When we shift back

to

the proper perspective of what
the sub-

ject of the EEC reading should think,

should defer to the brain technician.

referred

to

it is far from clear that he
In the sorts of EEC conflicts

by Sheridan and Armstrong, we have
to imagine that that

the subject has what he at least takes
to be, say, sharp pain

sensations, while the technician assures him
it is not really pain at
all.

Or the subject takes himself to be
sensing a bright,

color— say

an after-image—while the technician assures
him that he is

really being appeared
sharp

pain or

sensation

clear green

to

redly.

(It is legitimate here to speak of

bright, clear" green, because if it were a borderline

a very mild pain or a blue-green color,

for example

— the

problem in reporting the sensation might simply be that of
how best
categorize it.

The EEC example is not being used to point out any

alleged difficulty in classifying borderline cases.

It is to be

understood that the subject grasps all relevant concepts and takes

to
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himself to be experlencleg
a sensation that clearly
falls under one of
these concepts).
It seems to me that
the subject could ,ulte
legitimately respond. *en told by
the technician *at his
machine says, "So
much the worse for your machine."
This Is so, it would seem,
even In Armstrong's more
complex
case where the brain technician
claims to have EK data that
Indicate
a brain disturbance that
would account for the mistake
In Introspection.

It would of

course be Interesting to ask
how the technician

could establish such a failure
of Introspection In the
first place.
But In any case, as long as the
subject is experiencing the
sensation
of bright green. It may well be
reasonable for him to conclude chat
there Is some mlswlrlng or
misinterpretation of the presumably quite
complex machine.
If It comes to it, he might
begin wondering about
the technician's own sincerity,
or perhaps even about the soundness
of

the technician's own Introspective
facilities (which would be Involved
In the determination of the technician's
own sensations as he reads

the machine).

Even If the technician were to hook himself
up to his

own machine. It seems to me likely that
he would be more justified In
9

believing something Is wrong with his machine
than In believing
something Is wrong with his ability

to

experience his own sensations

properly.

Although it seems to me that justification still rests
with
the subject's own account of the sensations he
is having,

claim to have proven this.

What

I

I

do not

do claim to have shown is that the

EEG argument gains its prima facie plausibility from the
third-person
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error, and that once we
correct for this
i-iixs,

itC
1

is at
a ^ the very i
IS
least not

obvious that the subiect IS
is justified
iu« Cifioa in k
J
believing the technician's
report about the sensations the
subject Is experiencing when
It
conflicts with that subject's own
presently experienced sensations.
i

5

•

So It does not seem to me
that the EEG argument even

establishes that a conflict between
an EEG reading and the subject's
sensation report must be decided In
favor of the former.
But the EEG
argument,

It It

were

to

touch the stable foundations view
of Cartesian

foundatlonallsm (and not just the
Incorrigibility thesis) would have
to go considerably further than
establishing that the subject should

favor the brain technician's report
to his own.

It would have

to

show

that It Is likely that sophisticated
sensation-reporting machines of
this type will be developed and that
conflicts between machine reports
and subject reports will arise.

And here.

It seems,

there are even

Stronger grounds for rejecting the EEG argument.
These grounds have been brought out by George

"Incorrigibilism and Future Science" (1975).
critics of the incorrigibility thesis apply
the stable foundations view).

S.

Pappas in

(His arguments against
a.

fortiori to critics of

To understand Pappas' argument,

let us

note first that EEG machines of the required sophistication
can only
be developed if there are, and scientists discover, non-trivial
laws

relating sensations to neurophysiological states.
make correlations of specific brain-states

to

These laws must

specific sensations.

Let us grant with Pappas that it is reasonable
tions to exist and eventually to be discovered.

to

expect such correla-
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But in order to use the EEG
argument against the stable
foundations view.
It must also be shown
that it is likely that
conflicts
between the EEG readings and the
subject's reports .^11 arise.
Pappas
argues that it is not likely to
that such "EEG conflicts"
will arise:

neurophysiology of the future
consist of well-established
correlations! indeed laws
relating sensations and neural
events.
So, if it is now
reasonable to hold that such laws
will be developed as it
surely is and as all parties to
these disputes agree it is
also now reasonable to believe
that there will be built up
extr^ely reliable correlations between
reports of sensation.,
and machine readings of neural
events; and that we can
reliably infer from the latter sort
of correlations to the
former sort.
Now an EEG-conflict arises when,
after making sure that
^11 the appropriate concepts
neldlflTl
correct reports of his sensatiLs,
aft
and after
taking due precaution to see that
the brain machines
are working normally, there is still
a machine reading going
one way and the subject's report going
another way.
The
incorrigibilist can now argue as follows:
If it is now reasorelating sensations and neural events
will be built up in the future, then it
is also reasonable to
think, now, that EEG conflicts will not
arise.
This is simply
because in order for these law-like correlations
to get
established in the first place, there must be
extremely
reliable correlations holding between subjects'
reports and
machine readings; and an EEG-conflict would simply
be a breach
of these correlations.
And surely it is reasonable to hold,
now, that future neurophysiological science will
consist, in
part, of laws relating experiences of specific
sensations and
specific neural events.
The upshot is that.
.since it is now reasonable to think
that the relevant scientific laws will be developed,
it is
also reasonable to think that no EEG-conflict s will’arise.
wl 1
wi

1

’

.

(Pappas,

209-210)

1975, pp.

It appears to me that Pappas' argument is correct.

In sum, it does not seem likely that EEG-conflict

s

of

the

required sort will ever arise, and even if they did, it is not obvious
that the conflicts should be decided in favor of the machine's reports
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rather than the subject's.

The EEG argument, then,
does not establish

any llUellhood that singular
theoretical scientific propositions
will
eventually replace propositions
about a subject's mental
states as the
propositions that are basic for that
subject.

The World According to Quine
I

have discussed above some of the
arguments of Quine that

are specifically directed against
traditional epistemology.

Other

arguments of Quine have been interpreted
as offering additional
attacks, along conceptual change lines,
against founda tionali sm— or at
least against some specific version
of founda tionali sm
Quine himself
.

does not, as far as

I

know, explicitly state that these
arguments

challenge foundationalism.^

Quine’s argument for the underdetermination
or "inde teminacy
of translation can be viewed as an
argument against founda tionali sm

Where the EEG argument can be interpreted as
suggesting a shift over
time in the type of proposition which can
be basic, Quine’s indeter-

minacy of translation argument can be interpreted
as suggesting

difference in conceptual schemes across cultures

so

a

radical that we

cannot conclude that the type of proposition which can
be basic for us

can be so for those of the other culture.
Quine’s argument attempts to establish that two distinct and

incompatible translations of

a

foreign language may yet both be com-

patible with all the native speech behavior and gestures, as well as
the totality of dispositions to speech behavior," that translators
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have available to

then.

(cf.

Quine, 1960, pp. 27, 72).

native speech and behavior
will be sufficient

No amount of

to

establish that one
such translation better
captures what the natives 'really
mean."

Whatever Its other merits. It
does not seem that this
argument
offers a conclusion that Is
helpful to those wishing to
establish the
shifting foundations view.
If this conclusion Is
Interpreted as
directly challenging the view that
mental state propositions are
basic
to the individuals of the
native culture. It would presumably
have to
hold that there Is reason to think
that such propositions are not
basic In that culture.

But what reason does the
Indeterminacy argu-

ment offer for thinking this?

It might be taken to show that
the

anthropologist/translator could never determine
whether a given native
utterance was a sensation report or a
report of some other kind.
such an Interpretation would again make
the third-person error.

But

Here

the anthropologist/translator would
play the role of the brain tech-

nician in the EEG case.

The translator, as outside observer, might

well be unsure how to classify the native's
utterances.

But it does

not follow that the native speaker himself Is
unsure whether he Is

making a sensation report.
Perhaps the point is rather that the natives might
have a

completely different conceptual scheme that does not even make
the
distinctions we do between sensation reports and other types of
reports.

nothing

But the indeterminacy of translation argument in fact does
to

provide evidence for the view that there are such distinct

conceptual schemes.

At best,

it is an argument that the act of
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translation In and of Itself
does not provide evidence
one way or the
other-there are data-coepatlble
translations that
fit our conceptual

scheme and data-compatlble
translations that do not.

The argument
does nothing to show that we
ought to prefer the translation
that does
not fit our conceptual scheme.
And even If different
conceptual
schemes were established, it
would have to be argued that
this is

Incompatible with the stable foundations
view.

It is not an obvious

step from the existence of
different conceptual schemes to
the view
that epistemologically basic
propositions are historically or

culturally relative.
take

We have yet to see an argument
for the need to

that step.
It is important to note that
Quine himself would apparently

not feel that it is warranted to apply
the indeterminacy argument to
the critique of sensation reports
as basic.

Quine admits that some

sentences, namely observation sentences,
can be directly translated
(cf. Quine,

1960,

p.

68).

These translations can be confirmed by the

independent evidence of stimulatory occasions"
(ibid.,

p.

72).

The

indeterminacy concerns not individual sentences,
but whole translation
schemes, and the indeterminacy only arises because
the observation

sentences are not sufficient

to

determine the conceptual scheme on

which the translation of more theoretical sentences
depends (cf.
ibid.).

The predicament of the indeterminacy of translation
has

little bearing on observation sentences" (Quine,
1969,

p.

89).

Another position of Quine*s that can be interpreted as going
against the stable foundations view is found in his "Two Dogmas of
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Empiricism" (1961).

Quoting from and discussing
this work, James

Cornman takes Quine's main
thesis to be that "no particular
set of
statements Is Immune to refutation
and so none Is Irrevocably
at the

foundation of empirical justification"
(Cornman, 1978,

p.

250).

He

thus attributes to Quine a moderate
foundatlonallsm of the sort that

accepts foundations shifts.
It is not clear, however,

that Quine’s article contains
any

arguments for the view that propositions
about

a

subject’s mental

events will eventual ly— or perhaps
should at present— be given up as
basic in favor of singular theoretical
statements of science or other
types of propositions.

Indeed,

I

wonder whether here, as in his

translation argument, Quine does not mean

to be

excluding certain

types of sentences from his claim that
"no statement is immune to

revision" (Quine, 1961,

p.

43).

Specifically,

I

do not believe Quine

would here regard propositions about the
sensations a subject is presently experiencing as so immune.

Just as Quine gives special status

to his observation sentences in the translation
argument,

so,

I

believe, he would hold these sentences not applicable
to his general

claims about revisability in "Two Dogmas."

To see that this may be

so, note how Quine uses the term "experience" in the
passages

discussed by Cornman:
The totality of our so-called knowledge or beliefs, from
the most casual matters of geography and history to the profoundest laws of atomic physics or even of pure mathematics
and logic, is a man-made fabric which impinges on experience
only along the edges.
Or, to change the figure, total science
is like a field of force whose boundary conditions are
experience. A conflict with experience at the periphery occa-
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contrary experience.

"" ‘"e light of any single
.

.

“^y be held true come

•

*at may.
j
drastic enough adjustments
elsewhere In the system

it „e make

T

Fven
periphery can be held ^rue In
the
ce of recalcitrant experience
fac^orrelar-f”*^
by pleading hallucination
or
by mending certain statements
of the kind called logical
laws
conversely by the same token, no
statement Is Immunf to

“

(Quine,

1961, pp.

'

42-43)

The term "experience" here seems
to play the same role that
the term "observation sentence"
played in Quine’s discussion of
the

indeterminacy of translation.
determined and unproblematic.

within which one has
hypotheses.

ficient

to

It establishes the boundary
conditions

to arrange one’s

nonexperiential beliefs and

Unfortunately, experiences themselves are
never suf-

determine in and of themselves which of the
more theoreti-

cal beliefs to adopt.

comes to.

Experience itself is relatively well

This really seems to be what Quine’s account

But experiences themselves do not look
to be,

account, the sorts of things that can be jockeyed
around

other elements of the fabric.

on this
to

fit the

One can adjust for a recalcitrant

experience by pleading hallucination (which is in

a sense,

to

interpret it as just an experience) or even by amending
the laws of
logic, but there is no suggestion that the experience
Itself, however

recalcitrant, can be adjusted away.

assertion that
appear

to

S

A proposition making the bare

is experiencing such-and-such a sensation does not

be revisable on this scheme.

Quite the contrary, it provi-
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des the boundary conditions
to

*lch other

propositions must be

adjusted.

Nor is there the slightest
Indication that experience Is
about to lose Its role as
provider of boundary conditions
In favor of
something more theoretical.

This interpretation seems to
make Quine almost into

a traditional Cartesian foundationalist
who is simply making the
point that
the basic experiential
propositions are not in themselves
sufficient

to justify highly theoretical
propositions,

a

point Chisholm is happy

enough with to assert more than once
in Theory of Knowledge (cf
Chisholm. 1977, pp. 63. 82-84).

if Quine's epistemology is
ultimately

to be treated more radically than
this,

it is because of what he wri-

tes elsewhere, especially in
"Epistemology Naturalized."

There, as we

have seen in an earlier section of
this chapter, Quine takes a quite

different line against traditional epistemology
from the line Cornman
attributes to him.

"Two Dogmas" does not appear to be the place
to

look for Quine's criticism of traditional
founda tionali sm; it cer-

tainly does not seem to be the place to look
for a defense of the view
that foundations shifts have occurred or will occur,
Cornman'

interpretation notwithstanding.

Sosa's Argument from Nonsensory Modes of Knowing

The final argument

I

shall consider in support of the view

that the foundations are historically or culturally relative is by

Ernest Sosa, in

The Raft and The Pyramid" (1980).

Actually, this

would be better termed an argument for biological relativity, for it
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Is based on the supposition
that other species,

or extraterrestrial

beings, might acquire knowledge
In radically different
ways than we
do.

How could one impose reasonable
limits on extraterrestrial
mechanisms for nonlnferentlal
acquisition of belief? Is It
not possible that such
mechanisms need not always function

necessLSr°be'^d“"'J'"“\°^
^
^
knowledge
1 nde!r
deed ofJ any contingent

of their surroundings and
spatio-temporal fact? Let us suntose
^
hem to possess a complex system
of^rue beliefs cLcLn^r
their surroundings, the structures
below the surface of
things exact details of history
and geography, all constiu ed by concepts none of
which corresponds to any of our
sensible characteristics. I^at then?
Is it not possibleThat
asic beliefs should all concern
fields of force, waves
ema ca structures, and numerical
assignments to variables in several dimensions? This
is no doubt an exotic
notion, but even so it still seems
conceivable. And if it is
then shall we say of the noninf
erential
beliefs
iefs of such beings? Would we have
to concede the existence of special epistemic principles
that can validate their
noninf erential beliefs? Would it not
be preferable to formulate more abstract principles that can
cover both human and
ex raterrestial foundations? If
such more abstract principles
accessible, then the less general principles
that
define the human foundations and those that
define the extraterrestial foundations are both derived
principles whose valiity depends on that of the more abstract
principles.
In this
the human and extraterrestial epistemic
principles would
resemble rules of good nutrition for an infant
and an adult.
The infant's rules would of course be quite
unlike those valid
for the adult.
But both would still be based on a more fundamental principle that postulates the ends of
well-being and
good health. \^at more fundamental principles
might support
both human and extraterrestial knowledge in the way
that those
concerning good health and well-being support rules of
nutrition for both the infant and the adult?

^

(Sosa,

1980, pp.

22-23)

Interesting questions would indeed be raised if we ever

encountered extraterrestrial beings of this sort.

I

agree with Sosa's

implication that we should then look for more fundamental epistemic
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principles that would explain
both human and
extraterrestrial
knowledge
But Sosa is also right
that it "is no doubt an
exotic notion"
to imagine nonlnferentlal
beliefs of this sort.

Perhaps it is

conceivable, in some fairly broad
sense of that term, but mere
conceivablllty does not give us any
reasons for supposing that
what can
be conceived is very likely
or plausible.
is very vague,

Even what is conceived here

and I suspect that the more
realistic and detailed an

example one tried to construct,
the more problematic it would
become.
In any case, Sosa has not here
provided any strong reason for

thinking that such extraterrestrials
do or are likely to exist, and
so
he has not provided a strong
reason against the stable foundations
view.

Even if my task here were not
Just to show that there are no

decisive arguments against traditional
foundatlonallsm but also

to

show that foundatlonallsm is more
plausible than its alternatives,

would not consider Sosa's supposition

to

I

count against establishing

this unless some positive reason were given
for thinking there were
such modes of knowing, and unless some plausible
explanation were

given of how such knowing occurs or might occur.

Seco nd Approach;

I

Basics and Background Knowledge

have thus far considered one of two general approaches
based

loosely on the idea of a conceptual scheme

— the

first,

as we have

seen, holds that an alleged historical or cultural
relativity of con-

ceptual schemes implies shifts in the types of propositions which
can
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be basic.

I

shall next consider the
second general approach.

This Is
the Idea that all o£ our
beliefs are connected to one
another In an

Interrelated „et>,ork, and that
even so-called basic beliefs
depend on
background knowledge which the
subject „ust also possess.
We cannot
get outside our circle of
beliefs to test

belief-independent reality.

thea.

on some supposed

Even our perceptual judgments
must be

based on prior conceptions, etc.

One way of making this idea
more specific is to deny that
there is a so-called given grounding
at least some of our beliefs.
Thus the attack on the given,
which is the subject of the next
chapter, can be viewed as a version
of the conceptual schemes

argument, and the next chapter as an
extension of the present

discussion.

But there is another way of making
more specific this

idea of the dependency of so-called
basic propositions on others

within a conceptual scheme, and that is
by arguing that

a basic propo-

sition cannot be understood by the subject
unless he possesses a
variety of concepts, makes a variety of
assumptions, and understands

a

variety of other propositions which are not
plausibly construed as
basic.

This background knowledge vitiates the claim
that basic propo-

sitions have some special epi stemical
ly independent status.

turn in the next chapter

to

the arguments against the given,

Before
I

shall

briefly consider this background knowledge issue.
This issue is brought up in several places in the
1i

teratur e

.

shall consider Wilfred Sellars' statement of it in

Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind:"

I
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*

*

*

th6 siithoirxty of

tli 0

rpnoTf"

"tvi-?

*»

-f

—

called

standard conditions’
coiilrl
green” in recognition of
its
ts authority.
LthorUy'’°''iro^h^^''
In other words, for a
Konstatieru ng report
express observational knowledge,"
not only
^he presence of a g;eerobiect
T. r .
perceiver must know that
okens of This is green are
tokL^or-Thr'^-*'''"''^’
symptoms of the presence of
^°^ditions which are standard for
visual
plrceptJon!'"
^

/

absurrirthe^^d

something obviouslv

could be the expression of
observational knowledg^, Jo;es
episodes of this kind are
reUab?r?
h°
eliable indicators
of the existence, suitably
related to the
speaker, of green objects.
I do not think that it is
[a surd].
Indeed, I think that something very
like it is
true.
The point I wish to make now, however,
is that if it is
follows, as a matter of simple logic,
that one
ITVa t have observational knowledge
couldn
of any fact unless one
knew many other things as well. And let
me emphasize that the
point IS not taken care of by distinguishing
between knowing
how and knowing that, and admitting that
observational
knowledge requires a lot of "know how." For
the point is specifically that observational knowledge of any
particular fact,
e.g. that this is green, presupposes
that one knows general
facts of the form X is a reliable symptom of
Y.
And to admit
this requires an abandonment of the traditional
empiricist
idea that observational knowledge "stands on
its own feet."
(Sellars, 1963,

p.

168)

Although Sellars' terminology is sometimes different from
mine, he seems clearly to be making the general point
that so-called

basic propositions are not truly basic because they depend
on

background propositions.

However, some unnecessary assumptions on

Sellars' part must be cleared away before we get

object ion.

to

the heart of the
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First,

it is not necessary
that a basic proposition
be known

by the subject for whom
it is basic

•

It

is enough that it be

justified
Second, If Sellars is to be
taken as criticizing Cartesian
rather than external world
foundatlonallsm. then it would
be better
to express the alleged basic
proposition under discussion as
"This
looks green," or "S is appeared
to greenly," rather than
as "This is
green," which can be Interpreted
as a statement about the
external
world.
Third, it is important to recognize
Sellars’ assumption that
"the authority of the report ’This
is green’ lies in the fact
that
the existence of green items
appropriately related to the perceiver

can be inferred from the occurrence
of such reports."

Sellars makes

it sound as though "This is green"
can only be basic if a team of

observers could hear the subject utter
"This is green," infer that
the subject is appropriately related
to green items, and thereby

confer authority on his utterance.
person error.
subject,

This is again to make the third-

In order for a Cartesian proposition
to be basic for a

it does not have to be confirmed

certainly not necessary that
be necessary that

S

S

"on the outside."

make a verbal report.

be able to make a report,

It may not even

but let us assume for

the sake of argument that such ability is required.
IS not required to make a verbal report,

It is

however,

If,

S

it cannot of course be

required that the report be a reliable symptom or sign of
the presence of green objects in standard conditions, and that

S

recognize
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an

this.

Yet Sellars does require
these things.

third-person error, Sellars ends
up attrlbutlr*

^hlng

In

to S a

the

conceptual

sophistication that Is needlessly
complex and not obviously
required
in order tor a proposition
expressed by, for example,
"This
looks

green" to be basic for

S.

The effect of all this Is
to make the

dilemma for the Cartesian
foundatlonallst look more serious
than It
may really be.
Fourth,

I

have discussed versions of
founda tionali sm in

which what is basic for

S

need not be believed by

to assume that S must believe
a basic proposition,

must know it.

But nowhere,

to my knowledge,

Sellars seems

S.

indeed that he

‘

has it been argued that

propositions which are basic for a subject
must be believed by that
subject.

I

shall, however, for the sake of
argument, assume that a

basic proposition must be believed by
the subject.
Now, with all these assumptions removed,
or granted for the
sake of argument,

there still remains,

I

believe, a core objection

that the Cartesian founda tionali st must
contend with.

still seem that
standing if
basic for

S.

must have some background knowledge or under-

S

This looks green" or

"S

is appeared to greenly" is to be

What does this background consist of?

very likely that

For it does

S

It does seem

must have the concept of greenness.

But more than

that (and this seems to be what Sellars was getting
at, although he

overstated his claim), it would seem that

S

must understand something

about the relation of this proposition to other closely
related

propositions.

If he believes

that this looks green, for example, it
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see.s he would have to
understand what it is for
so.e object to
green.
And there's the rub.
For the proposition
that this looks

^

green, and certainly the
proposition that

S

is appeared to greenly,

seem to be derivatives of
the proposition that
this is green.
The
latter seems to come first
I'n terms
u
irst, in
ofc what
the subject first learns
and understands.
This I take to be
UU the
une essence
essennp of the objection
based on the background
knowledge
•

issue.

it seems to me that there
are two sorts of responses
to this

criticism of Cartesian foundationalism.

One response challenges
Che

crucial assumption chat basic
propositions are derivative in the
sense required. The other
questions whether anything
unacceptable
follows from the fact that basic
propositions are derivative in this
sense

The first response is made by
Roderick Firth, in "Coherence,
Certainty, and Eplstemlc Priority"
(1973).

He presents the "paradox

that it seems at least logically
possible to have the concept "looks
red" before we acquire the concept
"is red."

Yet

if,

as seems to be

the case, we cannot fully understand
the former concept unless we

possess the latter concept, it would seem
that it is after all not

logically possible
Firth, 1973,

p.

to

461).

have the former before we have the latter
(cf.

Firth continues

There are many subtle facets of this question
which cannot be explored here, but for our present
purpose it is sufficient to point out that the underlying paradox is
easily
dissolved if we do not confuse concepts with the
words used
to express them.
It is a genetic fact, but a fact with
philosophical Implications, that when a child first begins
to
use the word 'red' with any consistency he applies it
to
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--

--should
merely made to
appear red by abnormal
conditions of observation.
Thus the
child calls white mnarvid" n
red
glass.
In fact at rtS stLe
the'ch
those circumstances In
whrcrwe af ad
“uthfully
say -looks red to me now."
so that if wi l°a
^
""Reason
able to assert that the
child Is using 'red'fo
primitive form of the concept
"looks red." To

f

calfthls^a

iagvLirhe™rs^°'bf'"=“F“'™°"
--ly look
red^f of fLSs thftf ef 1
f:
that the child somehow loses
his primltfrcf f pff
f Te"

sophisticated one. As Lewis points
?hf“f
out
Chapter III of Mind and the World
Order the Lief 1st af
the nonscientist are able
to share what Lewis calls
"our common world precisely because
the scientist does not

f

f f

nontechnical
senses,
sef es-Lfd
and for the same reason there
is no inconsistency in
adults we continue to have a
"1looks ^
concept
a" which is
red
logically prior to our concept
"irr2!”
(Firth,

1973, pp.

461-462)

If Firth’s supposition here is
plausible, as it seems to me
to be,

then we need not conclude that the
basic proposition "This

looks green" is a derivative of
the nonbasic proposition "This is

green." For it may be the former
proposition that the child initially
comes to understand, although he may
express it incorrectly (from the

adult point of view) as "This is green."
(This shows another way in

which important distinctions are missed in
Sellars because he looks
at and epistemically evaluates the utterence
"This is green" rather

than the proposition expressing the experience
which might (or might
not) lead to this utterance.)
But what if,

to

avoid unwanted ontological commitments, we

insist that what is basic is not the proposition that
this looks
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green, but rather the
proposition
c is
P oposltion that S
appeared to greenly? Can
that be plausibly construed
as something the
child understands?
Again, care „ust be taken
not to leap to conclusions
that merely se em
I am Inclined to
think that the answer to
the question Is
yes.
Granted, the child does not
express himself
that way.
indeed, only a few Chlsholmlans
are likely to understand
what protion
P
the expression refers
to.
But as Firth has shown,
it is
•

m

one thing to use the
expression, another to understand
the
proposition. The child may very
well understand what It Is
to be
appeared greenly to. One could
argue, I believe, that It
Is a very

straightforward proposition that
requires little conceptual and
no
philosophical sophistication to grasp.
At least It should no

lo^er

appear that the assumption that
basic propositions are linguistically
or conceptually derivative is
an obvious one.
But even if Sellars and the
other critics are ultimately

right that so-called basic propositions
are derivative, there is

still the second response for the
critics to contend with.

response is, again,

to

This

ask whether anything unacceptable
follows from

the conclusion that basic propositions
are derivative.
It is important not to confuse the
genesis of the under-

standing of a proposition with the epistemlc
status of that proposition.

Sellars,

in the passage quoted above, attempts
to establish

that observational knowledge has as a
prerequisite a good deal of

background knowledge.
conclusion:

Then he moves directly from that

to his

To admit this need for background knowledge
requires
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an abandonment of the
j
une craaitional empiricist
F-Li.j.«_xbL laea that
observational
knowledge 'stands on Its own
feet'" (Sellars. 1963,
p. 168).
But
.

.

this is too quick a move away
from traditional empiricism,

llhen the

Cartesian foundatlonallst says
that a basic proposition
stands on It
own feet, he means that It
does so eplstemlcally.

He does not

necessarily mean that It does so
genetically or causally.

The mere

fact that one can point to
necessary causal conditions
without which
a given proposition would
not have been basic for a
subject at a t irae

does not seem, certainly not In
any obvious way, to vitiate
its
epistemlc status as a basic proposition.
Why should it be any dif-

ferent If we can also point to
genetic conditions of conceptual deve-

lopment such that, before a proposition
can be understood by (and
basic for) S,

there are concepts and other
propositions which must

have been learned and understood by
him?

It Is not at all obvious

that a proposition's epistemlc priority
entails Its genetic priority.

Perhaps there are arguments for such entailment
that the critic could offer.

But Sellars does not offer any,

I

am not aware of

such arguments by other critics, and yet it
appears that such argu-

ments need to be offered if the background knowledge
issue is to be
made into a good case against Cartesian founda tionali
sm
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Notes to Chapter IV

his

-""f

Seiws'

attack on glvenness-T^ll^e^
I
a u
n
the crucial steps In undermining
the possibility
poss^bUl^
of
a
knowledge’" (Rorty. 1979 n
I
'

theory of

LHSi? i

sitplalning which represeni* conceptaal'•
" (Ibid.).
his criticism of what seems
to be a
snec?fic»n
a“ach
on
the
very
possibility
posslbllltv^of'T'?*^^°"f^^^^°’’^®''®”°^°®^
of epistemology (cf. Williamc?
^
iQ?? rv
n-iia
claims Quine and Sellars ll his
chief “fluenc ; (if ’ibl
and Bruce Aune claims this of
Sellars (Aune 196?' p ijin’ i T
-"‘ion foundhlonlil^si. iid^iheJi
irL!:«“ddo require some Interpretation
arguments
to be applied against It
and Aune can be plausibly re|ardeS
hoid
rr o”®'
Sellars have provided the fundime Ti’
demonstrate the falsity of

tatlons are 'purely given' or
®Mlchael
r

’

'

.

.

r

•

“

L

“floiSi::?"

Influential or
slenff 1 c!i/^rir
approaches In the present chapter. Cf.
espeiifii
if
cially discussions of Lehrer, Will,
Dllman. Peirce, and Foley.

m

edition a9h"'’p?"io)!'

Theory of Knowledge, second

^Chisholm has used a definition of the
self-presenting which
self-presenting be certain (cf. Chisholm, 1976,
p. 25, 1979, p. 338).
In the section "Chisholm’s Iterative
Principles of Chapter VI I discuss why Chisholm
might have felt
forced to add this requirement.
His more recent definitions (cf.
Chisholm, 1980, p. 549; 1981, pp. 79-80) do not
retain the certainty
requirement.
In The First Person
Chisholm explicitly notes the
distinction at issue:
It will be noted that I have not defined
self-presenting properties by reference to certainty.
But if we think of certainty as constituting the highest degree of epistemic
justification, then we may say that a person’s self-presenting
,
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properties are objects of certainty
for that person.
(Chisholm, 1981,

p.

82)

^These are epistemic mediating steps,
not necessarily subjective mental steps.
Reason and inference need not be involved
here.
discussion
of the difference between two
epistemic propositions:
(A)
For all P, if i dearly and distinctly
perceive that
P, then I am certain that P.
(B)
I am certain that (for all
P, if i dearly and
distinctly perceive that P, then P).
Cleve, 1979, pp. 66-67)
r,
„ Cleve s
Van
discussion brings out that principle (A) is,
in our

n

,

terminology, non-iterative:
I maintain that in order to become
certain of a proposition I do not need to know that I am clearly
and distinctly
perceiving it, nor that whatever I so perceive is
either certain or true.
It is enough that I
clearly and distinctly
perceive the proposition.
(A) says that this is enough.
For
(A) says that perceiving something clearly and
distinctly is
sufficient to render me certain of it.
It follows that
nothing else is necessary unless it is also necessary
for the
occurrence of clear and distinct perception in the first
place.
But neither knowledge of (A) nor knowledge of the
fact
that I am clearly and distinctly perceiving something is
necessary for such perception to occur.
The point I have been insisting upon could be summed up as
follows:
(A) is not a principle I have to apply in order to
gain knowledge; I need only fall under it.
(Ibid
pp. 69-70)

^

,

. ,

^That is, I am interested in defending tenet IE2a as outlined
and discussed in Chapter III.
Q

Cf
the long passage quoted from Alston and the discussion of
this passage in the "Iterative Foundational ism" section of the present
chapter.
.

None of Quine's works which seem most relevant to the
foundational! st-coherentist dispute "Epistemology Naturalized"
(Quine, 1969), which was discussed above. Word and Object (1960) or
"Two Dogmas of Empiricism" (1961), both of which are discussed in the
present section make use of the term "foundationalism. " But as
stated in note 1 of the present chapter, several philosophers have
interpreted Quine's arguments as telling against traditional
foundationalism, and it would seem safe to say that there has been a
general perception among philosophers that certain of Quine's
arguments are or can be directed against traditional foundationalism.

—

—
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besides Sellars’ include Dewey
(1922
A
Aune
(1967, Chapter II, especially pp. 42-43
48
SD'i
u-t
(1977, p. 69), Bonjour (1978,
pp. 1-6), Rescher

p.

),

i

i

•

({980; pp.’329-33^!

CHAPTER

V

THE CRITICS OF FOUNDATIONALISM

II:

THE GIVEN

Critics of foundationalism have argued
that founda tionalists

must posit the existence of "the given"

to

serve as a foundation for

knowledge, and that either this given
does not exist or it could never
serve as an adequate foundation for knowledge.

These arguments are

discussed and criticized.

The Influence of Sellars

The classical source for a discussion of "the
myth of the
given" is Wilfred Sellars'
(1963).

critique.

"Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind"

More recent works have restated or extended Sellars'
My discussion shall consist of a detailed analysis
of two

of these works

—^Michael

Williams' Groundless Belief (1977) and

Laurence Bonjour's "Can Empirical Knowledge have
(1978).

a

Foundation?"

Williams claims Sellars as one of his major influences (cf.

Williams, 1977,

p.

vii) and both works draw heavily on Sellars.

If

Sellars' name is here forgone in favor of those of younger philo-

sophers whose arguments have not yet been discussed in the literature,
Sellars' important influence on these arguments should at least be

acknowledged.

Of course, neither Williams nor Bonjour would claim to

have restated or developed every significant argument by Sellars

against the given.

Sellars is a particularly difficult philosopher

to

interpret; indeed different interpreters have come up with strikingly
176
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different interpretations of him.l

I

shall not add my interpretation,

as It would add at least another
chapter, and the result would be

another in
have

to

a series of

be compared and

interpretations which would then themselves

assessed— another chapter still!

better off relying on Williams and
Bonjour
counted on as sympathetic interpreters.

,

We are

who can at least be

In place of additional

chapters, we can simply recognize that
there may yet be further argu-

ments against the given

to

be mined

from Sellars' rich work.

examination of these arguments will have

to

But

wait until someone digs

them out.
It should not be assumed from what I have
said that Williams

and Bonjour are entirely unoriginal.

Indeed, there is much that is

new here, and this makes an examination of their
work of particular
interest.

Michael Williams* "Groundless Belief"

The first work to be discussed is Williams' Groundless Belief

.

My discussion of Williams' work requires some reconstruction, as the

organization of his arguments is not always clear.

However, the argu-

ments themselves are there clearly enough and can be unearthed without
a great deal of

interpretation and conjecture in most cases.

Williams construes his arguments as a set of attacks on
"phenomenalism."

But he uses this term in such an extremely broad

sense that it is really equivalent to "founda tionali sm" as that term
is used

in the present work.

He recognizes that founda tionali sm need
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not be committed to sense data or
to the view that physical
objects

are logical constructs from sensory
experiences.

"phenomenalism"

wants

to

to

He uses the term

describe all forms of founda tionali sm
because he

call attention to "the important
continuities of thought

which exist between various theories often
taken
opponents" (Williams, 1977,

p.

to

be implacable

26).

Why these continuities could not be illustrated
using the term

foundationalism

rather than "phenomenalism"

I

am not sure.

Be that

as it may, when Williams writes "phenomenalism," it
should be

understood

to

mean "foundationalism."

He will not make the mistake of

thinking that if he has refuted some views about sense
data or physical objects as logical constructs, he has thereby refuted
foun-

dationalism as such.

Williams' Attack on the Given

The central argument of Williams' book, an argument which

occurs in several stages and which
a

I

shall analyze in detail below, is

criticism of the notion of the given,

a

notion which he feels is

required by all forms of foundationalism and which he also feels is

ultimately incoherent.

Williams claims

to

be attacking

there is a given element in experience" (ibid.).
in its explicit formulations,

H.H. Price. ^

"the idea that

This idea is taken,

from the work of Kant, C.I. Lewis, and

Kant's well known distinction between intuitions and

concepts is based on the notion of a given in experience.
represent the given element.

Intuitions

They are received passively by the mind
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(though for Kant they are not
representations of what Is "out there:"
even Intuitions are tor Kant In
some sense constructs of the
human
mind, but constructs which the
mind Is Inevitably constrained
to
accept).

Concepts represent the basic tools
which the individual can

actively use to formulate propositional
knowledge, but only when these
concepts are properly allied with the
given Intuitions.
The more modern doctrine of such
philosophers as Lewis and

Price is put this way by Lewis, in

a

passage quoted by Hllllams (cf.

Williams, 1977, p. 27):

There are In our cognitive experience, two
elements, the Immediate data such as those of sense, which are
presented or
given to the mind, and a form, construction, or
interpretation, which represents the activity of thought.
(Lewis,

1956, p. 38)

Williams calls this the "two-components view" (Williams,
1977,
What does this view have

to

do with founda tionali sm?

p.

27).

Williams

is right that there are strong associative links between
the two-

components view and traditional founda tionali sm (cf. ibid.,

p.

28).

The given in the two-components view becomes associated with the basic

propositions of foundationalism.

And if the given is taken to be sen-

sory experience or the beliefs closely associated with such

experience, as it usually is, we appear

Cartesian foundationalism.

to

have some version of

Further, the theoretical, interpretative

element of cognition in the two-components view is associated with the
inferential knowledge that is based on or derived from the basic

knowledge in foundationalism.

The worry, expressed by C.I. Lewis,

is

180

that without the given,

there Is nothing which knowledge
must be true

to and knowledge would be "contentless
and arbitrary" (Lewis,
38;

c£. Williams,

27-28).

pp.

1956, p.

with Che given, Lewis and others are

satisfied that we have an absolutely certain
data base which provides

both the ground for inferential or Indirectly
evident propositions and
the ultimate court of appeal by means of
which the reasonableness of

those inferential propositions is judged.

That the two-coraponents view and Cartesian
foundational ism are
strongly associated, both historically and
theoretically, is clear.

What is not clear is whether Cartesianism entails
the two-components
view, specifically the doctrine of the given.
to demonstrate such an entailment,

so

Williams does nothing

in principle one could charge

that Williams’ attack on the doctrine of the given is
irrelevant.

It

does nothing to show the falsity of Cartesianism since the
doctrine

attacked has not been logically linked
However,

I

will not pursue such

to

Cartesianism.

a course

against Williams,

since my own view of Cartesian foundationali sm, as well as any

Cartesian theory

I

can imagine, relies strongly on the view that there

is a given element in experience.

doctrine of the given

—

I

Cartesianism may not entail the

do not know about that

— but

if Williams were

right that the doctrine of the given were incoherent and must be
rejected,

I

would have

to

concede everything, for

I

cannot imagine

what a recognizably Cartesian foundationalism would be that did not
rely on the doctrine of the given.

Other Cartesians have also

accepted, at least implicitly, the doctrine of the given, and

I

ima-
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gine they would find themselves in
a similar situation if Williams'

attack on the doctrine proved successful.
So

I

am committed to showing that something
is wrong with

Williams' attack on the doctrine of the
given.

argument against it?

What,

then,

is his

Actually, although Williams himself is
not very

clear about this, it appears to me that
his main argument is not

against the existence of the given as such.

It is rather an argument

against the possibility that the given, if it
exists and whatever it
might be, could ever provide

a

foundation for knowledge of ordinary

propositions about the external world.

main argument seems

to

about it; and since

I

take,

This is really the course the

in spite of what Williams sometimes says

think this is a much more plausible approach

than one which tries to deny the existence of any element
of givenness
in experience,

I

will take Williams to be arguing for the more

plausible claim, although

I

seem fairly explicitly

be directed against the very possibility of

to

will also consider those remarks which

the given.
I

will first reconstruct what

I

take Williams' argument to be

from various statements of his that are sometimes widely dispersed

throughout the text.

I

will then present some textual references and

support for the reconstruction.

A Reconstructed Argument against the Given
as a Possible Foundation for Knowledge

The structure of the argument can be most easily discerned by
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first giving it in a "stripped
down" version:

(

)

dation for the justification of
external world
propositions, then apprehension of
the given itself
a form of non-propos i tional
knowledge.
pprehension of the given cannot be
a form of nonpropositional knowledge; it is
impossible to have such
cognitive yet nonconceptual knowledge.
the given to serve as the founation for the justification of
external world
propositions.

In more detail, we have:
WA2.

(1) If it is possible for the given to
serve as the foundation for the justification of external
world
propositions, then it is possible that what
is given
in a specific case counts in favor
of one such propo-

sition rather than another.
then the apprehension of the given must
itself
be some form of primitive knowledge or
awareness.
The given as such and the conceptual as
such are
mutually exclusive.
If 3, then the apprehension of the given
must occur
without conceptual mediation.
If 4c, then the apprehension of the given
is nonpropositional
If 5c, then it is not possible that the
apprehension
of the given itself is some form of primitive
knowledge or awareness.
ft is not possible for the given to serve as
the foundation for the justification of external world
propositions

(2) If Ic,

(3)
(4)
(5)

(6)

There is also an argument in support of premise
WA3:

6:

(1) Whatever can be known must be the sort of thing which
can be true or false.
(2) Propositions are the only sorts of things which can be

true or false.
ff the apprehension of

the given is nonpr oposi tional
then such apprehension cannot be of something which
can be true or false.
(4) If the apprehension of the given is nonpr oposi tional
then it is not possible that it is some form of
knowledge
.

Scattered among the remarks which go

to make

up these argu-
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meats are additional remarks
which suggest a different
conclusion from
that of WA2.
These additional remarks suggest
an argument that more
directly attacks the Idea that
there Is such a thing as the
given In
experience.
I detect two versions
of such an argument:
WA4:

(1) If there is a given in experience
that is independent
of all propositions, it must
be able to be

characterized

(2) If it is able to be characterized,
then there are propositions which adequately express the
nature of the

given.

(3) If 2c
then the given in experience is
not independent
of all prop ositions
(4) There is no given in experience
that is independent of

all propositions.

WA5.

(1) If there is a given in experience, then
one should be
able to find the given through introspection
of

one’s

experience.
(2) Evidence from the psychology of perception
indicates
that there is no such thing as a state of
sensuous
apprehension utterly unaffected by beliefs, desires,
and expectations.
(3) If 2, then there is no experience of the given
as
such.
(4) If 3c,

then it is not the case that one can find the
through introspection of one’s experience.
(5) There is no given in experience.

Williams does not explicitly recognize two distinct types
of
argument:

one concluding that the given cannot be used to provide
a

foundation for ordinary propositions, another concluding that there
can be no such thing as the given.
types are present, and

ate them,

above have

I

I

I

am sure, however, that these two

will treat them in turn.

But before

I

evalu-

shall consider what relation these arguments as formulated
to

Williams’ text.
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Textual Sources for the Above

Recon.c;^r,.n^.•

The major source paragraph for
WA2 is the follow! ng:

Since the apprehension of the
given element is supposed to
ultimate check upon empirical
knowledge, it must
itsllf^h^^^
tself be some form of primitive
knowledge or awareness.
But
when we recall the sharp distinction
drawn between the pure
oncept and the sensuously given,
a problem arises.
The pure
concept and the sensuously given
are thought by Lewis to he
independent-neither limits the other-but
this makes
7t
it look as If the mind has to be
able to grasp the given
without conceptual mediation.
In other words, the knowledge
which IS involved in the grasping of
the sensuously given
since it is independent of conceptual
interpretation by the
mind, must be non-propos i tional or,
to put the point more
pejoratively,, ineffable.
But if it is ineffable, it cannot
provide us with a check upon anything,
let alone the entire
edifice of empirical knowledge.
(Williams, 1977, pp. 28-29)

For an elucidation of what it is for one
thing
check upon something else, we must turn

to

to

provide a

a later passage:

The certainty of the given is saved only at
the cost of making
it unintelligible how awareness of the given
could serve as a
check on anything, how such knowledge could ever
count in
favor of one hypothesis rather than another.
(

That is,

Ibid

.

,

p.

32

the given provides a check on an ordinary proposition

about the external world, or a guarantee of some form, if
it gives us
some reason for thinking that that proposition is more likely
to be
true than some other ordinary proposition

Although Williams uses the term
I

— its

negation, for example.

knowledge" in these passages,

believe he is really talking about justification, and have

sented him in my reconstruction.

so

repre-

Indeed, Williams himself recognizes

elsewhere that the real issue being dealt with in these debates has

to

185

do with the concept of
justification rather than the more
complex concept of knowledge, of which
justification Is merely a component
(cf.

ibid., pp. 5-12, especially
p. 11).

The general idea behind Williams'
argument should be clear
from these passages: if the given
is to provide any sort of
foundation
for ordinary empirical propositions
about the external world, it must
be able to be used to show that
one such proposition is more reaso-

nable than another.

It would have

specific ordinary proposition.

Williams continues, if we are

to

do so in order to justify any

Thus, we have premise
to keep

1

of WA2.

But,

the given and the conceptual

distinct, as the two components view requires,
then apprehension of
the given cannot be in any way conceptual
or propositional.

be nonpropositional or ineffable.

But nothing ineffable can serve to

guarantee that one proposition is more likely
Premise

2

It must

to be

true than another.

of WA2 is taken almost directly from the
first sen-

tence of the main source paragraph.

Premise

3

is not to be explicitly

found, but it is echoed in Williams' reference to the
"sharp
that must be drawn between the conceptual and the sen-

suously given.

This premise must be understood as an essential tenet

of the two-components view.

If

there is no clear distinction between

the conceptual and the given in experience,

then we no longer have the

two-components view of Kant, Lewis, and the Cartesian founda tionalists.

Premises

4

and

5

are quite straightforward extractions from

Williams' main source paragraph after his remarks about Lewis.
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williams then concludes chat the
Ineffable cannot provide

a

check upon

anything, but this conclusion does not
follow validly from what he has
said thus far.
One way to make it valid Is to
suppose that Williams
Is here making

the unstated assumption that the
apprehension of

something that Is wholly Ineffable or
nonproposlclonal cannot count as
a

form of knowledge or awareness; presumably,
cognitive knowledge that

asserts that some state of affairs obtains
must always be
prepositional.

This assumption, stated as premise

6,

seems to be

justified in our reconstruction because it is
necessary to make the

argument valid.

Further justification for its inclusion comes
from

the fact that Williams later defends something very
like premise

6

(ibid., p. 36), although he does not explicitly
tie in this defense

with his earlier argument.
There are perhaps other ways in which one may reconstruct
Williams' argument.

I

claim only that the reconstruction

I

have chos-

en does not do violence to the text, does seem to represent Williams'

intentions, and does provide a valid, interesting, and plausible cri-

ticism that the foundationalist must come

terms with.

to

It should be

clear that in the passages quoted above Williams is not challenging
the view that there is a given in experience.

He is rather arguing

that even if there is a given, it could not possibly provide epistemic

support for ordinary justified propositions about the external world.

For the remaining reconstructions

I

will not give explanatory

comments about how the quoted source material relates
reconstructions.

to my

The interested reader will have to examine those

187

for

hxin

or h^r<^pl
f
nerseif.

t
I

oKoI
^
shalli only
state what the source

material is for my reconstruction
of these arguments.
The main question to be raised
about WA2 may well concern the
sixth premise.
But, as noted, one can find
remarks that appear to

defend this premise.

These remarks, reconstructed as
my WA3, are

quite brief:
Surely, whatever can be known must
be the sort of thing which
can be true or false, a condition not
met by the data of sense
conceived as phenomenal objects.
(Ibid

.

,

p.

34)

Williams has in addition some remarks in
support of this
claim, but these are best stated and
discussed when we come to our

evaluation of WA3.
WA4 involves more guesswork on my part.

It appears to be an

argument against the given as such, but it could
be interpreted as an

argument that the given cannot provide a suitable
foundation for ordinary propositions.

I

shall consider that interpretation later.

Here

is the source passage:

In fact, the doctrine of the Ineffability of the given
is
impossible to maintain. Necessarily, it breaks down when one
attempts to give some characterization of the given whereby it
is to be distinguished from other elements in experience.
Building on the idea that the given is the element in
experience shared by all conscious beings, no matter what
their peculiar conceptual accomplishments, Lewis offers
unalterabili ty as the criterion for givenness:

My designation of this thing as 'pen* reflects my
purpose to write; as ’cylinder’ my desire to explain a
problem in geometry or mechanics; as ’a poor buy’ my
resolution to be more careful hereafter in my expenditures.
The distinction between this element of
interpretation and the given is emphasized by the fact
.

.
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hat the latter is what remains
unaltered, no matter
what our interests, no matter
how we think or conceive
I can apprehend this
thing as pen or rubber or
cylinder, but I cannot by taking
thought, discover it as
paper or soft or cubical.
[Lewis,

1956, p. 52]

Lewis here implies that the pen is
given as non-soft,
non cubical, non-paper and thereby
offers at least three
descriptions of the content of the given.
To illustrate the
notion of the given by contrasting
different descriptions is
to contradict the idea that the
content of the given is
ineffable.
(Williams, 1977, pp. 33-34)
I

shall first consider this passage as

I

have, for better or

worse, reconstructed it; only once this
is done shall

I

turn to a con-

sideration of this problematic passage itself.
WA5 is a much more straightforward reconstruction
of the
source passage.

After presenting, as an "argument" against the
given,

the observation that Lewis, Price, et al

.

,

have philosophical presup-

positions that lead them to have a strong theoretical
need for there
to be such a thing as a given,

and thus they are likely to insist that

there is such a thing even if it is not there

to

be found, ^ Williams

goes on to say:
To add to this, there may be an even shorter way of showing
that the given could not be identified introspectively.
Evidence from the psychology of perception all points to there
being no such thing as a state of sensuous apprehension
utterly unaffected by beliefs, desires, and expectations and
consequently no experience of the given as such.
(Ibid
I

believe that

I

.

,

pp.

45-4 6)

have identified all the distinct and signifi-

cant arguments which Williams offers that involve the notion of the
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given.

At one point (Ibid., p.
31) he hints at another argument
that

presents a dilemma: either the given
is cognitive and expressible
or
noncognltlve and inexpressible, but
unacceptable results follov. from
either alternative.

However, this argument is not fully
developed by

Williams, and since Bonjour does
develop Just such an argument.

shall consider it when

I

I

turn to Bonjour.

An Evaluation of WA2 and WA3

These arguments are

be considered together since WA3
offers

to

an argument for one of the premises of
WA2 (premise 6).
I

believe that there are two ways to criticize
WA2.

is to challenge premise 6

(and hence to challenge WA3).

One way

This approach

requires the relatively radical step of maintaining
that there can be
such a thing as nonpropositional awareness

— awareness

awareness of any proposition or state of affairs.

that is not

Russell may have

held this radical view at one time— this will be
discussed below.
The other way to criticize WA2 is to challenge premise 5.

This does not require acknowledgment of any sort of nonpropositional
awareness.

But it is equally effective.

In fact,

to the same criticism as the first approach.

recasting of the objection in

a

it actually amounts

It merely involves a

way that is compatible with the con-

ventional view that any sort of awareness must be an awareness of some
state of affairs.
The reason

I

mention the first approach at all, and the reason

much of my argument will be formulated in terms of it, is that
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williams seems to have It In mind
as the line one would take
against
his argument.
He cites Russell,

and brings out HA3, which
Is speclfl-

cally designed

to

counter this Russellian approach.

My procedure will be to consider
the first, Russellian,

approach that criticizes WA2 on the
grounds that there can indeed be
some sort of nonpropositional
awareness.
I will develop a defense
of
the given that seems to be in line
with this Russellian approach,

recognizing all the while that many would
not accept the central

assumption of this approach concerning
nonpropositional awareness.

will then attempt

to

I

show that the defense of the given that
has been

developed can be recharacterized in such

a way as

to

be equally effec-

tive even though it does not require this
assumption.
So

I

shall for the time being accept premise

how one might challenge premise 6.

5

and consider

This of course requires us to look

at WA3, which is offered in support of that premise.

WA3 itself is

basically the claim that any cognitive or assertive
Icnowledge must be
propositional.

Since the apprehension of the given is by hypothesis

nonpropositional, it cannot really be counted as any form of

knowledge or awareness that is the apprehension of some state of
affairs.

WA3

,

If it is an apprehension at all,

it is so only in a vacuous sense

"this"

a

— an

according to a defender of

"apprehension" only of a

particular that cannot even be described.

apprehension

Surely such an

should not be dignified with the name of knowledge, nor

even with the name of an awareness.

I'Jhat

could it be an awareness of,

since it is by hypothesis not an awareness of any proposition or state

191

of affairs?

case.

It cannot be an
apprehension that such and
such Is the
,^at can It be then but a
misleading and ultimately
empty way

of talking?

Such are the thoughts which

-ot

such as UA3.

l^lle

wuuams

underlie his explicit claims.
I

I

believe must lie behind an
argu-

does not express

th™.

I

thlnh they

Moreover, he has more to say
than what

have thus far attributed
to him.

As

I

noted in the previous

section, Williams has some
additional remarks In explanation
and support of what I have reconstructed
as WA3.
Essentially, they amount to
the claim that when we examine
closely what philosophers take
to be
the given In experience,

knowledge.

It turns out

to

be traditional

propositional

Any time foundatlonallsts and
upholders of the two-

components view try to describe the
apprehension of the given, they
end up describing not the given
but ordinary propositional knowledge

containing concepts.

We can conclude from these remarks
of Williams

either that there Is no pure given Independent
of concepts, or chat,

whatever this given Is, it cannot have anything
or with justifying propositions.

to

do with knowledge

(As we have seen, Williams seems to

accept both these conclusions In different
places In his exposition.)

Phenomenalists
given, Williams says.

are likely to confuse two concepts of the

One is used when the "phenomenalists" like to

think of the given as pure and completely free of
conceptual, propositional components.

The other is used when they need to explain how

the given can serve as the foundation for ordinary
propositions.

Unfortunately, they cannot have it both ways

192

Williams presents Russell's
work on perception as an
illustration of "how easy It is to
confuse these two conceptions
of the
given (Ibid., p. 34). On
the one hand
Russell Is "commendably"
aware that the given, if
regarded as colored patches
In the visual
field, cannot be the bearer of
truth-values (cf. Ibid.).
Hence,
,

our

knowledge of the given cannot be
factual knowledge.

Correctly

recognizing this, Russell introduces
his well known distinction
between knowledge by acquaintance
and knowledge by description
(cf.
Russell, 1959, pp. 46-47).
of

Philosophy

,

commit himself

Let us here note a passage from
Problems

quoted also by Williams, in which
Russell seems
to

to

there being such a thing as
nonproposltlonal

knowledge

things said about it— I may say that
it is brown, that it is
rather dark, and so on. But such statements,
though they make
me know truths about the colour, do
not make me know the
colour itself any better than I did before:
so far as concerns
knowledge of the colour itself, as opposed
to knowledge of
truths about it, I know the colour perfectly
and completely
when I see it, and no further knowledge of it
itself is even
theoretically possible.
(Russell, 1959, pp. 46^7)

When
the

I

know the color itself

color—knowledge

I

of truths.

do not appear to have knowledge about
It would seem to be non-f actual

propositional knowledge, but it is, Russell seems

to

non-

,

be insisting,

knowledge nonetheless.
Williams' comment on this passage--"so far, so good"

— is

quite

odd given that the passage seems to assert the thesis of nonpropositional knowledge which Williams means to be objecting

to

(cf.
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Williams, 1977,

p.

35

).

WlUlanis' objection comes with
this passage of Russell's-

(Russell, 1959,

p.

47)

Williams’ objection:

"ith sense-data they are known
to me
presumably as brown, square or
of’the daturas
br»nn; square to 'wbe distinguished from knowing
that it is
squ^? The difference is entirely ve?b^t^
uncertainty has been resolved, and
acquaintance with objects
quietly transformed into factual ’knowing
that. ’5
as _diej are -that is,

~

bro^^

(Williams, 1977, p. 36)

In other words: insofar as Russell
is talking about knowledge at all,
he is talking about ordinary
propositional knowledge—knowledge Unat

this patch is brown, for example.

He cannot be talking about non-

propositional knowledge because there is no such
thing.

Russell is

merely confused about a certain type of
propositional knowledge concerning visual sensation reports.

That it is really propositional

knowledge inevitably comes out when philosophers try
to say anything
about it.

(If one were to respond to Williams here with the
point

that perhaps this sort of awareness, precisely because
it is

nonconceptual

,

is not the sort of thing one can describe using con-

cepts, Williams would be likely to respond that such awareness
could

not possibly amount to anything the founda tionali st could use.

More

on this below.)

Williams may be misinterpreting Russell here.

Russell does
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not seee to be agreeing
with Williams that
to .e "Just as they are",

or as square, etc.

^en

"sense-data" are Unown

they are necessarily Unown
to »e as brown,

Russell Is not claiming, or It
does not seem he

has to claim, that In being
acquainted with "sense-data" they
are

Unown

to me as brown,

or square, or whatever.

Indeed, In the first of

the passages quoted from Russell,
he seems to be insisting on
Just the

opposite:

any Unowledge by acquaintance
Is not Unowledge that this

colored patch Is brown and rather darU,
or of other such facts.

Knowledge of this latter sort would be
propositional and conceptual.
To have It,

I

would have to have the concept of brown,
for example.

But Russell seems to feel that there
can be some other type of

apprehension which is nonpropositional
Perhaps Russell is going too far if he is
claiming that one

can apprehend something that is not

a

proposition or state of affairs.

But why can’t he be right at least in the more
modest claim that there

can be some sort of awareness that does not require
any conceptualizing on the part of the subject?
brown,

I

presumably need

to

In order to know that this is

have the concept of brown.

But I need not

have this concept in order to have the sensory experience
Russell is

talking about.

At least

I

know of no arguments from Williams or

anyone else which successfully show that

experience if

I

I

cannot have the sensory

lack the concept.

It may well be an Illegitimate step from the claim that one

can have a sensory experience without possessing any concepts by which
to type or categorize that experience to the claim that this sort of
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situation is a case of
nonproposltlonal awareness-awareness
that Is
not an awareness of any
state of affairs.
As noted above. I will
take
this step for the ttae being,
and later show how the
arguments .ade
against Wllllaas can be applied
just as well without taking
this step.
But the immediate point I
want to make is that It does
not seem

implausible

to

suggest that a subject can have

yet not possess any concepts.

a

To Illustrate this

account of experience which Is
intended

to

sensory experience
I

will consider an

fill out Russel Is'

suggestion that there Is a distinction
between seeing a color and
knowing any truths about that color.
This account will be compatible,
believe, with both the view that
this distinction requires that we
posit some form of nonproposltlonal
awareness and the view that
I

accepts the distinction but denies the
possibility of such awareness.
A word about how all of this relates
to the given might be
helpful at this point:

if there is a distinction between
the

experience of seeing a color and knowing truths
about that color, then
what is given is the experience of that color.
exists,

The given,

if it

is this sensory experience that is distinct
from any concepts

that might be formulated in order to describe
that experience.
Clearly, an account of sensory experience that makes
such a distinc-

tion is necessary to defend this doctrine of the given.

(Accounts of

what precisely the given is depend more on one's theory of
perception
than on one

s

theory of justified belief.

Thus if some sort of

realism is true, the given might well be, in ordinary cases of perception,

the physical object itself.

The realist can of course still

196

speak of the subject’s
experience of the object.
account,

the given might be sense
data or images.

fuller discussion.)
experiences,

I

When

I

On a phenomenal i s t

(See below for a

speak of the given as what
one

do not mean to presuppose
or reject any particular

theory of perception.)

An Account of Experience
The following two situations
both seem to me to present

plausible accounts of experience:
Fir st Situation

A normal adult observer looks
out on a

:

clear bright day and has certain sensory
experiences of color,
of movement,

of sound,

etc.

These experiences, although he

may not conceptualize this, are
characterized by certain

qualities:

they are specific, particular,
ever-changing, con-

taining an enormous amount of detail—
detail which he may (or

may not) come

to

conceptualize as, for example, the veins on a

leaf of the apple tree in the foreground.

He does in any case

Interpret conceptually at least some elements of
this
experience, along such lines as these:

sailboat with

a blue

brown patches."
swimming but
wind

I

"I

sail on the river."

"There is a white
"The grass has some

thought that brown patch was a duck

see now it is some dead grass waving in the

.

Second Situation

:

A child who has not yet acquired

language or concepts looks out and has similar sensory
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experiences vAlch are, like
the adult's, characterised
by
specificity, particularity,
and detail.
Not knowing the
concept of sailboat, not
even knowing the concept
of brown or
of a colored patch, he
has no thoughts of
sailboats or brown

patches-lndeed no linguistic
thoughts or conceptual Interpretations at all.

Yet he Is conscious and
aware.

He Is aware

of these sensory experiences
In all their detail and

specificity.

This does not mean he takes
note of the details.

Hls experiences are specific
In the sense that they
provide
the data by which he could,
had he the conceptual

sophistication, make quite precise
discriminations, such as
that the blue color of the sail
Is lighter than that of the
river, or that exactly twelve
apples are visible on the apple
tree,

or that there are veins on the
leaves of the tree.

What is wrong with this account?

Presumably Williams would

object to it, but has he shown it to
be inconsistent or incoherent?

The objection to the account would seem
to center on the assumption

made in this account that the adult and
the child can have the same
visual experience.

The child, on this account, sees just what
the

adult sees, only without the concepts.

The child has sensory

experiences, and these are similar to the adult’s
as they view the
same scene.

The difference lies only in what concepts they
do or do

not form about these experiences.

This account of experience is unpopular among many
philosophers, Williams presumably included.

Experience and concepts
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ara not no easily
demarcated, they would say.
and It cannot really
be
said that the child and
adult see the same thing.
Johannes Kepler
and Tycho Brahe do not
see the same thing when
they watch the sun from
a hilltop at dawn.
So goes a popular example
by Hanson that Is
thought to Illustrate this
point against the above account
of
experience.
But does Hanson Intend It
to Illustrate such a
point?
Consider some of his comments
about the example:

Tycho and Kepler are both aware
of a brilliant yellow^
expanse over a green one.
Such a
se
a urn
picture is single and uninverted.
To be
unaware of it is not to have it.
Either it dominates one's
visual attention completely or
it does not exist.
If Tycho and Kepler are aware
of anything visual, it must
be of some pattern of colours
This private pattern is
the same for both observers.
So something about their visual
experiences at dawn is the
yellow-white disc centered between
green and
greL
aL blue colour patches. Sketches of what they
see
In this sense Tycho and
Kenlfr
epler bo?h
both see the same thing at dawn.
The sun appears to
the same way.
The same view, or scene, is presented
to them both.
.

.

.

.

.

M

(Hanson, 1958, pp.

7-8)

Careless readers of philosophers of science
such as Hanson and Kuhn
have sometimes interpreted them as making
very broad claims about the

nature of experience or the experience-concept
dual! ty— cla hns that
reject the above account of experience.

Hanson and Kuhn would wish their claims

But it is not obvious that
to

be extended

that far, and

there are passages such as the one above which seem
to reaffirm a

tra-

ditional account of experience.
Be that as it may,

it remains for Williams to show just what

is wrong with holding that we can have sensory awareness
that is
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distinct fro. conceptual
knowledge.
there

be such awareness,

One could even ™ake
the case that

for how else could
knowledge acquire Its

particularity?

Conceptual knowledge. Insofar
as It relies on
concepts. Is general.
"Brown," "square," "rather
dark," etc, are
general terms In the sense
that they can be applied
to many distinct
particulars.
But propositions Involving
these general terms may not
be what

I

come to apprehend when

1

apprehension is quite particular.

apprehend the given as such.

That

That may be why It cannot be

described using concepts, for
concepts generalize and hence
remove me
from the particularity of my
direct apprehension of the glven-my
unique sensory experience as

I

am having It at this specific
time.

None of this means that the given
Is

a

sort of undifferen-

tiated, amorphous blur, as It Is
sometimes represented to be.

contrary.

It Is finely differentiated
and

specific.

experience there is enough specific
information that

On the

Within sensory
I

can distinguish

the veins on one leaf of an apple
tree fifteen feet away from me.

may not, of course, come

to

conceptualize any of this, but

possess the requisite concepts.

And how could

1

I

I

can If

I

do so If the sensory

experience Itself did not contain considerable
de tall— enough

to allow

this to become a bit of conceptual information?

Indeed, if anything deserves the epithets
undifferentiated and

amorphous, it is the conceptual element of knowledge,
not awareness of
the given.

The thought that there is a white sailboat with
blue sails

on the river could be an appropriate interpretation of
any number of
distinct sensory experiences.

It

is that thought,

if anything,

that

200

is rather vague and
Indeterminate, not the
Immediate sensory

experience itself.

V^llliams* Response and
the Thesis of

Nonpropositional Awareness

Williams is likely
lines:

to

respond to all of this along
these

"But if you insist that
there is some pure,
nonconceptual

awareness, what can it be an
awareness of?

The only thing you can say

(except -unhelpfully— that it
is an awareness of the
given, or an
awareness of _t^, as you resort
to pointing) is that
it is not an

awareness of anything that can
be described.

For If you try to

describe It, you are back In the
realm of the conceptual and
propositional.

You claim there Is some form
of awareness, but you

can't describe what It Is an
awareness of or give It any content.
Such

tnys

tery— mongering

"
!

It is at this point,

in replying to Williams,

of nonpropositional awareness comes
to the fore.

again,

the view that it is possible for one
to be

that the thesis

This thesis is,

aware— to have

sen-

sory experiences, for example-^i thout
being aware of any proposition
or state of affairs.

It posits some form of awareness that
is not an

awareness that some state of affairs obtains.
is will point to

they will say,

Defenders of this thes-

the paradigmatic case of a preconceptual
child who,

is surely aware,

but since he does not possess any con-

cepts he cannot be aware of any propositions.

As already noted,

I

first consider a response to Williams based on a
defense of this
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thesis,

then a response that
does not requite such
a defense.
I believe that
If
make the assumption
that In order to be
aware of a proposl tlon-that
Is. In order to have
a state of affairs
aa an object of awareness-one
must understand the
concepts contained
in that proposition or
state of affairs, then under
that ass^ptlon
the thesis Of nonproposltlonal
awareness becomes a quite
plausible
It seems very reasonable
to assert that a
preconceptual child is
aware, and If such awareness
cannot be of any proposition
since he has
no concepts, then It would
seem there must be a
nonproposltlonal

awareness.

What can Williams say against
this?

(He could, of course,

challenge the assumption that
awareness of propositions requires
conceptual understanding. That
response will be considered in the
next
section.)

Consider his charge that the doctrine
of nonproposltlonal

awareness Involves mystification and
talk about the Ineffable, talk
which Is Inevitably self-defeating
because It attempts to describe

what on its own grounds is indescribable.
I

believe that this sense of mystification
can be largely

removed by explaining what the object of
this alleged nonproposltlonal

awareness is.

This is not necessarily a self-defeating
exercise.

There is no obvious absurdity in using concepts
to discuss whether

nonconceptual given exists, or even to assert that
is exists and
state one's reasons for thinking that it exists.

a

to

On the other hand,

if the given does exist and one's awareness of
the given is

nonproposltlonal, then obviously one cannot state what proposition
it
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is one is aware of
where one Is aware of
so.e aspect of the
given.
But here too an explanation
of what the given
is or „lght he can
help
to ease the sense that
some Impossibly obscure
doctrine Is being

advocated.

Finally, an explanation
can be offered of how
the given
might plausibly be construed
as providing a basis
for the justification of the propositions
we ultimately come to
believe.

Thus

I

will primarily be discussing
the given.

will be
helpful to relate this
discussion to the thesis of
nonproposltlonal
awareness.
As 1 have hinted In the
above paragraph, the given
Is the
object of this nonproposltlonal
awareness.
The given Is what the preconceptual child Is aware of, and
since his awareness cannot Involve
any concepts, it is nonproposltlonal.
Those who reject the thesis of
It

nonproposltlonal awareness will also
take the object of awareness
to
be the given, as I will explain
In a later section.
But for now I

will characterize the given as the
object of one's nonproposltlonal
awareness
I

should note too chat In discussing
the given

be offering a plausible doctrine.

establishing that It is true.

I

— by

only mean to

do not mean to be affirming or

The point Is only to respond to

Williams' call for clarification— "What could
such

amount to?"

I

a

doctrine possibly

giving a plausible account.

What the Given Might Be

What,

then,

is this object of nonproposi tional awareness?

is what one has direct sensory experiences of.

It

Exactly what the given

203

is will depend,

as I have noted above,
on one's theory of
perception.

if direct realism is true

parts of them

— the

then ordinary physical
objects, or at least

facing surface of a tomato,
perhaps— may constitute

part Of what Is given.

On other theories of
perception,

the given may

be sense data, sensory Images,
or similar phenomena.
But on any account. It would
seem that what is directly
given
to us

through sensory experience Is
something we are Intimately familiar with. When we refer to
the given we are referring
to colors,
shapes, pains, the taste of
strawberries or the feeling of dizziness.
Is

this "Ineffable"?

Perhaps It is In the sense that
the experience

of these sensations can occur
even if one does not have the
concepts

by which

to

categorize, understand, or describe them.

But If this is

ineffable, the charge of mystery-mongerlng
or of obscurantism begins,
I

believe, to lose much of Its force.

experience would seem

to

be obvious

The nature of sensory

to

everyone who experiences, and

It would also seem obvious what the
difference Is between experience

itself and descriptions of that experience.
It would seem necessary to call

awareness.

these experiences forms of

The person who has tasted strawberries,

for example, would

seem to have acquired an awareness which one who has
never tasted them
lacks, even if neither of these individuals has any language
or con-

ceptual knowledge.

The prelinguistic child does not apprehend

that

the tree is green.

What he apprehends, quite nonconceptually

is what

he

sees— no more, but, significantly,

no less.

,

Perhaps this idea is

behind Russell's comment, possibly misunderstood by Williams, that
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things with which

I

have acquaintance are
things immediately known
to

just as they are.

Russell «,y not at all mean
to be speaking of
propositional knowledge that
such and such Is bro™,
for example.
He may mean to be speaking
of knowing the feel,
the look, the taste of
be Insisting that such
knowledge Is distinct from
knowing
that it is the feel (look,

taste,
>

a possible distinction,

etc.)
cc.; ot
of X.
x

AnH nf
And
if one grants such

one can begin to see how
knowing the feel,

etc. of X, and other such
nonproposltlonal awareness might
serve as
the basis for ordinary
propositional knowledge, for example,
knowing
that It Is the taste of
strawberries.
But more on that later.
As for
the alleged Impossibility of
such nonproposltlonal awareness.

It Is no

argument at this stage, given what
has been said so far, for Williams
to simply respond "That's
ineffable, so it must be Impossible."
The Given as a Basis of Justification

Suppose Williams grants the possibility
of a nonpropositional

awareness of the given.

He could still insist that it could
never

serve as the foundation for the
justification of ordinary

propositions.

How could the "ineffable" guarantee
anything about any

ordinary proposition, "let alone the entire
edifice of empirical
knowledge" (Williams, 1977,

p.

29)?

How-could-it-be-possible?" arguments begin

to

lose whatever

force they had when one begins to spell out an account
of how it could
be possible.

How could the given support the entire edifice of

empirical knowledge?

Let us consider the account of the given that

205

has been offered.
On this account, sensory
experience, far from being
an
amorphous blur devoid of
content. Is extraordinarily
rich In content-

perhaps most or even all
the content of empirical
propositions Is
derived from this sensory
content.
Oranted, one cannot s^clfy
„hat
this content Is without
going over to the
propositional and leaving
the given behind.

But to simply Insist that
there can then be no real

content Is to beg the question
against the two-components view.
Indeed, on this view, experience
Is much richer in content
than concepts are.
In order for the concept
brown to be adequate to
cover a range of different
experiences. It must carry less
content
than any one of those Individual
experiences.
And It Is for this

reason that It is very plausible

to

suppose that experience, with all

Its detail and relatively high
content, can provide eplstemlc
support

for propositions, with their more
general nature and carrying rela-

tively less content.

To move, as Cartesian foundatlonallsts
require,

from what Is given In a particular
experience to a proposition such as

that expressed by "There Is a brown
object In front of me now" can be
not only plausible, but extremely modest,
since we are moving from

higher content

to

lower content.

It

seems just as legitimate as the

move from "There are 5849 beans In this
jar” to the lower content

Statement "There are
At any rate,

a

number of beans in this jar."^

this is one way it could work.

If the question

is only "How can it be possible?" then this is
one answer.
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Back to WA3
we .ust relate the above
considerations, based on the
thesis
of nonproposltlonal
awareness, directly to WA3.
My reconstruction of
Wlllafs here Is taken fairly
directly from the text (cf.
Ibid., p.
34).
Premise 2 Is Implicit In the
text, but It Is quite
obvious that
Williams Is assuming something
like this, given both his
claim that
Whatever Is known must be the
sort of thing which can be
true or false
and his clear dismissal of
the nonproposltlonal as a
candidate for
knowledge
.

As WA3 stands,
ml se

1

however.

It Is Invalid.

The wording of pre-

(Wllllams' own statement) is not
close enough to the wording of

the conclusion of premise

Intended.

I

3

to allow us to extract the
conclusion

have left It that way thus far
because

I

think Williams

use of the term 'known” Is misleading
and the whole argument should
be
recast anyway.
The problem with talking about knowledge
here is that, if the

traditional definition of knowledge as
justified true belief is
accepted, then premise

1

becomes true by definition.

If premise 2 is

also accepted, as it is, quite reasonably,
by many philosophers,

then

it seems that the conclusion of WA3 can
be made to follow validly

from the premises of the argument with only a
few minor adjustments.
But Williams should not be talking about knowledge.

For what

we are talking about here is the apprehension of
the given, a cognitive state which may not yet qualify as knowledge.

Indeed it cannot

207

qualify as knowledge in
the full-blooded
a a
S
propositional sense. The
question is whether there
can be any
ucn sort of nonpropositional
y such
^^3.1T0ri0SS
Xri OtHpT nr\tbeg this question,
we need to further
•

1-

1

•

reconstruct HllUan,s’ argument,
revising HA3 to:
WA3': (1) For all x. If
x is an object of
awareness
a member of the set of
i-i,
true or false
•

’

rnen
then x is

caLwe
'

'^'’ose things
of ^
'
X is a proposition.
Tf it IS
1 _ not
LUL^tthe
hf case that that
which is given in
then it is not the Lse

rtat"thar

h:

K

awareLsL
The conclusion of line

3

"

-

follows from premises

1

and

2

object of

with the

instantiation of "that which is
given In experience" for "x"
.
It
would perhaps be more appropriate
to instantiate a specific
case of
what is given for a particular
person in a particular experience,
but
since this could not, by
hypothesis, be specified, the argument
is
formulated more generally.
If

the account of the given which
has been presented above is

correct, then WA3

’

is defective.

this account, premise

1

of WA3

'

And it is clear that, according
to

should be rejected.

For the above

account is based on the view that not all
objects of awareness are
propositional.

When one is having a sensory experience
but not con-

ceptualizing (perhaps because one is

a pr e- ling ui s tic

not, on this account, entertaining a
proposition.
in even the most rudimentary sense,

child), one is

One is not aware,

that any proposition obtains.

What one is aware of, presumably, is the sensory
experience itself.
But an experience, like a tomato, is not

the

sort of thing that can be

true or false.

Propositions

^
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experiences and tomatoes
can, of

course, be true or false,
but not the experience
Itself, or the to.ato
Itself.
But since there Is undeniably,
on this account, some
sort of
awareness. It simply follows
that not all thirds that
one can be aware
of are the sorts of things
that can be true or false;
l.e., some

awareness is nonpropositional
If one accepts the thesis
of nonpropositional
awareness.

It

seems to me that the account
presented in this section and
the previous two sections constitutes
an entirely plausible reply
to

Williams' argument.

Defendi ng the Given Without the
Thesis of
Nonpropositional Awareness
As

I

have already noted, however, it
is not necessary to

accept this thesis in order to respond
to Williams.

Essentially the

same considerations and reasons apply
even if one holds that any

object of awareness, even awareness of
the most rudimentary sensory

experience, must be propositional.

For the debate over whether there can or
cannot be nonproposi
tional awareness turns on matters that are
Irrelevant to the response
that has been made to Williams.

I

believe that the debate turns on

the assumption noted above that in order to
be aware of a proposition

one must understand the concepts contained in
that proposition.

The

proponents of the thesis of nonpropositional awareness simply
make
this assumption, and then conclude that since pr econcep
tual children.
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tor example, are obviously
capable of being aware,
their awareness

must be nonpropositlonal
But It does not seem
to me at all Implausible
to deny this
assumption.
It may well be that
every object of awareness
is a

proposition, and that understanding
in order to be aware of
it.
a subject,

that

S

blue.

a

proposition need not be required

Some propositions may
simply be given to

and need not be ^derstood
by him.

Suppose, for example,

Is a preconceptual child
who Is experiencing sensations
of

One may well maintain that
S is aware, and that
the object of

S's awareness is

^

^

the proposition that let
us say, S is

experiencing something blue or
perhaps.

S

Is appeared to bluely.

This

supposition requires that we say
the object of S's awareness
can be a
proposition which S does not grasp
or understand.
But this may In the
end be no more paradoxical
than the obvious truth that I can
be

acquainted with someone who Is in fact
the winner of the grand prize
in the state lottery without
being aware of this fact.
If one takes this approach,

premise

6

then it is premise

of WA2 that would be criticized.

Premise

5

5

rather than

states that if

the apprehension of the given must occur
without conceptual mediation,

then the apprehension of the given is
nonproposi tional

antecedent

to

.

I

take

the

mean that the given as such cannot be known
or appre-

hended through the use of concepts.

This seems acceptable enough in

that we are talking about the type of apprehension
that occurs inde-

pendently of any understanding of concepts.

But it does not follow

from the antecedent that this apprehension is nonpropos
i tional

.

The
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above sUe.ch i„«ea.es
.He

possiMlU,

,,a. one can appceHen.
a propo-

sition even If one
possesses no concepts.
should be clear then that
either approach can be
used to
Challenge WllUa.s' WA2.
1 a. aware, however,
that »any questions
could be raised about the
general sketch presented
above of the given
and Its relation to the
conceptual. For example, "If
the given Is so
obvious and familiar, why
do different philosophers
describe It

differently?"
claim

"How do you know that the
detail and specificity you

find In experience as such
Is not rather provided by
the con-

to

cepts you have by this time
undoubtedly acquired?” "Doesn’t
your
account rely on your being able
to say that the preconceptual
person’s experience can be the
same as the adult’s postconceptual
ience.

p

But hasn

t

Wittgenstein shown that you cannot talk
about

one experience being the same
as another?"

And so on.

In order to show that the
doctrine of the given is true or

highly likely to be true, one would
have
questions as these.

to

adequately reply to such

One would have to say much more in
defense and

explication of the doctrine than has been
said here.
intention
only

—

to

to

establish that the doctrine is true.

It is not my

My concern has been

show that the critics of foundationalism
have not established

case.

This sometimes involves giving a sketch of
what a foun-

dationalist theory, or in this case, an account of
what the given,

would look like, for example, when the critics ask
"How could that
be?

all

or
I

What could such a view possibly amount to?"

wish

to do here

defuse such questions by giving

But that is
a

rough sketch
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of what that view
would amount
ount to.
to

3o»e inuial

plauslMUty

that view.

Po

the

Thi<= IS only
This
to show that there
is
-r

U

Is not

to at,ue

sttot^l, tot

ptasent wotU Is United In
that

1 do not Intend to
present such arguments for
foundatlonalls. or allied
views.
It Is quite
enough for now to show
that the antl-foundatlonallsts
have not

^de

their case.

An Evaluation of WA4 and
WA5

WA4 is an argument against
the existence of the given,
,4s I
have noted, I am not sure
that the passage I have based
my reconstruction on ought to be construed
Just as I have reconstructed
It.

Williams may at this point be
offering some other version of
the argument against the existence of
the given Itself.
We shall see about
that presently and have another
look at Williams' text.

Meanwhile
shall consider WA4 as one possible
Interpretation of Williams'

I

passage
The idea behind the first premise
of WA4 is that some account

or characterization must be able to
be offered.

If no account can be

offered, such a "doctrine" that cannot
even be stated is hardly worth

bothering about.
premises

2

But any account that can be offered
is then used, in

and 3, against the doctrine itself.

presumably have

to

nonpropositional.

be propositional.

Any such account would

But the given is, by hypothesis,

Hence the doctrine in a sense is refuted by merely

being stated.
It seems clear that this doctrine rests
on a confusion between
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given as an epistemological
theory on the one hand
and that which Is
actually given In experience
on the other.
Of
course, the doctrine of
the given expressed
by some founds tionali
sts
and by the two-components
view advocates must be
expressed and

nderstood In terms of concepts
and propositions.

In this It Is like

every other epistemological
theory and every other
theory of any kind,
for that matter.
But It does not at all
follow that the doctrine
Is

thereby vitiated.

Premise

1

Is surely true In the
sense that any

viable theory must be
characterized proposltlonally
If it Is ever to
be formulated, understood
and evaluated.
But to do this Is
not to

•proposltlonallze" the given Itself.

Constructing an eplstemlc theory

is one thing, having a sensory
experience quite another.

The former
does indeed require propositional
knowledge, but It does not at
all
follow that the sensory experience
of the given as such requires
such

knowledge.

That which Is given In sensory
experience may well be

uncharacterlzable in propositional terms.

So premise

2

may well be

false

Alternatively, one might challenge
premise

3

on the grounds

that even If an eplstemlc theory can
"adequately express the nature of
the given." It does not follow that
the given as such Is not Indepen-

dent of experience.

If

to assert that the given Is Independent
of

experience is to assert, as
here,

I

would take Williams to be asserting

that the two-components view is true, then
the mere fact that

the given can be described and defended
by an epistemic theory does

nothing

to

undermine this two-components view.

The given may well
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exist as seething Independent
of propositions In
the sense that one
need not grasp or ,n.derstand
any proposition in order
to apprehend the
given.
It may have this
Independence even if one can
also give a
theoretical characterization
of the given.
Finally, If the assertion
that the given Is not
independent of
propositions means that propositions
can be formulated about the
given, or that the given cannot
exist Independently of the
existence
of propositions, one can simply
ask what Interest the conclusion
of
WA4 has and how it can be applied
against the two-components view.
I

shall turn now to alternative
Interpretations of the passage

of which WA4 Is one reconstruction.

The most plausible alternative

I

can discern rests on Williams'
claim that Lewis has to characterize
the given as unalterable.

*

On this Interpretation we have:

characterizes the given as unalterable.
/a? He must
(2)
provide some such characterization (e.g.
if
not as unalterable then as alterable).
(3) If 1 and 2, then propositions must be able
to provide
an adequate characterization of the
given.
(4) If 3c, then the content of the given is not
ineffable.
If there is a given in the sense required
(
)
by the twocomponents view, it is ineffable.
(6) There is no given in the sense required by the
twocomponents view.

This interpretation differs only slightly from
that offered as
WA4, and

says

I

believe it commits the same sort of fallacy.

When Williams

To illustrate the notion of the given by contrasting
different

descriptions is
is ineffable"

to

(cf.

contradict the idea that the content of the given
ibid., p. 34, my emphasis), he is,

clearly committing this fallacy.

I

believe, most

When we talk about the given we are
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talking about a concept
or a notion" Just as
„e do with an,
eplstetlc
concept. „e of course
use propositions to talk
ab.t
It.

But

s.el,

we can talk about the
given, about whether It
exists In the sense
required by the two-c<xtponents
view, tor example, without
thereby committing ourselves to the
falsity of that view on
the grounds that the
given has already becane unduly
"proposl tlonallzed . " To
characterise
the general concept of
the given— to state what
we mean when we enunciate the doctrine of the
glven-ls not to state what the
content of
the given In the case of a
specific sensory experience Is.
So we are
not committing the fallacy
of stating what on our
own grounds cannot
be stated.

Williams might feel that what he
says about the requirement
that the given be described as
nonpaper, nonsoft, etc, constitutes
an answer to the above response,
for here we are discussing a
specific
sensory experience: Lewis* experience
of the pen.
But here Williams

may be making the same mistake he
may have made earlier with Russell.

Lewis does not say, and Williams is
mistaken if he takes Lewis to
imply,

that the pen is given as nonsoft,
noncubical

What IS given is

a

,

and nonpaper.

set of sensory experiences that might
come to be

conceptualized as being of some object that is
nonsoft, etc.
I

lack those negative concepts,

I

have only the

But if

given— those sensory

experiences— and not the propositional awareness, requiring
concepts,
that what is given is hard or nonsoft, etc.

In fact,

one could treat

these concepts in the same way Lewis treats the
concepts of pen,

cylinder, a poor buy, in the passage quoted:

I

may come to designate
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this object as ••nonpapef
when
for that stationary,
and so on.

I

a. rouging through
.y ,esh loohlng
Ue are here as before
operating at

the conceptual level
rather than designating
what is given In
experience as such.

Perhaps, finally, some
other Interpretation besides
those
already given Is required
of a passage from
Williams such as:
•Necessarily, [the doctrine of
the IneffabUlty) of the
given breaks
down when one attempts to
give some characterization
of the given

whereby It Is

experience

to

be distinguished from
other elements In

(Ibid., p. 33).

ments In experience.

But In one sense,

The sensory given Is all and
only that which Is

a sensory experience for
a particular subject.

mean,

then.

there are no other ele-

What Williams must

Is that the doctrine breaks
down when we attempt to

distinguish the given from the
conceptual.

The rest of the passage

from Williams (cf. Ibid.) does
seem to support that Interpretation.
But we have already seen where
Williams goes astray In thinking
that

this constitutes an objection to
the doctrine.
I

turn now to Williams' last argument
against the given,

represented by WA5.
of Williams’ text.

This is a fairly straightforward
reconstruction

According to Williams, psychological
experiments

have shown that there is "no such thing
as a state of sensuous appre-

hension utterly unaffected by beliefs, desires,
and expectations"
(ibid., pp. 45-4 6).

This is supposed

to

show that there can be no

experience of the given as such and hence no reason
for thinking it
even exists as a realm distinct from the conceptual
and
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propositional
The first point to make
concerning WAS Is about the
vagueness
°£ the argument, especially
of the cnuclal pr»lse
which states what
the psychological evidence
has uncovered. What Is
meant by a state of
"sensuous apprehension utterly
unaffected by beliefs, desires
and

apprehensions"?

Are the advocates of the
given Insisting that the

given must be thus unaffected?

Not necessarily.

No one Is saying

that what is given for a person
Is 'utterly unaffected" by
that
person s desires, for example.
Suppose 1 desire a hot fudge
sundae.

undertake to walk to the corner
Ice cream parlor and order
a hot
fudge sundae.
Immediately afterwards I have sensory
experiences of
I

particularly happy nature.

These sensory experiences constitute
part

of what Is given to me at that
time.

sundae,

1

Had

I

not desired the hot fudge

would not now be having these sensory
experiences.

IS given to me

Is affected

by my desires.

So what

The same Is true of dreams.

Dreams constitute part of what Is
given to me at certain times.
It Is a commonplace that what

I

beliefs, desires, and fears.

So again my beliefs,

what is given

a

But

dream Is often a product of my
etc.. Influence

to me.

All this is obvious.

If this is sufficient to refute the

doctrine of the given, then it is a rather weak
doctrine.
course these facts say nothing against the
doctrine,
need not be unaffected by me, for
from certain sensory experiences.

But of

l^at is given

can often direct my attention away

I

But this means only that the world

of concepts (represented by beliefs,

expectations, and desires)
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causall, influences
what Is given.

This does not at all
establish

what Williams needs and
what he apparently
thinks he has establishedthat the so~called
given
is as it^ were
qv imbued
u
8
through and through
with
the conceptual in such
a way that it is
impossible to conceptually
or
eplstemically distinguish
between them. To conclude
this would be
lust as fallacious as to
conclude that idealism must
be true because
-ntal events can causally
Influence physical events,
hence the physical must be Imbued with
the mental and cannot
really exist as a pure
and separate state.
(Recall again that while
the doctrine of the
given will require
e that thAro
q
there isc a^ conceptual and
eplstemic distinction between the given and
the conceptual,
concentual
thl= does
a„
this
not mean that the
•

r

-5

roust be
e

concentual
conceptual.

T^ iis iroportant
It
to avoid
c-

the con-

fusion of thinking that because
"the given” Itself Is a
concept and
can be conceptually distinguished
from other concepts. It must
be

that

the co ntent of the given must
also be conceptual.)
If Williams does not mean
to be making this obvious
(and

Ineffective) point about the causal
Influence of the conceptual on the
given. It Is up to him to make
clear just what he does mean.
The second comment

I

wish to make about WAS Is a question

about whether psychological experiments
could ever prove or disprove
the philosophical thesis of the
given which Is being debated.

1

do

not hold that psychologists and
epistemologlsts can never have

anything useful

to

say to one another.

But there are two aspects of

this debate about the given that make
me suspicious about claims that

psychology can make a contribution here.

The first Is that according
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to WAS,

psychologists are making claims
about what Is discoverable
through introspection.
Or at least the clahns
they do .ake are seen,
according to WAS. as being
able to detemlne whether
something Is or
is not discoverable
through Introspection. But
psychologists have
been extremely reluctant
to talk about
introspection, to base conclusions on reports from their
o>vn introspective
states, or to say what
is or is not discoverable
through Introspection. Given
the present
methods psychologists employ.
It Is unlikely that they
can discover
anything about Introspective
states, presuming that there
are such
states.
This Is not because psychological
methods are defective, but
because they are designed, or
at least have the outcome,
of giving
us

different range of facts than those
the Introspectlvlst In epistemology claims to be giving us.
The psychologist's reliance on
third-

a

person reports precludes his collecting
and reporting on the kind of
data— direct subjective experiences—which
the advocate of the given
might claim to base his doctrine on.
The second aspect of the debate about
the given that seems to

make it unamenable to psychological
testing is that the debate is
about, first of all, whether there is a
conceptual distinction between
the given and the conceptual (that is,

is the alleged distinction

simply incoherent?) and, secondly, whether
there is an epistemic

distinction between the two (that

is,

can the given serve as the foun-

dation for the justification of ordinary external
world
propositions?).

It

seems doubtful that psychological testing can

offer determining evidence on the existence of these
distinctions.
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word about introspection.

founcauonaust. o.

c.Uic

It can be misleading

of foun.af fonalf
s..

fo

for the

fasisf f.af

discerning the given requires
reliance on Introspection,
introspection is typically
supposed to have as Its

object one's o™
mental states-one's
thoughts, dreams, and
beliefs, for example.
Typically these states are
described as "private."
"Inner," etc. But
even If there are such
private events, and even
If some of these

constitute part of what Is
given for a person at a time.
It does not
fellow that the advocate of
the given Is committed to
saying that all
of what is given Is private,

inner, and purely mental.

If the direct

realist can be a foundatlonallst
and an advocate of the
given, and
I have seen no
refutation of such a possibility,
then It may well be
that what Is given In cases
of ordinary perceptual
experience Is the

ordinary external world rather
than anything Irredeanably Inner
and
subjective. The physical world or
specific objects within It may not
be conceptualised, the person
may not know or be Justified In

believing that he Is actually perceiving
the physical world and not
rather some dream or hallucination,
but none of this, I believe, need
change the fact that In normal cases
of "successful" perception, what
IS given may very well be the ordinary
physical world and the ordinary

objects in It.

If

that is so,

I

would find the term "Introspection"

as applied to such instances of perceiving
the given a rather

misleading term at best.

Perhaps for such instances it would be best

to coin and use the term "extrospection.

"

This may cure both foun-

dationalists and their critics of feeling that founda
tionali sm
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requires ihe positing o,
sense data as things
di„erent iro. physical
objects and yet required
as the objects of so»e
introspective cental
act of sensory experiencing.

This leads
Slven.

some final remarks about
the existence of the
It appears from the
above that unless Williams
can show that
to

direct realism is logically
or theoretically
incompatible with the
doctrine of the glven-a task
he does not address
himself to-he must
admit the possibility that
what are in fact trees,
for example, are
part of the given in cases
of ordinary perception,
even if the subject
does not conceptualize them
as trees.
Brick walls, as the motorist
unhappily discover when he
collides with one. are even
more vigorous
examples.
If this can be so. then
it can be seen how ineffective
and
off the point is Williams'
exasperation with proponents of
the given
for advocating the Ineffable.
If anything Is "ef fable,"
it is
a

brick

wall, whether conceived as such
or not.
The possibility of ordinary
physical objects constituting part
of the given should also give
pause to anyone who claims that
psycho-

logical experiments have proven that
the concept of the given is inco-

herent or that the given just cannot
exist.

experiments lead to?

What could such

At best they could help establish
the factual,

genetic question of whether there is ever

a pr

econceptual stage in

which the given is experienced without the
mediation of concepts.
even supposing the latter were established,
it does not seem this

would determine the conceptual and epistemic
questions which, as we
have noted above, are central to the debate at
hand about the

But
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existence and epistemic
significance of the given.
In summary,

then,

it does not seem that
Williams’

arguments
WA4 and WAS succeed in
establishing a case against
the given.
B^onjour’s Critique of the
Given

In his article "Can
Empirical Knowledge Have a
Foundation?"

Laurence Bonjour professes

to give

reasons tor "doubtit^ whether
any

version of foundatlonallsm
is finally acceptable"
(Bonjour, 1978,
P.l).

The first part of his
article Is an attack on the
view Boljour
calls "externallsm" (cf.
note 4 of Chapter II), a view
>*lch the foundatlonallst can use to defend
the thesis that a subject's
beliefs can
be basic for that subject.
Although 1 do not think that
Bonjour 's

attack on externallsm Is finally
successful,
here.

As Bonjour himself admits,

I

shall not consider It

this argument Is not successful

against the type of foundatlonallsm
which holds that It Is propositions about the subject's
experiences rather than about his
beliefs
which ultimately justify nonbaslc
propositions.
Since It Is this

experience-based" type of foundatlonallsm
which

1

wish to discuss and

defend in Chapter VI, Bonjour's argument
against externallsm may be
passed over in favor of his critique of
the given, which does directly

challenge the type of foundatlonallsm

Many of the points

I

vant against Bonjour as well.

I

wish to defend.

have made against Williams will be releHowever, it is Instructive to consider

briefly another fomulation of the argument against
the given, for both
its similarities to and differences from Williams'
account.
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Bonjour

basic argument against
"glvanlsm" Is clear and
straightforward in Its general
plan.
It can be formulated
as
follows
'

cognitive state.

^

justifying ordinary beliefs.

“

extent
extent‘L\rf'"°®"“*''"
it confers Justification,

*“"''er

it must also require

(6) If this Intuitive state
is to properly serve as
the
basis for the justification of
ordinary

beliefs It
must both confer Justification
on those bellefs’and
;°t requ ire justificatio n Itself.
state cannot properly serve as
the
basis for the justification of
ordinary beliefs.

'

Premises

1

and

2

use the concepts of Intuition,
apprehension, and

cognitive state, which are not
explicated by Bonjour.

willing enough to accept these
premises, as

I

However.

I

feel the problems

with the argument lie elsewhere.
In defense of premise
3, Bonjour has this to say:

The problem to be raised revolves
around the nature of
t e intuition or immediate
apprehension (hereafter I will use
mainly the former term).
It seems to be a cognitive state
perhaps somehow of a more rudimentary sort
than a belief which
involves the thesis or assertion that-p.
Now if this is
correct, it is easy enough to understand in
a rough sort of
way how an intuition can serve to justify
a belief with this
same assertive content.
The problem is to understand why the
intuition, involving as it does the cognitive
thesis that-p,
does not j-t self require justification. And
if the answer is
offered that the intuition is justified by
reference to the
state of affairs that-p, then the question will
be why this
.

.

.

am
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the state
apprehenslon of
falrs^to°justl£v*^th°" °i
wise one and the sIL
“thercoanjMvI
both an apprehension of
constitute
?he stat^of^ affairs
af^J
and a justificatlon of that very anorehenQ-irh
itself up by its
own cognitive bootstraps
One’ is
data that certain cogn ;ive
Chlshota's
«a es"^ MS
that extr^ely Paradoxical
^e^Iru
riy cL^
rPnstltutes
Unfe^^’
an explanatlon of how this Is

L

possible.

(.Bonjour,

1978, p.

lO)

believe that Bonjour has
moved here from defending
his premise to
complaining that foundatlonallsts
have not defended theirs.
Instead
1

of explaining why It Is
Impossible for any cognitive
state (Including
of course the sensory
apprehension of the given, which
Is at Issue for
the Cartesian foundatlonallst)
to both justify ordinary
propositions

and not require justification
Itself. Bonjour has merely
Insisted how
extremely paradoxical this notion
Is and asked the
foundatlonallsts to

explain themselves.

Undoubtedly the foundatlonallsts
do need to

explain themselves, but It hardly
constitutes a refutation of foundatlonallsm to point out that further
explanation on the foundationalist's part is necessary.^

In defense of premise
4, we have this from Bonjour:

intuition is not a cognitive state
^nd thus involves no
and
cognitive grasp of the state of affairs
in question, then the need for a
justification for the intuition is obviated, but at the serious
cost of making it difficu t to see how the intuition is
supposed to justify the
belief.
If the person in question has no
cognitive grasp of
that state of affairs (or of any other)
by virtue of having
such an intuition, then how does the
intuition give him a
^^^son for thinking that his belief is true?
(Ibid., p. 10)
If in saying a state is non-cognitive
Bonjour means that the subject
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has no awareness whatsoever,
as he appears to mean,
I would agree
with
Bonjour that the subject
could not be justified
in believing anything

on the basis of such a
state.

But apprehension of
the given is a form

of awareness.

Semi-Cognitive Statpg
The points Bonjour nmkes
against 'seml-cognitlve states"
and
generally In defense of his fifth
premise, are, first, that
"this
'solution' to the problem seems
hopelessly contrived and ad
(Ibid.,

p.

second, that this attanpted
solution uses an

11).

Inappropriate visual metaphor with the
underlying Idea of

a

mind

directly confronting Its object
(cf. Ibid., pp. 11-12), and
third,
that even if there were such
seml-cognitlve states, they would be

of

no help to the glvenlst. for It
Is Impossible to separate the
two

relevant aspects of a cognitive state—
Its capacity to justify and Its
need for Justification itself and
have a seml-cognitlve state which
has the former property while lacking
the latter.

Bonjour does have more
points.

to

say in defense of these last two

On the misleading metaphor of vision:

The main account which has usually been
offered by givenists of such semi-cognitive states is well
suggested by the
terms in which immediate or intuitive
apprehensions are
described:
immediate,"
"direct," "presentation," etc. The
underlying idea here is that of confrontation
in intuition,
mind or consciousness is directly confronted with
its object,
without the intervention of any sort of intermediary.
It is
in this sense that the object is given to the mind.
The root
metaphor is vision: mind or consciousness is likened to an
immaterial eye, and the object of intuitive awareness is that
which is directly before the mental eye and open to its gaze.
^

:
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tlva state which
tion
,

eye

.

can^stlfy^uJa:!
justify but does

.

LTapr^uI

Whateve/else it

nontlid''

4

be

=""

=“

not require justifica-

T'

fs Tot

-“"I

ire''""""-

too simple to be even
mlnlm^Uy
lo °tje"
of mental phenomena and
to the vanity of
io
?
*
conditions
upon
which such phenomenon
depend
Thn
is conslderLle
Intuittripieal o rte"c“'
model,
especially as applied to
perceptual
sciousness, but only
to insist that this
appeal is fsr r
adequately support the^ery
speclfirslnrof
results >*lch the strong
!""
flundatlollllsi

Lelre
^

f

needs!’^ 1

“

slm"
r;f":ifiLn?i:i'fr seeming confrontation,
this by
Itself nro„iaf=
i

cognitive states, whatever they
may

be\alUd "’"w^Ich^res^t
(Ibid., p. 12)

One striking thing about this
passage is Bonjour’s claim that
talk of vision Is metaphorical,
vague, and inapplicable.
Quite the
contrary: vision Itself Is,
along with the other senses,
precisely

what the Cartesian foundatlonallst
is talking about.
model or metaphor for something
else:
ceptual consciousness under discussion.
not,

so

Vision Is not a

It Is one of the types of per-

Bonjour says that the mind Is
0

far as we know, anything like an
eye.

Perhaps not, but an eye

is quite similar to an eye!

Bonjour obviously thinks the founda
tionali st is talking about
the mind as something distinct from
vision.
in mind here?

What could Bonjour have

One possibility is that Bonjour is not in
this passage

thinking primarily of Cartesian foundational
ism, which he would

characterize as the "perceptual consciousness"
approach.

Indeed, he
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has just been discussing
Anthony Quinton’s external
world foundatlonalls..
So Bonjour .ay well
grant that the visual
'•.etaphor" Is
-re appropriate to the Cartesian
foundatlonallst approach.
This .ay
his concession, in the
passage quoted above,
that there Is
considerable Intuitive appeal
to the .odel when
applied to the
"perceptual consciousness"
approach.
If this Is right,
then, his critical remarks are not
particularly applicable to
Cartesian

foundationalism.

Another possibility Is that
Bonjour feels that the
foundatlonallst has much more to deal
with than vision and the
other senses as
such.

His co.ments on the complexity
of mental phenomena and
the

variety of conditions upon which
such phenomena depend suggest
this.
Even the direct realist has
to admit that there are
cases of
hallucination, dreaming, optical
Illusions, etc., in which things
are
not as they appear.
Perhaps in ordinary cases of
"successful" vision
there Is a direct confrontation
of the percelver with an
ordinary physical object, but this Is not
so In all cases.
So what Is going on
has to be more complicated than
what a simple direct realist metaphor
of confrontation with ordinary
physical objects might suggest.

Whether this Is Bonjour's Intended point
or not. It deserves a
response. And this Is that the visual
confrontation metaphor can
accommodate cases of "unsuccessful" as well
as successful perception.

Even If it Is only In cases of successful
perception that the subject
actually does confront the ordinary physical
object he believes he
perceives,

the visual confrontation model still Is
appropriate In
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other (presumably more
complex) cases because
the subjecr takes
there
to be an ordinary
object he Is seel^; he
has experiences like
those
had la cases of ordinary
successful perception. Of
course he

may not
be justified in believinc
eving that Vio'o
i
j
he s looking at an
ordinary object, but
that's not the Issue here.
The Iss^ Is whether
the visual confroni

tation model is adequate
and can give an account
of what semlcognltlve states might be.
And 1 see no reason why
the fact of
unverldlcal perception would
In Itself prevent such
a model from
working.

The given Is the set of
sensory experiences an
Individual

has.

Sometimes, happily, these
experiences adequately report
what Is
happening In the physical world,
sometimes, unhappily, they don't.
But In either case the subject
to see (hear, etc).
He

se^

se^

be confronted with this or
that object.

to

It we can Imagine a seml-

cognltlve state-a particular visual
experience for example-whlch
justifies (without Itself requiring
justification) the proposition
that S is looking at something
red, surely there Is no problem
In Imagining a similar seml-cognltlve
state justifying the same proposition,
the only difference being that
In this case S Is not In fact
looking

at something red, but merely dreaming
this.

One semi-cognitive state

might be awareness of what is in fact

tomato, another might be

a ripe

awareness of various colored patches that
might be taken
ments of a ripe tomato but are in fact
elements of
illusion.

a

to be ele-

dream or

The visual experience itself, and hence
the cognitive or

semi-cognitive state which the subject is in, may very
well be quite
similar.

Bonjour would have to supply us with some reason
why semi-

2 28

cognitive states could
not le plausible
explanations lot the unsuccessful visual experiences
even though they could
be posited for the
successful ones.

Concerning Bonjour’s remark
that

•'even if

at some point Involves
some sort of confrontation

empirical knowledge

this by
Itself provides no clear
reason for attributlt*
epist^nlc justification ... to the cognitive
states which result" (ibid.,
p. 12), it
.ay be remarked that
confrontation >rtth an object
certainly se^s to
provide a reason for thinking
that object is there, and
that seeming
confrontation also can provide
a reason if the subject
has no reason
for thinking the apparent
confrontation may not be veridical.
I see
no reason at all t*y Bonjour
should feel there is any mystery
about
how this could be, given that
he is supposing at this
point that there
Is some confrontation between
the observer and the world.
Again, if a
.

.

.

motorist collides with a brick wall
and has the associated
sensations,
what better reason can he have for
thinking
that he has Indeed

collided vrtth a brick wall?

Most of our confrontations with
reality

are happily more gentle, but the
principle remains the same.
Bonjour's third and last point against
seml-cognltlve states
is that even If there were such
things they would be of no help to the

givenlst
The basic idea, after all, is to
distinguish two aspects of a
cognitive state, its capacity to justify other
states and its
own need for justification, and then try
to find a state which
possesses only the former and not the latter.
But it seems
clear on reflection that these two aspects cannot
be
separated, that it is one and the same feature
of a cognitive
state, viz. its assertive content, which both
enables it to
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confer justification on
other stafpc
^^so requires that it
be justified itself.
if
to Introduce seml-cognltlve
staLrin"’
basic beliefs, a^nce^o
whL^ver L^Lrsucb“'’'/°
capable of conferring
Justification It will to^tb'^r
extent require justification.
Thus evL
.
k
exist, they are of no
°
help to the glvenlsj
attempting
answer the objection at
to
iLue here
i

^

If

It seems clear on
reflection"

to

“

Bonjour that the justifying
and

the justification-requiring
features of a cognitive state
are In prin-

ciple inseparable, perhaps
he Is thinking only of
ordinary empirical
assertions such as "Reagan Is
President" or "Peas do not
grow well 1„
dry country." Ordinary
assertions of this sort are
clearly both
capable of justifying other
propositions and require justification
themselves.
If „e think only of such
propositions. It Is hard to see
how these two features could
be separated.
But It Is easier to see
how this might be If we consider
the mental states the Cartesian
foun-

datlonllst focusses on.

A person who Is having visual
experiences Is

presented, on this account, with an
array of data that are full of

content and can serve as the basis for
a great number of assertions.
It seems possible, even plausible
here,

to

imagine that these visual

experiences serve as the justification for
ordinary propositions
without themselves calling for or requiring
justification.

"What

Justifies you In thinking you are having this
visual experience?"

"Nothing— I’m just having

It,

fectly reasonable response.

that’s all."

This seems to be a per-

Whether It Is true or not Is another

question, but the possibility and apparent
reasonableness of this sort
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of account Is more
than enough to counter
Bonjour's claim that on
r ef lect ion It
Is clear that no
cognitive or seml-cognltlve
state can

justify without itself
requiring justification.
An Argument from

Tin piausibili

tv

It should be clear
that Bonjour's dismissal

states, as well as his
whole attack on glvenlsm,
Is essentially an
argument from implauslblll
ty
how could there be such
things as
:

cognitive or seml-cognltlve
states which justify without
requiring
justification? How could the need
for Justification just end
at some
point?

And so on.
But arguments from Implauslblll
ty are rather weak arguments,

especially In philosophy, where
practically any theory can be
shown to
have its implausible aspects
or consequences.
For that matter, even
theories on the physical sciences
have their Implausible aspects.

If

physicists judged a theory on the
basis of Its plausibility rather
than how well and how thoroughly
It explained the data at hand,
we
would never have relativity theory
or quantum mechanics.

I

do not

believe that philosophers, any more
than physicists, should rely on

Implauslblllty arguments.

Of course, a feeling of "That’s
absurd!

How could that be?" could stimulate
a philosopher to find arguments

against the offending theory.

But merely to restate his feeling In

various assertive ways is no such argument.

Bonjour does have a point, though, in insisting
that foun-

dationalists explain themselves.

It certainly does not help a theory
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to have its unexplained
iraplausibilities.

Bonjour's article does
articulate some of the
problematic aspects of
foundational ism that
need to be attended to.
In particular, an
account of the given is
needed
As

have noted. It Is not my
purpose here to present arguments in support Of founds
tlonalls„.
But 1 do thl* Bonjoufs
call
for explanation deserves
a response:
at least enough of a
response to
defuse the feeling that
foundatlonallst. Is too Implausible
to be a
viable theory.
I

This response Is two-fold.
the given which

criticisms.
account:

I

I

The first aspect is the
account of

have presented above In
response to Williams’

do not take myself to have
presented a convincing

only to have presented the
beginnings of a explanation of

the way things might be.

In particular I have been
concerned to show

what the given might be and how
It might be capable of providing
justification for ordinary nonbaslc
propositions (cf. sections above
discussing these topics).
To the account already presented,

response

to

Bonjour’s argument:

I

I

would like

to

add this in

do not know whether the awareness

one has when experiences are given
to one are properly described as

cognitive or as semi-cognitive states.

But

I

hope to show that it is

not implausible to think that there might
be such states.
semi cognitive

Perhaps the

label is the better one, because "cognition"
usually

Implies thinking, reflection, knowledge, all of
which imply in turn
that there is some propositional content to what
is thought, reflected
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But is It not plausible
to suppose that
there Is so.e rudimentary form of awareness
*lch Is produced by the
Interaction of sense
organs with the environment,
which occurs even before
an Individual Is

capable of understanding
propositions.

Suppose, as Bonjour Is
willing

to,

that this awareness Is or
can be an awareness of
the world as It
Is, at least at that
particular place and tlme-that
this awareness

involves a direct confrontation
of the human perceiver
with the world.
Is It not now clear how
this awareness could. In
principle at least,
serve the two roles Bonjour
feels so certain can't be
served In
tandem?

It could justify ordinary
propositions because It Is so rich

In content, so detailed that
one visual experience could
provide the
basis for myriads of propositions
about, for example, the room
In

which
tion.

I

am now sitting.

But It would not Itself require
Justifica-

It Is not a conceptual
awareness that the subject could
be

making conceptual mistakes about,
or which would require an adequate
and accurate conceptual repertory.

So It wouldn't have to be

justified by assurances that he was using
concepts correctly or that
he correctly remembers what this or
that means.

There may be no need

or requirement to justify the question
"What is the subject's basis

for thinking he is having these visual
experiences?"

And again,

it

seems quite plausible to respond that the
very fact that he is having
these visual experiences is enough to justify
the fact that he is

having them, if he ever comes to wonder and
reflect on the justification for his experiences.
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If Bonjour asks,

"How can this be7"

I

thl*

It

I3

fait to ask

hi. to look at his own
expetlence and see fot hl.sell
how It „l,ht he
both that it serves as
the basis for his ordinary
beliefs and also
that It is senseless to
ask fot the justification
for this thinking
that he has these experiences
and a fortiori that it
Is senseless to
the justification for
the experiences themselves
(since only
propositions, It would see., can
be Justified and experiences
In ther.selves are not propositions).
Bonjour might well be dissatisfied
at
this, and my general account
of the given, as a positive
argument In
favor of foundatlonallsm; but
1 think he would have
to admit that in
the face of this account his
argument from Implauslblllty
Is stripped
of whatever force It had.
New and stronger arguments
are going to

have to be devised If foundatlonallsm
Is to be refuted.

The second aspect of my twofold
response to Bonjour Is the

account of foundatlonallsm that Is
presented and discussed In Chapter
VII below.

It

Is far from a complete theory,

of some aspects of It.

but the mere statement

together with reflections on the directions
In

which the theory needs to be developed,
can help to dispel the objections of Williams that the theory Is
Incoherent and can't even be pro-

perly formulated and of Bonjour that the
foundatlonallst needs

explain himself and show how such

Before

I

a

to

theory could work.

consider this account of foundational ism,

I

shall

consider Chisholm’s account, for the account discussed
in Chapter VII
is merely a reinterpretation of Chisholm's.
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V

I

CHISHOLM’S FOUNDATIONAL
ISM

Rode.iC CMshol^.s
foundauonalis.
second edition of his

Theor^^^jino^^

as developed

(1977) la assessed.

1„ PHe
It Is

found to be unsatisfactory
In Its attempt to
formulate a "bridging
principle meant to state
conditions under *lch a
basic proposition
JusUfles a nonbaslc proposition.
Chisholm's revision of
this system
In "A Version of
Foundatlonallsm" (1980) Is then
assessed and Is also
found to be unsatisfactory
regarding such a principle.

Chisholm’s Epistem lc Principles
Approach
Central to any successful
foundatlonallst theory Is an
account
how the basic or directly
evident" propositions which
serve as the
foundation for knowledge can
confer evidence upon nonbaslc
or

Indirectly evident" propositions.

Roderick Chisholm, who has

published the most carefully worked
out verslon-or verslons-of
founds tlonallsm.l has consistently
taken what I have Identified In

Chapter III as the eplstemlc
principles approach.

That Is. he does

not regard nonbaslc propositions
to be deductively or Inductively

implied by basic propositions.

The justification of nonbasics
by

basics Is Instead determined by
eplstemlc principles which state the

conditions under which a basic proposition
justifies a nonbaslc
proposition.

These principles are taken to be necessarily
true.
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Chisholm's attempt

to

formulate such eplstemlc
"brldglpg

principles" In the first
edition of

Theor^of^^^u^

has been

sho™

ro be unsatisfactory
by Herbert Heldelberger
(1,69).

Chisholm's
second edition system
Is In part an attempt
to meet Heldelberger's
As

shall argue, this attempt
Is unsatisfactory,
for his
second edition eplstemlc
principles and definitions
still do not
explain how a directly evident
proposition can Justify an
Indirectly
evident one. In spite of the
fact that they appear
designed to explain
this.
In the absence of
such explanation, as I
shall also argue,
I

Chisholm's system does not allow
for knowledge of propositions
about
the external world.
The next section provides
a brief exposition of the
basic concepts and principles of
Chisholm's system.
arguments follow In

subsequent sections.

Finally,

I

„IU

consider and evaluate Chisholm's

1980 revision of his second
edition Theory of Knowledve system.

Chis holm's Account In "Th eory of
Knowledge.
Second Edition

One of the central concepts in
Chisholm's second edition foun

dationalist system is introduced in the
context of his definition of
knowledge.

As this definition,

once unravelled, also introduces the

other central epistemic concepts which
are important
I

to

my argument,

shall begin with it;^

D6.4

h is known by S =df h is accepted by
S; h is true; and
h is nondefectlvely evident for S.

(Chisholm, 1977,

p.

110)
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The acceptance condition
can be equated with
the belief condition
in
the traditional definition
of knowledge
The third condition
is
designed to avoid Gettler-type
counterexamples,
Chisholm defines the
key expression In It
as follows;
D6.3

h Is nondefectlvely
evident for S =df

Either

h Is

pTcon^c^lo^^
^

for

^

S.

propositloi

(Ibid., p. 109)

The terms "certain" and
"evident

refer to significant points
on

Chisholm's carefully delineated
scale of epistemic value.

The certain
is for Chisholm that which
it is most reasonable to
believe.
More

precisely
D1.4

h is certain for

S

for

1s

-df h is beyond reasonable
doubt
no i such that accepting 1
is more reasonable for S
than accepting h.
S,

and there

(Ibid., p.

10)

The phase "beyond reasonable
doubt" is also defined:
Dl.l

h is beyond reasonable
doubt for S =df Accepting
h is more reasonable for S
than is withholding
h.

(Ibid., p. 7)

'

To withhold a proposition Is to
accept neither It nor Its negation
(cf.

Ibid., p. 6); but the term "accept"
itself and the phrase "mDre

reasonable than" are primitives In Chisholm's
system.
equated with "believe" (cf. Ibid.,

p.

6),

"Accept" may be

but neither tern Is defined

independently of the other.
Certainty is the highest epistemic status a
proposition can
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Falling Immediately
below what Is certain
on the eplstemic
scale is the evident:
•

5

h is evident for 9 =rif

for

S

f

and (11) for every

-----

-

S

-f

\

u

j

i

reasonable doubt

1

rhaT:L^;tl“

-r?l^^-orrL^n

for

(Ibid., p. 12)

A proposition may be
directly or Indirectly
evident.
This
nctlon brings out the
essentially foundatlonallst
character of
Chisholm's epistemology.
Intuitively, a directly
evident proposition
is one which Is evident
without any other proposition
serving to
justify or confer evidence
upon It.
Chisholm expresses this
Intuition
as follows: for any directly
evident proposition
p, It Is acceptable
to say "What justifies me
In thinking I know that
p Is simply the fact
that p (cf. ibid., p. 19).
Indirectly evident propositions
then are
those which have their
eplstemic status as evident
propositions co:^
ferred upon them by some other
proposition or propositions.

What Unds of propositions turn
out to be directly evident on
Chisholm's account? Chisholm's
approach Is foundatlonallst In a

Cartesian sense In that those
propositions which are directly evident
tor a person

S

have to do In some way with S's
mental states— his

thoughts, beliefs, feelings, perceptual
experiences, etc.

"Thinking

and believing provide us with paradigm
cases of the directly evident"
(ibid.,

p.

21).

Chisholm calls such directly evident
propositions

self-presenting," after Meinong, and provides
the following
definition:
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D2.1

h is self-presenting
for S at t =df h
is true at
and necessarily, if
h is true at t,
then
h is
evident for S at t.

\

A paradlg. ease of a
proposition
for .e is that expressed
by

n

*lch

-

Is.

,

t;

(j,

when true, self-presenting

see„ to have a headache."

Examples of
other propositions which
can be self-presenting
are those about what
a
person believes, what he
seems to perceive, and
what he seems to
remember. The fact that S
believes that Socrates Is
mortal, for
example. Is said to be enough
to make It evident
to S that he does

believe that Socrates is
mortal (cf. pp. 21-22).

Chisholm does not equate the
self-presenting with the directly
evident, but rather sees the
former as a subset of the
latter.
A
directly evident proposition
is roughly one that Is
entailed by a proposition that Is self-presenting
(cf. ibid., pp. 23-24,
especially
D2.2).3
Even the broader class of directly
evident propositions does
not extend far enough to embrace
any of those propositions which
are
often characterized as being about
the "external world," or what
Chisholm calls propositions about
"the ordinary things we know"
(Ibid.,

p.

11).

An example of the latter would be
the proposition

expressed by "There Is a cat on the roof."

Such a proposition Is not

self-presenting for any S-for It may be true
without being evident

S—nor

Is It directly evident,

to

since It Is not entailed by any self-

presenting proposition.
Propositions about the external world, then, are
for Chisholm
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positions that can only
be indirectly and
not directly evident,
since Chlshol. emphasizes
that such propositions
can be and are hno™
(cf.

Ibid., pp.

n,

le.

120- 121

),

he must,

by 06.4, conclude
that

they do achieve the
status of being evident.

And they must be ren-

dered evident, ultimately,
by propositions that
are directly evident
(cf. p. 85).

Although directly evident
propositions are certain,
sharing
with mathematical and other
necessary truths the highest
eplstemlc
status possible. Indirectly
evident propositions are
not certain
according to Chisholm, since
It Is not as reasonable
for us to believe
them as it Is to believe,
for example, propositions
about the elementary truths of arithmetic
and propositions about
what
to us to

s^

be the case (cf. ibid.,
pp. 10-11).
The relation between the
directly and Indirectly evident
Is of
course a matter of great Importance
for Chisholm.
As a foun-

datlonallst, he must explain just
how the former confers evidence
upon
the latter.
He sets forth a series of
eplstemlc principles In Chapter
4 which appear Intended
to give at least a partial
account of the

relation between the directly and the
Indirectly evident.

One of the

most Important of these principles
will figure prominently In the

discussion
C:

to

follow:

For any subject S, If S believes, without
ground for
doubt, that he is perceiving something
to be F, then
it is evident for S that he perceives
something
^ to
be F.
(Ibid

.

,

p.

78)
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icate letter F is to
allow as subs tituends
only those predicates *lch connote
sensible characteristics,
e.g. being „hlte.
Chisholm nses -perceivesIn such a „a. that
11 s perceives seething
white, then It follows
that there Is some
ordinary external
object which is white.
i
What Chisholm
means by belief "without
ground
for doubt" will be explained
below.

Directly evident propositions
do not entail Indirectly
evident
ones, even if we take
Chisholm's eplstemlc principles
to be
necessarily true, as Chisholm
himself surely wishes to.
Even principle C, which moves us from
the directly to the Indirectly
evident,
does not express this as a
matter of the directly evident
entallit^’
indirectly evident.

Consider two states of affairs:

p:

S believes without
ground for doubt that he perceives
^t^ives
something to be white.

q:

S

and

q

C

does perceive something which
is white,

can be indirectly evident to

S,

but p does not entail q.

Principle

tells us that it is necessary
that if p is true, then
q is evident

to S (in this case indirectly
evident).

But it does not follow that
q

Itself must be true, for this may be
one of those cases in which

proposition is both evident and false,
explicitly allows (cf. ibid.,

p.

a

a

possibility which Chisholm

15).

Some Difficulties

Let us return now to Chisholm's definition
of the nondefectively evident (D6.3).

Since Chisholm holds that indirectly evident
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propositions are a.o„g those
„e tao„. he .nst allow
that so„e
indirectly evident
propositions are nondefectlvely
evident.
By D6.3
there >vlU then be
indirectly evident
propositions *ich are
entailed
hy a conjunction of
propositions each of *lch
has a basis for S.
When an Indirectly evident
proposition Is entailed by
a cor.
Junction of propositions,
at least some of the
propositions conjoined
must themselves be indirectly
evident.
For as we have
seen, no

directly evident proposltlon-and
hence no conjunction of
th«.-could
entail an Indirectly evident
proposition. And since by D6.3

^

of

these conjoined propositions
has a basis, it follows
that at least
some indirectly evident
propositions are such that they
have bases.

What does it mean for one
proposition
another?

to be a

basis for

Chisholm provides the following
definition:
Dh.l

e Is a basis of h for
S =df e is self-presenting
for Sand necessarily, if e Is
self-presenting for S^then
h IS evident for S.

(Ibid., p.

106)

As we have seen, some h’s are
going to have to be indirectly

evident propositions.

This requires, by D6.1, that
there be some

self-presenting proposition
presenting for

S,

e such

that, necessarily,

if e is self-

then some proposition h is indirectly
evident for

S

It is at this point that a careful
articulation of Chisholm’s

foundationalism becomes essential

to

his account of how ordinary pro-

positions about the external world can be
Icnown.

It has been noted

that such propositions can only be indirectly,
not directly, evident.
If they are to be known,

they must, on Chisholm’s definition of
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^nowledge. be nondefectlvel,
evddeab as well.

Hence there .nst, hy
above argument, be so„e
Indirectly evident
propositions >dalch have
b3S0s
And tliGiTGforp
i-ucLtirore, Itf pv»t
u
t
Chisholm is to pxnla-tr.
explain how propositions
about the external world
can be tao™, he
.ust show that we can
plausibly expect there
to be propositions

-r

•

"i

(

self-presentl^ by

finition) which can serve
as bases for indirectly
evident proposiHowever, Chisholm’s
definitions and principles
as they stand
do not explain how there
can be such propositions.

Those of his principles Which explain how
propositions become Indirectly
evident turn
out to exclude self-presenting
propositions fro. servlr^ as
bases for
indirectly evident ones.

Let us consider precisely
why Chisholm's system
does not provide such an explanation:
We have already seen that
every proposition
which Is self-presenting for
S will be directly
evident for S, and
that no directly evident and
hence no self-presenting
proposition can
entail an Indirectly evident
proposition. How then can there
be some

proposition

e

such that necessarily. If e
is self-presenting for

then there Is some proposition
h which Is evident for

Indirectly so?

S,

S,

but only

(This Is, of course, what Is
required by D6.1 If there

Is to be any Indirectly evident
proposition h which has a basis.)

Since this relationship between the
self-presenting and the Indirectly
evident cannot be a matter of entallment.
It must be a matter of one
of Chisholm's eplstemlc principles
saying that the relationship holds.
(Again, we may presume that Chisholm
Intends his principles to be

necessarily true.)

This leads us to principle C as the keystone
which
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states as a necessary
truth the conditions

™der *ich so„e directly
Ident proposition makes
it the case that
some logically
distinct
proposition is indirectly
evident.
Initially, principle C
looks promising.

necessarily, if

s

ceiving something

evident

to S

It states that

helieves >^t,„ut ground
lor douht that he is
perto

he white (for example),

then it is (indirectly,

that he is perceiving
something to be OUte.

to principle C,

According

It will always be the
case that a directly evident

proposition will, under specified
conditions, determine another
proposition to be indirectly
evident.

And this seems close to
what is

required for a directly evident
proposition to be a basis for
an
indirectly evident one.
But a closer look at
principle C in conjunction with
D6.1

brings difficulties to light.

dltlons under which some

dent

h,

e

If

principle C is to express the

cor.-

can be the basis for some
indirectly evi-

what precisely is our

e and

what is our h?

Obviously, h is

the proposition that S perceives
something to be white.

As required,

h is indirectly evident for
S.

Note that

e

cannot be the proposition that

is perceiving something to be
white.

may be self-presenting for

S,

S

believes that he

For although this proposition

it is not the case that necessarily,

it is so then h is evident for S.

It is

if

consistent with the necessity

of principle C that there be cases in
which (i) the proposition that

believes that he is perceiving something

self-presenting for

S,

to

be white is true and is

yet (ii) h is not evident to

S.

As Chisholm

S
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recognizes (cf. ibid.,
pp. 74 75)^

situation will arise
when

believes that he Is
perceiving something
also exi St grounds for

position that

S

S

to

to

S

be white and yet
there

doubt this belief,

Hence by D6.1 the pro

believes that he is
perceiving something

to

be white

cannot be a basis of h
for S.^
Clearly, what we need
for

e

is the whole antecedent
of prin-

ciple C (substituting
"white" for the predicate
letter F):
e

believes, without ground
for doubt
perceiving something to be
white.
S

’

that he is

But if e is to be a basis
for another proposition.
it must by D6

self-presenting

.

1

be

.5

Are Epistemic States
Self-Presenting?
It does not appear
plausible to maintain that an
epistemic

state such as e Is self-presenting.
of

e

se«s. first, that an analysis

in terms of Chisholm's
stated definition of one of
Its central

concepts-that
that

It

e

of a belief that Is without
ground for

Is not self-presenting, and
second,

doubt-lndlcates

that Chisholm does not In

any case Intend the concept of
the self-presenting to embrace
epistemic propositions such as e.
Indeed, we shall see that. In
response to
recent criticism of his second
edition definitions and principles.

Chisholm has chosen to revise and narrow
his definition of the selfpresenting In
such as

e

a

way that more clearly excludes
epistemic propositions

from falling under that concept
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But let us first
consider an analysis
of e in terms of
CMSH01..S second ed.Uon
de^ni^on of che seU-pnesen
f fns (02.1).
Such an analysis requires
that „e consider .ore
precisely „hat It
means for a belief to
be without ground
for doubt.
Chlshol. provides
the following definition:

U)
beijevL'’thitTanf
Uons that are ac^eptabU^o“
r?rnd:\'o°"cfutrt:":r'
negation of
I

the proposition that
p.

(Ibid., p. 76)

When one's belief Is without
ground for doubt, then,
a quite
complex eplstemlc condition
obtains with respect to
that belief.

(The

complexity Is here not spelled
out In full.

That would require

replacing 'acceptable" and
"tends to confirm" with
Chisholm's definitions of these concepts.)
since this c«plex eplstemlc
coMltlon Is

equivalent by definition

to

the condition one Is In when
one's belief

is without ground for doubt,
it would appear that e
comes to the

following

elieves that he is perceiving
something to be white
and no conjunction of propositions
that are acceptable’
confirm the negation of the
proposition
that uhe is perceiving something
to be white.

Given the definitional equivalence
expressed by D4.3, it would seem
that

e

is self-presenting

if and only if

construed as self-presenting.

f

is.

But

Its second conjunct,

f

is not plausibly

for example, is a

contingent general proposition, and it appears
that such
can be true without being evident for S.6

a

proposition

The view that general pro-
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f-

a„d eptste^lcaU,
„ore .aslc propositions
wonla see. to be both
andependentl, plausible
and a position that
Chlshol. would accept.
(Cf. Chisholm on
contingent
eener^l r,T-r^
S
general
propositions, ibid.,
pp. 64-67,
especially p. 66.)

Thus, upon analysis.
It does not look as
though

e can be
counted as self-pmsentlng
under Chlshol..s second
edition definition
Of that concept.
Before „e consider his
.ore recent, revised
definition. It will be
instructive to exa.lne several
passages In Theory of
ESOwle^ that bear on his concept of
the self-presenting,
to see both
what Chisholm appears to
Intend by this concept and
*at con-

siderations have led him to
revise his definition of
It.
No passages,

to my knowledge,

suggest or clearly imply
that

eplstemlc states are self-presenting;
there are at least two
passages,
however, which suggest that
Chisholm does not Intend
eplstemlc
propo-

sitions in general to count
as self-presenting.

One such passage Is

to be found in the first
edition of T heory of Knowledge

,

where there

Is a fuller discussion than
In the second edition of
the Intended

range and limits of self-presenting
states.

Chisholm Is careful

to

note that propositions about
one’s thoughts (which are shown
by
example to Include chose about one's
beliefs, memories, and emotions)
may not be the only sorts of
propositions capable of being self-

presenting.

He suggests that some propositions
concerning what one Is

trying or undertaking to do” are
also capable of being self-

presenting (Chisholm, 1966,
*

»

p.
f

29).
/

Therp
i<= at least
looci- some
mere is
reason

to
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think that if Chisholm
held that eplstemic
states conld be selfpresentlng (either because
they are themselves
tteughts or because
they constitute another
category of potentially
self-presenting
propositions), then he would
mention this possibility
in the present
passage.
But no such mention
is made.

When Chisholm does, in
the second edition,
directly discuss
the nature of eplstemlc
propositions, he
does so in terms very
dif-

ferent from those that
would be suggested if he
believed eplstemlc
States could be self— D^esen^fno••
P asentlng. he discusses
eplstemlc states as nor-

2StlXe states.
respect

to

To assert that one is
in some eplstemlc state
with

a proposition,

Chisholm says, is to assert
that one has

some responsibility or duty
with respect

to

that proposition (cf. Chisholm,
1977,

U).

p.

one's belief concerning
But on any traditional

account of normative states,
a person can have a duty
without it being
evident to him that he has that
duty.^

Chisholm's Iterative Principles

Chisholm

s

second edition also Includes an
extended discussion

of iterative eplstemlc prlnclples-for
example, the principle that

knowing entails knowing that one knows.
tantly on the question whether

e

This discussion bears impor-

is self-presenting.

An iterative

principle which asserted that necessarily,
if Ksp, then

Ksp (where "Ksp" abbreviates

"S

S

knows that

knows that p") would, given D2.1,

entail of some eplstemlc states that they
are self-presenting.

on this principle, whenever Ksp were true.
It would be evident

For,
to

2

(indeed.
S

by

s

^ue

D2a.

Ksp.

It would not

Hence Ksp „oeXd He
seU-pcesencdc, co
follow that

e

la self-ptesentlng
,

rather hard pressed
e

to
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explain

one

an eplstetlc state
such as

Is not self-presenting
given that one as con,plex
as Ksp Is.

However, Chlshol* explicitly
rejects such

a

stror« Iterative

principle, and thus appears
to avoid the consequence
that Ksp Is
self-presenting.
He bases this rejection
on the following
considerations

same

a certain proposition
is known.

Such a person then
anything is

known or evidfnt."'^?Liefore^a
pro
without it being evident t^at
may be known without it being
known that it’ is know^!°^°""'"°"'

irrLwenrLd'
(Ibid.,

p.

114)

Chisholm does affirm a series of
qualified iterative
Clples.
poses,

prin-

The first of these, and the
one most relevant to our puris as follows:

Kl:

If S considers the proposition
that he knows that p
and if it is evident to S that
p, then it is evident
to b that he knows that p.

(Ibid.)

Kl appears to allow that the epistemic
propositions it per-

tains to may be true without being evident.
tlon, e.g. Ksp, may be true of some person

considered by
Ksp is evident

S.

to

In such a case,
S.

For an epistemic proposi
S

without having been

Kl cannot be used

to

establish that
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Unfortunately, K1 does not
avoid the conclusion
that Ksp Is
self-presenting as neatly as
It appears to.
Notice that In the

quoted

passage above, Chlshol.
affirms a psychological
principle to the
effect that If a proposition
Is evident to a person.
It Is understood
by that person.
On the basis of this
principle, Chisholm rejects
a
strong Iterative principle
In favor of the weaker
K1
Chisholm also
afflmms as another psychological
principle that If one understands
a
proposition, one has contemplated
and reflected upon It (cf.
Ibid.,
.

p.

«).

In a recent article,

Herbert Heldelberger has shown
that

these psychological principles,

together >dth D2.1, entail that
no

propositions are self-presenting
(cf. Heldelberger, 1979,
D2.1 can be revised In an
obvious

p.

62).

way to avoid this consequence,
but

Heldelberger notes that the revised
definition will then entail that
Ksp Is after all self-presenting,
given K1 and the psychological
principles.

Implausible results are shown

to

obtain If one rejects

the second, but retains the first,
of the psychological principles
(cf.

ibid., pp. 64-67).

Heldelberger further points out that the
consequence that Ksp
is self-presenting presents serious
difficulties for Chisholm.

Either

he must deny that Ksp is self-presenting
or adopt the view that self-

presenting states need not be confined
For if Ksp is self-presenting, then
entailed by Ksp.

But p may,

of

to

p is

what is epi stemlcal ly basic.
directly evident, since it is

course, be a proposition about the

external world— the sort of proposition Chisholm's founda
tionali sm
cannot accept as directly evident or basic (cf. ibid.,
pp. 66-67).
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According

ro

Chishol. (1977, p.
70), propositions abont
tbe external
world do not constitute
a "proper stopping
place" in the process
of
lustiflcation, for one can
reasonably ask what
Justif icatlon there is
for accepting such a
proposition.
In responding to
Heidelberger

.

Chisholm writes:

believe it is accurate
to say that
if
remarks about the
the
5psychological nr
restrict self-presentation
to the ce?tatn\^ari
^
^t“^
distinguished
from the evident)
then wo
u
difficulties
that
Heidelberger points out.
I

‘

*

(Chisholm, 1979,

p. 337 )
It would seem enough,
in order to defuse
Heldelberger's criticisms, simply to reject the
psychological "pre-conditions"
or principles noted above. ,7hy then
does Chisholm go further
and offer a
revised and restricted definition
of the self-presenting?
Apparently
the reason Is that he does
not wish Ksp to be
self-presenting. Recall
that Chisholm rejected a
strong and unqualified iterative
principle

because he held the psychological
principle that a proposition must
be
understood if evident. Now that
he rejects that psychological
principle, there does not appear
to be any reason for Chisholm
to
prefer the qualified principle K 1
to a stronger iterative principle
such as the following:

EK.

If S knows that
knows that p.

p,

then it is evident to

S

that he

Apparently, Chisholm would now accept EK,
or something very
close to it.

Otherwise, he would not feel the need

to

revise his
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definition of the self-presenting.

EK together >rith his
original

definition would entail that
Ksp Is self-presentlr«

But he can

.

retain EK and avoid the
apparently undesirable
consequence that Ksp Is
self-presenting by requiring
that a self-presenting
proposition be
d£«aln. rather than merely
evident, whenever true.
This Is, in
effect, just what his new
definition does. 8 Chisholm's
decision to
thus restrict the self-presenting
also indicates that he does
not wish
to opt for the alternative
of allowing some
self-presenting states to
be nonbaslc, and this means
that he cannot allow
propositions about
what one Knows to be self-presenting,
.^aln, his restricted deflnltlon neatly avoids such a
consequence.
It follows,

of course,

this revised definition,

that if e is to be self-presenting
on

it must be certain.

Recall that

that S’s belief that he is
perceiving something

ground for doubt.

It

to

e

states

be white is without

seems unlikely that such a
proposition can be

accorded the highest possible epistemic
status for

Propositions

S.

such as those expressed by "S seems
to have a headache" or "S believes
he is perceiving something to be
white" seem, when true, to be con-

siderably more reasonable for

S

to believe.

It also

seems more reaso-

nable to affirm basic arithmetical truths
and other simple necessary

truths than to affirm a proposition such
as e.

are more reasonable
(cf. D1.4).

to

belive than

e,

But if other truths

it follows

Even if it were maintained that

through reflection, achieve certainty about

S

a

that

e

is not certain

could ultimately,

proposition such as

e,

it would not follow that e is self-presenting on the
new definition,

for prior to reflection

e

would be true yet not certain.
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Some Consequences
If it IS true

that e is not
self-presenting, then
principle C
does not provide the
required linkup between
directly and Indirectly

evident propositions.

It

Is not

this principle that
shows us how

directly evident propositions
can be bases for Indirectly
evident
ones,
.or do any of Chlsbol^.s
r^alnlns eplste.lc principles
appear
capable of showing this.
The only
other principle that Is

a candidate
for explaining how
Indirectly evident propositions
can have bases Is
principle I (Chisholm, 1977,
p. 84).
But like the antecedent
of principle C, that of principle
I contains the
requirement that one’s
belief be without ground for
doubt.
Hence any att^pt to show
that
the antecedent of principle
I Is self-presenting
will encounter the
same difficulties found In
trying to show this tor the
antecedent of

principle
It

C.

thus seems doubtful that
Indirectly evident propositions
do

have bases, as Chisholm
understands this tern.

This presents a

problem both for Chisholm’s
foundatlonallsm and for his attempt to
account for our knowledge of ordinary
propositions about the external
world.

Revisions would seem to be In order
If Chisholm Is to retain

his foundatlonallst structure and
his antl-skeptlcal approach to

knowledge

Chisho lm

s

A Version of Foundationalism"

Chisholm does indeed offer revisions in "A
Version of

Foundationalism

(1980).

It

is to

these revisions

I

shall presently
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First, however. It

be helpful to say

seething about

a

Change In Chisholm's
view on propositions
that occurred between
the
publication of the second
edition of Theory of Know1ed,e
and "A
Sion of Foundationallsm."
Chisholm's newer principles
have a quite
different appearance from
his older ones, but
much of this Is due to
this change, and a brief
explanation of Chisholm's
new view on propositions will facilitate
an understanding of
his newer principles.

Chisholm's new view Is that
first-person propositions do
not
exist.
He has arrived at this
view after reflecting on
the differences between such locutions
as "There
j-nere existes
xr
u
exists an x
such that
x
v,

himself

to

be vrtse."

be tmse" and

believes

"There exists an x such
that x believes x to

The first locution can be
false while the second Is
true,

for example If x reads a
palm and concludes that the
person whose
palm It Is Is wise, without
realizing that the palm Is hls
own.
This
suggests to Chisholm that we
should not think of a belief or
other socalled propositional attitude
as a relation between a
person and a

proposition, but rather as a relation
between a person and

When

I

say that

proposition.

I

perty of wisdom

I

am wise,

a property.

am not expressing my belief in
a

I

am, Chisholm would say, directly
attributing the proto

myself.

Apparently, all of my beliefs require
the

direct attribution of some property
to myself, even if

I

am at the

same time ^directly attributing some
property— such as that of being

wise— to someone

else.

The complexities of indirect attribution
need

not detain us here, since the relevant
principles Chisholm cites con-

cern only direct attribution.

Chisholm leaves the locution "x
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directly attributes to
y tne property of being
F" undefined,
but note
that "direct attribution
is necessarily such
that,

tor every x and
y,
if X directly attributes
a certain property
to y, then x Is
Identical
with y" (Chisholm, 1980,
p. 544).

Ch isholm*

s

New Defini tions and
Principles

hisholm has redefined
several old t-orTn
terms andj provided some
definitions of newly introduced
terms.
s.
I
1 shall r
consider some of these
definitions and the relevant
1

revised principles.

Chisholn, has a new definition
of the evident:

is

counterbalanced.

(Ibid., p. 548)

The newly Introduced tern

m

this definition Is in turn
defined:

‘hat an attribution Is
counterbalanced If and

(Ibid., p. 547)

Chisholm also has a new definition
of "objective certainty:"
The direct attribution of a property
may be said to be objec^ person provided these conditions
hold;
rhP
the df
direct attribution of that property
is beyond reasonable
doubt for that person; and it is
at least as reasonable for
him as is the direct attribution
of any other property.
(Ibid.,

p.

548)

For our purposes, the most significant
newly introduced concept is
that of being epistemically in the clear:

An attribution may be
said

tn

^istemlcallv in the clear for
not dlsconfl^^Tl;;rJ,.

unsuspect

“

^

presumption in their favor
for him.
'

,

or

P^^ties that have some

^

)

j

This requires an account
ot confirmation and
dlsconf Irma t Ion:
property orbel^g'^G^UUernatlJel^

to

"nLnLXti"
^
- -

L’aXo“

0.

cojfl™

(Ibid., pp. 552-553)

The concept of being
eplstemlcally
"basis

m

the clear Is used to
define

:

We could say that a
self-presenting property constitutes
the
MSis for an attribution provided that the subject
has
that
property and provided that.
If he has It and If tL
attr^bu-

attrlbu^iorJs

evld"enL '

(Ibid., p. 558)

The following two principles—
one new and one revlsed-are

relevant
P3:

to

the discussion that will follow:

For every x, if (i) x directly
attributes to himself the
property of being F, and if (ii) x
being F is not explicitly contradicted by the set of
properties that x
irectly attributes to x, then his
being F has some presumption in its favor for x.
(Ibid., p. 552)
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P6:

For every subiect x
be something 'that 1
then it

L

evident

-ff

^

P

fo

is F.

x^thlr^"''"
^
perceives something thit
(Ibid., p. 555)

P6 is. Of course,

the taportant bridging
principle that

explain the conditions

™der

att^pts

which what Is self-presentlrg

«hes

to
a

proposition about the external
world evident.
Chlshol. also nakes an
Interesting distinction
between the
concept Of the directly
evident and that of an
evidence-base:
Of our'propertles

IZlTrT

•

be yielded by those

“

constltute^hat *rch irdlr^:car:"de“:®
ThL"

evld^"“^^So'’’L"o“?

Trelrre^nJ

L°r:i^:o"\:t\d"^Lt-"rec“iy^\v\r

to that

properties which are self-presenting
"""

thus self^p?esentl^!'
Hence a property may be In one’s
evidence-base without It
being directly evident to one
that one has that prorert^
For
one’s having
that“pL^y
(Ibid., p. 550)
It may look as though Chisholm
is making the distinction noted

in Chapter II between internal
and external justification.

believe

I

there are important similarities
between the two distinctions, but
also some differences.

Chisholm’s is more narrow in scope.

internally justified is not limited

to

the directly

The

evident— it may

include other evident propositions as well—
and the externally
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justified 13 Of course
„of allied

ro

the self-present
l„g

cases of e.ter„all,
Justified propositions

.11

Pnradf,
Lgra

.

not .e seU-presentlr,

or potentrally
self-presenting at all-they

.11 be ordinary external
world propositions such
as the proposition
that the butler did
It.
Also,
.11 not always be enough to
consider an externally

a

Justified

proposition In order that It
become internally
Justified.
consider the proposition
that the butler did
It. but this
.ay not yet be evident
to him.

However,

Watson may
proposition

believe that If „e restrict
ourselves to the set of
self-presenting and directly
evident proposiI

tlons (or properties as
Chisholm would now have It),
what Chisholm
says about the evidence-base
and the directly evident
.11 be true of
the externally and the
Internally Justified, respectively.
For
example, I believe that
whenever S considers >*ether
a self-presentlr«

proposition is true of him (or
considers whether
property Is to be attributed

to

(If he has that property) this

him),

.11

a

self-presenting

then If the proposition Is
true

be Internally Justified

for him.

Within the realm of the self-presenting
and the directly evident,
whatever Is in one's evidence-base
Is externally Justified, and
whatever is directly evident Is Internally
Justified as well.

An Alleged Counterexample to Chisholm’s
Definition of "Basis

I

wish to make an interrelated set of
criticisms involving the

principles and several of the definitions
noted above.
as follows;

I

I

will first consider an unsuccessful attempt

will proceed
to

offer a
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counte^exa^ple

Po

new

.eMnUlon

of

••..eis.-

„HUe

fHe

propose. oonnPenexa.pU
fs onsoccessfnf
an anaf.sfa of wH.
.
f.fa fs so
eads fo results
*lch are then applied In
criticise of P3 and P6.
The alleged oounterexa.ple
Is Intended to show
that there Is a
property which is not
a basis in
hho situation
In the
described, but >Alch Is
a basis on Chisholm's
definition.
It Is a refln^nent
on
Heldelberger's 1,6. counterexample
to Chisholm's bridging
principle In
the first edition of
Theo 2
P,.
counterexample
la as follows:
A man Is looking at
an object that Is In
fact white,
and that Indeed now
appears to be white.
But a few moments
before
the Object had a red
light shining on It.
The red light has been
pointed out to him; It has
been turned on and off
several times while
the man is looking at the
object, etc.
•

:.o^Kn^

’

Initially, as In Heldelberger's
example, the man Irrationally
persists in believing that
he Is perceiving an object
that Is red.

even though the red light
has been turned off and
he Is being appeared
whltely to. The man does Indeed
believe (correctly) that he
Is being

appeared whitely to.

But he also believes (falsely)
that he Is being

appeared whitely to by an object
that is red.

Then a scientist whom the man
(with good reason) admires and
trusts comes In.

The scientist tells him he's
perceiving (and being

appeared whitely to by) an

object that Is white, and for this
reason

the man comes to believe that
he's perceiving and being appeared
whl-

tely to by an object that is white.

Consider these properties:
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“

‘

-

»y so.e-

A = the property of
being appeared *ltely
to.
In the situation
cited
ucea, atter
aftpr the scientist
^
has arrived, I
believe It Is true to
say of our «„ (call
hlM S) both that S
has y
and that S has A.
Purther. A Is a
self-presenting property for
S.
although W is not.

The objection that
this situation constitutes
a counterexample
to Chisholm’s definition
of ’basis” runs as
follows:

Given this
definition. A must be
regarded as a basis for the
attribution of y.
But A is not a basis for
the attribution of y
this case.
Any basis
In this case will be a
self-presenting property (or
properties) having

m

to do irtth S’s belief
that he Is In the presence
of some trustworthy

scientist who has told him he
Is perceiving a white
object.
For It Is
on the basis of this more
complex belief, rather than
any simple perceptual belief, that
I

S

comes to directly attribute
W.

believe this objection is correct
in its claim that A is a

basis for the attribution of
W on Chisholm's definition of
"basis."
To say that A is a basis for
W is to say (1) that A is

self-presenting;

(2) that the attribution of W is
epistemically in the

clear; and (3) that necessarily,
if A is self-presenting and
the

attribution of W epistemically in the
clear, then the attribution of W
is evident.

(Reference

to

persons is here suppressed.)

mine these conditions in turn

to

I

shall exa-

see that each is satisfied.

(1) A is a self-presenting property.

This condition is
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clearly satisfied
since rh-i=K^i
Chisholm xs explicit
that such ways of
being
appeared to are
self-presenting (of. ibid.,
•

p.

(

2

)

549).

The attribution of
W Is eplstemlcally

m

the clear.
This
is so provided only
that
at W is
Is nnr
not andisconfirmed by any set
of properties that have some
presumption In their favor
for S.
To say that the

direct attribution of

property has some
presumption In Its favor
Is
to say that the direct
attribution of that property
Is more reasonable
than is the direct attr-fKutattribution ofc its negation
(cf. Ibid., p. 547).
a

It seems to me that
Chisholm would wish to
say that the
attribution of W Is eplstemlcally
In the clear In this
case.
There Is
property that has some
presumption In its favor for
S and that
dlsconflrms W, l.e., there
Is no reason for S to
believe that It Is
not the case that he Is
being appeared to by an
object that Is white.
And there is every reason to
u uexieve that he
being appeared to by
such an object.

-

,

It

,

,

is not reasonable for S
to directly attribute
the negation

of W even during the time
that he Irrationally persists
In dol.^ so
(l.e., in believing that he
Is being appeared to by
an object that Is
red).
Obviously, a person may believe
something even when It would be

more reasonable

to

withhold the belief.

(This suggests that the rela-

tion of being more reasonable
than, and also the properties
of having
some presumption In favor of,
being eplstemlcally In the clear,
and
being a basis, have to do with
a person's evidence-base
rather than

with what is directly evident to him;
that
relations have

to

Is.

these properties and

do with the data that presents
Itself to the person
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-the.

.hae

*e.He.

he has consMe.ed

apprep.ia.e epls.e.ie
eonclusions

^.h

.his da.a a„a

.he

.aga.d .o i..,

att.iha.lo„ oi .he nega.ion
oi „ un.easonahie
io.
lacking any presump.lon

S

(and oi

c^.ee

in its favor for S);
i. also seems that
.here
ate no properties in
this si.na.ion *i.h
have any presomp.ion
in
their favor for S and
which conf-ir^
confirm the negation of
W.
No attribution
Of a property *ieh
led S to believe that
he „as being appeared
to by

an object that was red
could have had any
presumption in its favor for
By hypothesis, he
arrived at his belief in
a conpletely irrational
way, without the support
of any reasonable
attributions of properties.
The attributions he did
oiake concerning
this belief, if

he n^de any at
all besides the direct
attribution of the belief Itself,
were all
quite unreasonable for him.
And all those properties
which are reaso
nable for him to attribute
point to W as the most
reasonable additional property to attribut
e given the choice
between W and the
negation of W.
If the above considerations
are correct,

then

I

should conclude that W is
eplstemlcally in the clear for

believe we
S.

(3) Necessarily, if A is self-presenting
and W eplstemlcally

in the clear, then the attribution
of W is evident.
I

believe that this third condition
for being a basis is

satisfied in virtue of this instance
of P6:^
P6

:

For every x, if (i) x is appeared
whitely to, and if
(ii) his being appeared whitely to
by something that
is white is epistemically in the
clear for x, then it
is evident for x that he is appeared
whitely to by
something that is white.
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If A is self-presenting
S
r S,
8 for

j.
then condition
(i) of P6

is

'

satisMe..
,Ha

for S, rhea condition
(11) I3 satisfied.

So P6'

cUaP

tells us that

necessarily If a Is
self-presenting and the
attribution of W eplste.1cally in the clear,
then the attribution
of W Is evident for
S.
That
Is, condition
(111) is satisfied.
If the above reasoning

A is a basis of W for

Is correct,

then „e ™ust conclude
that

S.

An Uns uccessful Re spong^
to the
Alleged Counterexample
shall now consider a first,
and unacceptable, response
to
this proposed counterexample.
This response Is to state
that the
attribution of W Is not after
all eplstemlcally In the
clear.
I

The respondent might argue
as follows:
”P 3 logically Implies

mlcally in the clear.

P3

that the attribution of W
Is not eplste-

states that:

For every x, if (i) x directly
attributes to himself the
property of being F. and If
(11) x being F Is not expUcitly contradicted by the set
of properties
''

““Ibutes

to X.

that x
then hls being F has some pre^

sumption in its favor for x.

"Now consider the following property:
M - the property of being almost
always deliberately
misled by others about what S is
perceiving.

"Suppose that

S

directly attributes M to himself.

That is, he

believes he is usually deceived by others
about what he perceiving.

Perhaps that is what made

S

refuse initially to attribute W to
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himself.
"It see„s .Ha. .He
a...iHu.lo„ of H fa no.
expffof.f, eo„..a^-ted H. .He se. of
p.open.fes .Ha. . afoec.l,
a...fHu.es .o x. Po.
he al»pl, Hoes no.
Hold an, HeUefs *loH
en.aU .He a...lHu.lon
of
the negation of M.
To be surf,
ino
i
ere, he also indlrec.ly
a. .rlbu.es the

following property to the
scientist:
R = the property of
being always right.

Hence he directly attributes
some appropriate
attributions of neither R nor

R'

R'

to himself.

But the

entail the attribution
of negation of

His belief that the
scientist Is always right
Is compatible with
his belief that he Is
usually deceived deliberately.
Perhaps he

believes that onlj^ the
scientist Is trustworthy.
•If this is correct,

then the attribution of
M Is not expli-

citly contradicted by any
set of beliefs which
P3,

S

holds; and hence, by

the attribution of M has
some presumption In Its
favor for

S.

"But If this Is so, then
the attribution of W Is not
eplsteml-

cally in the clear, for the
attribution of M dlsconflrms the
attribution of W. That Is, if M were
the only logically distinct
property
the attribution of which was
beyond reasonable doubt for S,
then the
attribution of W would not be
acceptable. For although the
scientist,
in the case described. Is
Insisting to

S

that S Is being appeared

whltely to by an object that Is white,
if the attribution of M were
the onlj: thing that was beyond
reasonable doubt for

reasonable

to

S,

it would not be

attribute W, and would probably be
reasonable

bute the negation of W.

to

attri-

since the attribution of M thus
dlsconflrms
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that of W. and since,
as „e have seen, the
attribution of M has sc™a
Ptesueptlon In Its favor
for S. It follows
that the attribution
of w
IS not eplstemlcally
In the clear
for S."

An Evaluat ion of
Chisholm’s P3
do not believe that
this response Is
successful. Rather
than showing that the
attribution of W Is not
eplst^tlcal ly 1 „ the
clear. It seems to me
to show that P3 Is
false.
For It should not be
a result, even in
the situation described,
that the attribution of
M
has some presumption in
its i-avor
favor tor
for Sb.
i
^
The ^culprit
here, I believe,
I

is P3.

think P3 is too latltudlnarlan.
and

I

I

believe that It cate-

gorizes as properties having
some presumption In their
favor those
not have that epistemic
status according to Chisholm's
definition of "having some
presumption In favor of" (cf.
Ibid.,
p.

551).

shall consider P3 more directly
In order to see what. In my
view, is wrong with It.
The difficulty can be Illustrated
by giving a
more generalized example analogous
to the one given Immediately
above.
I

Suppose a very methodical and
consistent, but rather unstable.

philosopher— call him Professor Pyrrho—
goes mad.
much Descartes.
SIS IS true.
E

=

He has read

too

He has come to believe that
the evil genius hypothe-

That is, he directly attributes the
following property:
the property of being such that an
evil genius not
less powerful than deceitful, has employed
his whole
energies in deceiving Professor Pyrrho.
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Professor Py„ho consistently
and methodically
tevlses his other
beliefs accordingly, so
that he does not hold
any beliefs inconsistent
With his direct attribution
of
E.

According
E

to P3,

„e would have to say
that the attribution
of

has some presumption
In Its favor for
Professor

seems ^acceptable.

Py„ho

.

But

this

,^y should Professor Pyrrho's
"methodical

madness

confer any epistemic
legitimacy on such an
outlandish
hypothesis as that expressed
by his direct attribution
of E?
The mere
fact that Professor Pyrrho
does not hold any beliefs
contradicting the

attribution of E does not, It
seems, make this attribution
have any
positive epistemic status for
him.

It does not

become a more reasonable hypothesis by virtue
of his madness, neither
for him nor for

anyone el se
This seems to be confirmed
by what Chisholm says about
the

attribution of a property having
some presumption In Its favor.

On

this view. If the attribution
of a property has some
presumption In
its favor, then It Is more
reasonable to attribute that property
than
to attribute Its negation.

But

I

do not believe that the attribution

of E is more reasonable for
Professor Pyrrho than the attribution
of

not-E.

There are few If any experiences
Professor Pyrrho could have

that would lead us to want to say
the attribution of E Is more reaso-

nable for him than that of not-E.
those experiences.

His madness Is certainly not one of

His madness might

explain^

he comes to believe

the evil genius hypothesis, but It does
not make the hypothesis

justified or reasonable for him.
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Here

I

a. ass^ing ,Hat

*e„

-tains

the attribution
of a property

the status of having
so.e presumption In
Its favor for some
person, this status Is
conferred upon It and
derived from >*at Is
In
that person's evidence
base, rather than
froa „hat Is directly
evident
to that person.
This Is the „ay I have
understood Chisholm's
use of
the phrase •'having
some presumption In
favor" as well as the
phrases
acceptable." "beyond reasonable
doubt" and "^re reasonable
than."
So the attribution of
a property may be
beyond reasonable doubt,
etc.

for a person even though
he strongly rejects
attributing It.
to attribute it, but
he doesn't.

^

He

A Sati sfactory Respon se
to the
Alleged Counterexample

hope to have established
that the proper way to
respond to
the initial counterexample
Is not to claim that
the attribution of W
is after all not eplstemlcally
In the clear.
But a quite different
kind of response seems to
me to be entirely satisfactory,
and that Is
to accept that A Is a basis
for the attribution of W tor
S, and simply
to deny that this result
constitutes a counterex'ample. A
Is a basis
for the attribution of W. even
If s does not, in some sense,
"use" A
I

eplstemlcally In order

to

reach the decision

to

attribute W.

This

decision is reached In this case by
more roundabout means having
with the testimony of the scientist.
a property such as W.

to do

Nevertheless, A tends to confirm

Even if the proper Inferences are
not made In

the case cited, A does provide a
reason for attributing W.

And In
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this sense, A Is a
basis for the attribution
of W.
I

think It Should be Clear
that In

^klng

this response, as

I

believe „e must do, „e
are committing ourselves
to the view that
a
property *lch Is a basis
for an attribution
constitutes part of a
person's evidence-base,
and need not constitute
part of what Is
directly evident to a person.
A basis Is that which
constitutes
grounds or reasons for
attributing other properties,
or which makes
reasonable the attribution
of other properties.

But It neel not make

£Iident such attributions, and may
not even Itself be evident
person for whom that property
Is a basis.

one

to the

A basis In some sense cuts

work out for one; It provides
the groundwork that allows
one to
make some eplstemlc Inference,
for example, to some
property that can
y Indirectly, not directly, evident.
But whether one actually
does make the appropriate
eplstemlc Inference Is another
story.
One
s

may tall utterly to do so.
has not been put
As

I

to

Yet the basis remains a basis.

It just

use, as it were.

have noted.

I

also believe that when we say
that the

attribution of one property is more
reasonable than that of another,
or has some presumption in its
favor then or is acceptable, or
beyond

reasonable doubt, we are saying something
about a person’s evidence
base or what can be inferred from
it rather than about what is

directly evident or what can be inferred
from that.
In this sense

I

believe that these epistemic properties
are

fundamentally different from the epistemic
properties of being
evident, being known, and being certain.

The latter pertain essen-
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tially to that which
is evident for
fnr a
. person
whereas the former
pertain onl,
,he evidence-base.
This is to ^,e the
sa.e

Chishol^.s

„te

testtictive distinction
that

ah.t

have «de in Chaptet
ii
about the distinction
het>,een the intetnall,
and the externally
justified
i

An Evaluat ion of
Chisholm’s P6

The distinction between
the evidence-base and
the directly
evident can be used to bring
out what see« to .e
to be a difficulty
with P6 and its instances.
This principle tells us
that if x Is
ppeared redly to (whitely,
etc.) and being appeared
redly to is

epistemlcally

m

the clear for x, then
It Is evident for x
that he is

appeared redly to by something
that is red.
li s has the property
of being appeared redly
to,
a

property that Is part of S's
evidence-base.

then this is

And to say something is

epistemlcally in the clear is to
say something about one's
evidence
base and about those non-baslc
properties that are made reasonable
what is In one

essentially

s

evidence-base.

vrtth a

by

So the antecedent of P6 Is
concerned

person’s evidence-base, while the
conclusion tells

us what Is actually evident for
the person, as opposed

to

telling us

merely what Is In his evidence
base or what Is made reasonable
by his
evidence base
This move from what is in one’s
evidence base

actually evident

to

to

what is

one seems to me to be important and the
kind of

relation that needs to be explained by some
epistemic principles.
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However. It does not
appear to

provide the needed
explanation,

n.e

that P6 and Its
Instances

it does not

see. to .e that
when the
antecedent oi PS is
satisfied, this wiii aiiow
ns to .he an. concisions about What is
evident to the person
in question.

For purposes of
illustration, let us
co.ider again P6' and
our .an S loohlng at
the *lte object
*ich earlier had a red light
shining on it.
Let us imagine
Sine Slightly
sliehtlv rH
ff
different
circumstances from
those described above.
As before, the red
light has been turned
off;
the man is appeared
whitely to by an
object that is white,
and he

irrationally believes he is
appeared whltely to by an
object that is
red.

But this time, no
scientist comes in to guide
him to the correct

belief.

instead, he believes that,
in five .inutes, the red
object
that is appearing whltely
to hi. will turn into
a white object.
This
belief is not support by any
reason. ,«ter five .Inutes,
then, he has
the correct belief, but I
do not think we would want
to say that the

attribution of W-the property
of being appeared whltely
to by an
object that is white— is evident
to this man.
If a man In Maine
believes that an earthquake is
occurring in California because
a black
cat Just crossed his path, we
do not want to say that his
belief Is

evident to him; not even If, as it
happens, an earthquake Is Just
then
occurring in California. It seems
to me we have

situation In the above case.
tional and accidental means.

S

the same sort of

arrives at the correct belief by Irra-

The coincidental truth of his belief
is

not enough. It seems to me, to allow
us to say that this belief Is

evident

to

the man.
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Yet the antecedent
of P6' Is.

believe, satisfied in
this
situation, as It was In
the example described
earlier.
If 30. and If
w is indeed not evident
to
u o,
S
then Pfi'
cnen
Pb
is not acceptable.
Or again, consider a
person who Is appeared
redly to and for
Who™ there Is no data
which dlsconflr^s the
attribution of the property of being appeared
redly to by an object
that Is red.
But su^
pose that the person
does not understand
what It Is to attribute
to
hlrtself the property
of being appeared
redly to.
(Not because of any
lack of knowledge of
technical philosophy, but
simply be he does not
grasp simple concepts such
as beine
oeing red.;
red
Th-ite
t
This example
might also
constitute a problem for P6*.
1

'i

Finally, consider our

S

again,

du;^

the five minute period

at the end of which, as
he Irrationally believes,
a red object will
become white.
Prior to the Imagined color
change, he does not even
attribute W to himself. He
directly attributes Its negation.
Surely
we could not say In this
circumstance that W Is evident to
him.
And
yet the antecedents of P6' remain
satisfied, I believe.
If any of these considerations
are correct,

then It seems we

must reject P6 and its instances.
A possible response is to say
that the consequent, as well as
the antecedent, of P6 pertains
to the evidence- base

.

On this view P6

tells us how nonbasic properties
have various degrees of justifica-

tion conferred on them by basic
properties; but they do not tell us

how a property becomes evident

.

Such a principle would tell us considerably
less than what P6
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appears intended

to

tell hq
us.

how the self-presenting
can

t j
we would
not have a principle
explaining

^he

an external world
proposition

evident.

But we would have a
principle that explains
how the selfpresentlr, can at least
Justlf, (m the external
sense) an external

world proposition.
If «e reinterpret
Chisholm's principle as
making this more

modest claim and make a
few necessary adjustments
reinterpretation.

I

to

accomodate such a

helleve that we can have
a plausible principle

that will serve the
Important role of a bridging
principle between the
self-presenting and the external
world.
In the next chapter
I attempt
such a reinterpretation.
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Notes to Chapter VI

edlUon

(“'”a

recently The First Person
~
not

dll^ssed

a^66). second
1980 )^ and most
nnd 8).
The latter work
(

/'losi

^

’

here.

Sion that "every
proposlUor^“a«*jus?m
justified, in part, because
of =o
directly evident" (Chisholm,
igyy^^p^'^s
complete discussion of the
directly evident.

in believing is

the
^

2

^ retain the
numbers and letters
etters rv.-,oVnmi
Chisholm uses to identify
his principles.

u.

dlf.feren^“»°tto? L"t"fo\?rhere,
lutit'i
mately correct, to think
of the relation b^h
and the directly evident
as one of
'
implication. Nothinr^n ?L
presfnrd
ference between this acLunt
rb
mind.
Compare Chisholm’s definition
of the^d
P. 24) With his definition of

and approxithe self-presenting

^^ti^

L

o.irrlns'L^m"^pr\“iVJ:

=afed^

’

turns on the difactually has in

^ rL"c“L\rionJlr1^:
^

h

prln^ip^lMc^Ii

edition of Theory of

Knowledge ('Cb-fcboin,
45c^) and shown by Herbert
Hlldelberger a9hQ^ ro k
Chisholm acknowledges and
discusses tMs nrnM
^ oblem in his second edition
(cf. Chisholm, 1977
p. 75).
,
1^66,

_
p.

/.

,

.

’

shall henceforth assume that

e

is

^

although the self-presenting
proposition that S is thinking entails
e general proposition that
someone is thinking, the lattir is
not
se f presenting, for it may be
true without

being evident to S eg
')!"''"" """
Chisholm, Ibid!,*’
pp!" 23 - 24
Nevertheless, the generalization that
someone is thinking is
one that can be directly evident,
since it is entailed by a self?
presenting proposition (cf. note 3 above).
This might lead one to
conjecture that the second conjunct of f
is also directly evident,
owever, there is no reason to suppose
that this is so.
The proposi-
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case, that expressed
by "S is thin^iL"r
nor likely that there
is some self-nrpc
^
the second conjunct of
f.

R

Proposition (in this
neither obvious
proposition that entails

duties a?e"woul'd°notri
our
beUeve"'h:!d'irrr every case in
duty obtains for a person
which a
it
-mediately evident to that
without reflection, thrt
person,
It doL
tain.
Reflection would seem to be
required before one's duties h
will not be self-preLn^iL
to
for he may have the duty
^ Particular duty,
without it^beinc
it.
Cf. Sir David Ross’s
remarks (1930 pp'^^30-3 2^°th^
duties are not self-evident
actual
to ns pr.a
careful reflection can
at best produce a "greater
likelihood"
actual duties are. Cf also
*at our
R B Rr dW ' discussion
(1959. pp.
188-189) summarising tte
vlL o; no^"^
duties are discovered by
intuition.

r"

^

1979.

relevant to our present purposes, to avoid
"I-proposltions" (cf
f°r a
discussion of his new views)
It 1 s n -nof Chisholm's new def InitloA
slmplv
for "evident." In Person and
Oblect , 9 h' !“o\
""
already proposed a ^Inltlon
of the sellpr^en
which
^
was
just
such a variant on D2.1.
Further confirmation that Chisholm
wishes to restnVt rho
c
^
propositions so as to exclude epIst-U
p^oposlt L::
found In this passage from his
1980
*

^rM

1

L^

artlcle;™

We may leave open the question
whether certain logically
necessary propertles-for example,
being
nonred— are self-presenting. If they are either red or

L1?ca“l

r"cfrt:s?:n^

not self-presenting
self-presenting pF^ertles are psyc"®ho-

(Note that Chisholm maintains in this
wLk that lt^is°propertles
rather than propositions which are
self-presenting.
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what would seem to be
^o" rather than
the proper lo^t
°^^tion to be derived from
perceptually takes there to hi
P6
"x
is white."
former locution here so
i prefer the
that
for Chisholm’s definition
of "Lsls°'’caf ^
reconsidered in discussing
P6.
Chisholm defines perceptuallv
taV
of how one is appeared
to (Chisholm. 19
^^^554^
ferences between the two
difnotions aro no/’enough
u
to affect the point
wish to make concerning P6
I
:

,

^

chapter VII
A VIABLE FOUNDATIONAL
ISM?

After
the basic

a

discussion of whether
belief states should
serve as

pcoposmons *lcb Jasllfy
ponbaslc pcoposUlons,

Cblshol.lan principle which
acie^pcs

Co

a

slate conditions >a,det
which a

basic proposition externally
sriries a nnnK
y Jjustifies
nonbasic proposition is
presented and discussed.
•

Chisholm’s New Pr inciple
Reinterpreted
We have seen that the
critics of founds tlonallsm
have failed
to establish an, compelling
arguments against a "stable
foundations”

version of Cartesian
foundatlonallsm.

But we have also seen
that the

leading systematic attempt
to set forth a
foundatlonallst theory-that
of Chlsholm-has failed
to state conditions under
which basic propositions make evident nonbasic
ones.
Thus we do not yet have a
satlsfactory bridging principle
essential to the Cartesian

foundatlonallst-that moves from
propositions about a subject’s mental
States to propositions about the
external world.
But we would not do well to
abandon Chisholm at this point.
It will be recalled from the
last chapter that Chisholm’s
principle P6

attempted

to

explain how the self-presenting could
make evident an

ordinary proposition about the external
world.!

It failed because the

antecedent of P6 could be satisfied
without the external world proposition in question being evident

to

the subject.
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And yet, as

I

noted
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at the end ot the
last chapter.

It „ay well be
that the relevant
pro-

IP, Che subject.
This raises
the question whether
we could not yet
have our Cartesian
brld^ln,

Pttnclple 11 we simply
reinterpreted and slightly
«dllled Chlshol„.s
P6 so that It stated
conditions ™der which a
basic proposition
«.d e a
nonbaslc proposition
externally Justified
rather than evident (or
internally justified in my
sense).
The principle as thus
reinterpreted would be weaker
than
Chisholm intended P6 to be.
It would not explain
the Interesting and
Important relation between
basic propositions and
the evident.
Nevertheless, it would at
least be an attempt to
state conditions
under which a basic
proposition Justifies (externally
justifies. In
this case) a nonbaslc
proposition. That too Is
Important—
the

Cartesian foundatlonallst needs
such a principle.

And although It

would be more limited than
Chisholm's P6. perhaps It Is
a necessary
first step before the
foundatlonallst can go on to specify
the con-

ditions under which a nonbaslc
proposition Is rendered evident.
At any rate,

I

believe that Chisholm's principle
as thus rein-

terpreted Is worthy of serious
consideration.
of this chapter discussing It.

I

shall spend the bulk

First, however, I shall discuss
some

recent remarks by John Pollock
which are critical ot foundatlonallst
theories.

A response to Pollock can make
clear why It appears

necessary to hold chat propositions
about a subject's experiences
rather then those about his beliefs are
the basic propositions that
serve to justify nonbasic propositions
for that subject.

Chisho Im'

s
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P6,

as well as my
reinterpretation of 1ItC,

rather than belief starve

tt,

hus.

opt for e
experiential states

the discussion of
Pollock can help

explain

an Important feature
of the bridging
principle to be
discussed later has been
adopted.

Belief States as

ers

Chisholm and Pollock have
both apparently assumed
chat,

if

’

there Is any basic state
that can serve the
Important role of
Justifying propositions about
the external world.
It Is likely to be
a
subject's belief state. For
example. It Is a subject's
belief that he
is looking at a red
object which, together with
other conditions,
justifies the proposition that
he Is Indeed looking at
a red object.

Or so It was held.

But

I

believe that the assumption
>*lch led

to

examples like this is mistaken,
and that this Is one
reason for the
failure of Chisholm's and
Pollock's Initial accounts of
the baslc-

nonbaslc relation. 3

Both philosophers now seem

assumption as a source of difficulty.
the assumption up,

to

recognize this

Chisholm has apparently given

since his most recent principles
(P6 and the other

principles formulated In Chisholm,
1980) abandon belief states as
the
basis for justification and adopt
appearance or experiential states.
Pollock, on the other hand, apparently
still accepts the assumption.
In a surprising recent turn, he
now holds that the difficulties

generated by this assumption demonstrate
the falsity of his earlier

foundatlonallsm as presented In Knowledge and
Justification
Indeed, demonstrate the falsity of

M

,

and

forms of foundatlonallsm (cf.
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Pollock, •A Plethora
of Epistemological
Theories." 1979
pp.
SO lar as 1 k„o„.
this .election leaves
Chisholm as the oal,
eorreat
defender of foundatlonallsm
who has a published
theory of
foundational! sm/
.

Pollock thus uses the
assumption that the
Justlfylng-state
Will be a belief-state,
if it is to be
anything at all, to reject

foundationalism as
PA:

a whole:

(1) If foundationalism

-f

q

ri-nQ

’
"
are belief states!
^ Justifying states
e not belief sta teo
f
r Foundationalism is arnot
(3)
true.

=totes

'

(1) states the assumption
that Pollock has apparently
retained and
Chisholm has rejected. We
can of course, and will,
ask whether

Pollock is wise in retaining
It.

But for now. let us look
at (2), for

we are trying to determine
what mental states serve
as justlflers of

nonbaslc propositions, and

1

belief states as candidates.

think Pollock Is right In
rejecting
My own view Is that, while
(1) Is false,

(2) is true.

Pollock^s Criticism of Belief States

Justif lers

Pollock considers the following
principle which. In line with
(1),

he takes to be essential
(F)

to

any classical foundational 1st
theory:

Necessarily, a person S Is justified In
believing a proposition P Iff (3D (r Is the set of
epistemologically
asic propositions believed by S&F
supports P for
S)

(Pollock. 1979,

p.

93).

Note that any justified proposition
will be supported by what

S
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That is. belief-states
function as justlflers
for nonbaslc
propositions
It Is principle F,

aiUlculty *lch forces

Pollock says, which
wuj.cn IS
is the
th» source of
the

ns to conclude

theories are false" (ibid.,

p.

that 'all classical
foundations

98).

believes.
one
Unfortunately, one rLelv Lhpv''
gically basic propositions
^Pistemoloat all.
Tnl
perception, the only belief
one is Lt fo h
^
I^°t
example] the belief that rsaOnly^wlih consU^LL
sophn«c"trordoe"®
any beliefs at all about
perception ItlS
Le°"\"?- '’f
not about oneself but
about the world
•

around oneself

(Ibid., pp. 98-99)

Why should there be a
problem If. as Pollock here
suggests,
the subject's only relevant
belief Is that there Is
something red
before him? The problem arises
because the proposition that
there Is
something red before him Is
not basic In the Cartesian
sense.
It Is
about the external world. A
candidate for a Cartesian basic
proposition In this case would be the
proposition expressed by "It seems
to S
that there Is something red before
him." or perhaps that ex_pressed
by
"S is appeared to redly." But.
and this Is the point Pollock
Is making
In the above passage, normally
S will not be likely to hold
the belief

that he Is appeared to redly.
that means.

Most likely he will not even know
what

"Only with considerable sophistication
does one come

have any beliefs at all about perception
Itself."

Some eplstemolo-

glsts say In effect that only Chisholm Is
sophisticated enough

what

"S

Is appeared

to

to

to know

redly" means, and they are not necessarily
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paying Chisholm a
compliment.
But If S does not
believe the proposition
that he is appeared
to tedl„ then hy
(.) this proposition
conld not he the
Justifier o,
some other proposition
P.

One could retain a
foundatlonalist structure,
in spite of this
Objection, by holding that
the basic propositions
are ttase which S
vlously believes, for
example, the proposition
that there is

something red before
external world.

S.

But as noted, such
•basics" are about the

If these prf.
are Koo-i
basic propositions,

then all is lost as
far as a specifically
Cartesian foundatlonallsm
goes.
It the
Cartesian program is to be
salvaged all
barvaged,
ell Koo-t
basics must remain propositions about S's mental
states.

Pollock may be right that
is appeared

to

S

will not normally believe
that he

redly, nor that he is
experiencing a red sense datum,

nor that he sees a red percept
(cf. ibid.,

p.

98).

These beliefs

Involve technical concepts
much disputed by eplstemologlsts,
and it
may be that an ordinary S does
not even understand them,
let alone
believe them.
If so. then these cannot,
given (F), Justify any other
propositions.
But I am not sure that Pollock
is right that there is

Cartesian proposition that
red object.
by

S

believes when he is looking at some

What about the proposition

I

mentioned above, expressed

It seems to S that there is
something red before him"?

candidate:

"S _takes there to be something

question at hand is:

red before him.")

Under normal circumstances, when

S

(Another
The

is looking at

something red, does he believe that it seems
to him that there is
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-aeves

.He ex.e.ne.

before Hi™.

„on. p.opos.Uon

Wa are asking

tion tha. 1.

se^

.o him

^e.Her

S

.Ha. .He.e

i, ao.e.H.a,

Helieves .He Car.esian
proposi-

.ha. there is something
red before him.

NOW i. is Plausible
that .he answer

to this question
is "Ho "
One might <,ui.e reasonably
be troubled over
any insistence that
S will
normally go through the
rather complex act of
believing that He
to see something red
whenever he also believes
that he act^lly

see something red.

^
^

Indeed, one might
reasonably maintain that
the

concept of actually seeing
something red excludes the
concept of
seeming to see something
red.
"I don't
to see it," s might
insist,
I really do see
f "
Ar.a
u
y
it.
And
perhaps
we should take him
at his
word

^

-f

It

•Yes."

S

is also plausible, however,

to say

that the answer is

may be taken to believe
that he is having certain
experien-

ces when he is looking at
a red object, and this
may be all that is
involved in seeming to see
something red.
In this sense, seeming
to
be red. or appearing to be
red. may be a normal, perhaps
even a

necessary, accompaniment to S's
seeing something red, and he
may
naturally and Inevitably believe
that he is having these experiences
of red (cf.

the discussion of Roderick
Firth's comments In the last

section of Chapter IV).
My own inclination is to say that
the answer is "Yes."

When a

given belief is adopted, an array of
associated beliefs is often also
adopted.

It

seems plausible to me that

S

does believe that he has the
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experience of red when
he sees something
red, and that, I
am inclined
to believe, is what
is involved in
saying that S believes
that he
seems to see something
red
.

These inclinations ot
„lna In no way amount

to a proof.
Mot
do the stated Inclinations
to answer "No" to
the question.
I do not
thdnh that an adequate
proof on one side or
the other of this
dehate
has been or can easily
offered. nBut .uy be offerAH
this means that the
position
that Pollock would have
to take— namely
^exy, tnat
that the answer must
be
No"-ls conjectural and not
well founded. At least,
he owes us an
argument.
So. although I think
Pollock Is right to reject
belief
States as justifying states,
I believe that we
must look to other
reasons than those he gives
to see why they should
be rejected.

Why We Should Reject Belief
States as
believe that justified
propositions are not justified,
ultl
mately, by what we believe.
We (In some cases automatically)
believe
I

because of our

^

eriences . and these are the
ultimate justificatory

bases for what we know.
It Is at least possible that
what one believes Is quite Inde-

pendent of what Is Internally or
externally justified for one.

A suf-

ficiently Irrational or unbalanced
person can believe almost any
proposition, p erhaps even the false
proposition that he seems

to see

something red when actually he’s having
the experience of green.

mere fact of such belief. If It can occur,
would not seem
to justify what is believed.

The

to be enough
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In order ro dlscounr
such examples,

U

c^ld

he

Cartesian proposition
cannot possibly fall

ass^ed that

a

to be believed
*en It Is
This naturalistic
account of beliefs
Insists than whenever
one
has experiences, one
Invariably has beliefs
that one Is havlt^
those
experiences, or at least
that one cannot at the
time have beliefs
that
one is having experiences
other than the ones one
Is actually having
Polloch's new article seems
to rely on this
assumption In places.
though at other points
his argument seems to
presuppose the
of
this assumption.

tme.

f^

At any rate,

Obviously true, and

this naturalistic account
of beliefs is not
1

would not wish

gument in its favor,

m

to have

to

rely on It. without

order to discount an example
such as

that above about the irrational
person.
But even if the naturalistic
account should prove to be
true,
it seems to me that we should
look to the sensory experience
itself as
the ultimate source tor the
justification of propositions about
the

external world, for It Is the
experience which Is the source of
the
belief, and not vice versa. And
It seems also

to

be the experience,

and not the belief, which Is
the source of the justlfledness
of propositions about the external world
when such propositions are justified.
In sum, although Pollock has not
proved that belief states

cannot function as Cartesian
justifiers of external world

propositions, the efforts to place belief
states in this functional
role have not led to any successful
Cartesian founda tionalist

principles.

And since there is some reason for
thinking that
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experiential states rather
than belief states
are the more
appropriate
candidates for this role,
It seems <rise to
formulate principles
which
place experiential
states as justltlers
of propositions
about the
external world.

Po llock’s Rejec tion
of Foundations 1 cm
But Pollock says that
to do this Is to
abandon founds tlonalis..
He accepts both
premises of arsument PA
noted above, concluding
that all forms of
classical foundatlonaism
are false.

Why does Pollock accept
premise

1

of the argument?

He conaiders this alternative
to his
nis classiVal
a
Classical fr.
founda
tionali sm principle F
noted above!
*-

(DR)

0(S)(P)
relative

[S

to

is justified in believing
P iff gT') rr

epistemologically bLlc^ rofo
S&r supports P)].
(.Follock,

1979,

t

pp.

•

ns^^

99-100)

Pollock calls this alternative
"direct realism."

What Pollock has to say about
principle DR as a contrast to
classical Cartesian foundatlonallsm
Is curious.
He considers whether
principle DR Is compatible rith
classical foundatlonallsm:

regarded as a foundations theory’
I
1" [{pledge and JustlfLJ!!?
delTndlng a foundations
*
But
ff
reflection,
I now think that that
had more
-rn the
to do with
genesis of the theory than with
Its content.

Hefa^a

*>e

(Ibid., p. 100)

He then goes on to note that
principle DR is compatible with clearly

nonCartesian foundational and nonfoundational
theories, and that there
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is a continuum of
fHeortes f.o. fha

cUsslcal Carfeslan foun-

daUonaUs.

af one exffe.e fo
pone coHenenffs. af
fHe ofHen.
f.one fs
not the elean hfea.
fhaf
,3ve been expecfe.
he.een fonn.affonallst and coherence
theories (cf. Ibid.).

Pollock is right that
principle DR Is compatible
nonCartesian theories of
t?
Jiustlfirar^on
fication.
For principle

>rtth

DR does not

require that basics be
about

a

subject's mental states.

Thus,

it is

compatible „lth. for example,
what we have called
external world foundatlonallsm and the shifting
foundations view.
But of

course, to say
this is not yet to say
principle DR Is Incompatible
with Cartesian
foundationalism.

Pollock Is also right that,
as

I

have pointed out In
Chapter

III,

there Is a continuum of
theories between Cartesian
founds tlonalism and coherentlsm.
But we need to know what
Pollock has In mind as
determining placement on the
continuum. Apparently position
on the

continuum Is determined for Pollock
by:
class of basic propositions
Is.

(1) How narrow or broad the

(Cartesian foundationalism,
excluding

as basics all but some subjective
mental propositions, would be
at the

narrow extreme.)
Status.

(2)

How privileged basics are In their
eplstemlc

(At one extreme basics would
have to be certain or

incorrigible.

At the other they would not have
to have any higher

epistemic status than that of being
justified.)
I

gather that this is Pollock's view from
the following

passage

Epistemological theories make up a rather rough
continuum.

At
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one extreme we have
claQ<=^no^
privileged status to a

a

*i''a

ce«al“r"
proposltlons-the eplstemologlcauf
Lsf”“
" P"P°sltlons.
the opposite extreme
At
we have^nure e h
£2 hetence_ theorl^ which
regard all propositions
as befi^
with one another and
P^P
give no

prlvUerd'"'’'^''®''’^”®^'®^
Between these two
extremes we'^have a®rat^*'“^
of theories which give
collection
some sorrof
f"
propositions, but a lesser
status tha“Iia?"‘'
conferred by
olassical foundations
theories.
Bv retJectlng
f
classical foundatlons theories we have
efferrt
i
effectively
lopped
off
one end of the
contlnuum.

(Ibid., p.

Notice the clear Implication
at the end

of

101)

this passage that

Pollock has rejected
classical foundational Ism
and. presumably, given
good reasons for rejecting
It.
But what reasons has
he actually
glvenl All we have from
the article on that at
this point Is
his not

entirely successful argument
that belief states cannot
serve as
justlflers. and thus that (F)
Is false.

right on that-bellef states

a^

But let us assume that
he Is

justlflers.

How Is that supposed

to undermine a specifically
Cartesian foundatlonallsm and
effectively

lop off one end of the
continuum?

If the continuum Is
determined by

conditions (1) and (2) above.
It's hard

to

see why Pollock thinks he

has lopped off the Cartesian
foundatlonallst extreme.

I

Recall again

requirements for Cartesian
foundatlonallsm stated In Chapter III.
have noted that nowhere has
It been successfully argued
that a

Cartesian foundatlonallst must hold
that basics are certain or
Incorrigible.
It is quite compatible with
Cartesian foundatlonallsm
that the guaranteed eplstemlc status
of a basic proposition merely
be
that of being Justified.
Indeed, Pollock himself explicitly
agrees:

289

£lima faci^ justified, and
there is no
status between prima
facie incir'f-j
"
Most classical

fe^alS
We

Z

•

at least
intermediate
incorrigibility,
opted for incorrlgiolasslcal
"^“^f'^lblllty, but It
° ^^t)us

bility, and many of
the classical^^^
foundatlona theLlas
focused
must be recognized
that thft" mor"
required for classical
fonnda^
As such, one
cannot refute all classical fr. Lnrtheo??es"
a
swoop by proving
one fell
ttarthefe are n^
cally basic propositions!
eplstemologlTMa !!
important observation
because some non-founW onl!
foondationalists chave thought
they could do
just that.

w

y

PF*

'JD

Now on Pollock's continuum
of theories, at the
tar foundatlonallst extreme we will
presumably find theories

which (1)
restrict basics to subjective
mental propositions and
(2) give basics
the high eplstemlc status
of Incorrigibility.
But principle F, the
only principle he claims
to have refuted, says
nothin, ab^t either of
these conditions.
It only says that basics
must be believed by the
subject and that It Is these
belief states which serve
as justlflers
for the indirectly evident.
So to have refuted (F)
Is not to have

said anything against theories
embracing conditions (1) and
(2) but

holding experiential states
rather than belief states as
justlflers.
Yet on Pollock's own grounds,
such theories should be positioned
at
the foundatlonallst extreme
of the continuum.

So much for having

effectively lopped off one end of
the continuum."
Also, as we have seen, and as
Pollock recognizes in the above

passage, Cartesian foundationalism need
embrace only the first of
these two conditions.

It might say only that basics
must be
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justified, not IncottigiMe.

Such a Catteslan
foundationalls™ is

perhaps not at the far
end of the
foundatlonallst extreme,
but it
regains a Cartesian
theory that deserves
to he called
•classical."
And Pollock has thus
far said nothing
against it.
It

well be that Pollock
only „eant by
••classical- foundationalls» a theory *ich
held belief states as
justlflers.
But it
is certainly possible
for there to be a
Cartesian theory in our
technical sense which rejects
(P). namely, one
which takes experiential
states rather than belief
states as Justlflers.
And Pollock has certainly said nothing that
would require us to
conclude that Cartesian
theories must hold somerhino
ing like
HVc f'F'i
CF).
So in arguing against
(F), he
has not argued against
Cartesian foundatlonallsm as
such.
It may be too that
Pollock is thinking that
classical foun-

dationalism must be

ite^-that

if a Cartesian proposition
Justi-

fies another, the subject
must know it does.

But we have seen in

Chapters III and IV that there
is no obvious inconsistency
in a noniterative Cartesian foundatlonallsm.
Such a theory will say that
a

subjective mental experience can
make an external world
proposition
Justified, even though the subject,
lacking any sophisticated epistemology, may not be Justified
In thinking, indeed may not
even believe,
that his subjective mental
experience justifies an external world
proposition.
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Brld.tn.
We have seen that
there are reasons for
favoring experiential
states over belief
states as ,nstlflers.
hot no sufficient
reasons for
giving up the attempt
to construct a
bridging principle alor«

Cartesian foundationalist
lines
lines.

AnS tI uhave
And
suggested that a slight

.edification Of Chisholm's
PS might be a plausible
candidate for such
a principle.
I shall proceed
next to construct such
a principle from

the ground up.

Although the end result
ulll be a principle ver,
close
to Chisholm's. I prefer
to construct It step
by step rather than
state
It outright.
In this way. the
reasons for Including
various elements
in It can be better
understood.
I shall Introduce
some new ter-

minology and use some terms
differently from Chisholm's
usage.
This
will not alter the Chlsholmlan
nature of the principle.
Chisholm himself has made many such
changes from revision to
revision.
I „in
point out any significant
relations between my terminology
and
Chisholm’s that might not be
obvious.
I

shall say that at least one
basis for justified propositions

about the external world Is what
one's senses present
Chisholm.

I

shall concentrate on one of the
senses— vision.

shall restrict myself to It. even
though

matter

to

to one.

I

Like

Indeed.

feel It's not a trivial

extend results to the other senses
once principles for

vision have been established.

This Is one of several ways In which

the principle to be constructed
will be limited In scope.

When, under conditions of normal light
with unimpaired vision

I
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and open, focused
eyes,

looU In cHe .Auction
of a nfpe Potato
Which is a few feet
In ftont of „e and
Is unohstnucted by
any Intervening object, then
1 shall say that
I a. visually
presented with a
red-object-ln-space. But 1
shall also say that I
a. vls^lly presented with a
red-object-ln-space when I merely
dre^ that I'm looking
tomato.
That Is, what Is visually
presented to me has to do
Just
with what appears to me,
not with what actually
exists external to me.
So the phrase "visually
presented with a
red-object-ln-space" must not
be taken to have any
existential Implication.
If I'm so presented
with a red object. It does
not follow that there
actually exists some
red object external to
me which I was looking
at.
I

I

say that my visual
experience presents me with
a

red-object-ln-space, and not just
chat It presents me with
a red
ject, or with a red patch.
This Is because I take
exception to
those theories of perception
which state that visual
experience at Its
most basic and uninterpreted
level consists Just of an
array of
colored patches, presented as
It were on a flat surface.

Due to the

fact that we have two eyes set
apart from each other, our visual

experience contains an additional
quality which we come
as three-dlmenslonallty.

to

Interpret

Perhaps It Is only through
experience that

we come to understand this stereoscopic
quality of our visual

experience In terms of distance In
space, solidity, and so on.
Nevertheless, It seems to me that this
quality Itself Is present even
in the most untutored experlencer
of visual phenomena— chat even at

this stage one does not experience vision
as a flat array of colored

293

patches.
The expression "S Is
visually presented >rith
a red-objectin-space" win take the
place of Chisholm's
expressions "S is appeared
redly to" and "S
perceptually takes there
to be a red object."
The
Termer expression will
fiu the same role as the
latter expressions do
in Chisholm’s epistemic
principles.
pies.
It wi
1 1
^
will,
in
other words, be used
to express a basic
proposition.
As noted above, the
principle to be constructed

.vlll attempt
to state the conditions
under which a basic
proposition makes a nonbasic proposition externally
fac- opposed
stitied (as
y Jiustlfled
to internally
justified or evident).

A Chlsholm ian Bridging
Principles
The most obvious starting
point for a bridging principle
is
something like the following
direct approach:
^
visually presented with a
$-object-in-space, then the proposition
that S Is
looking at a
object is externally justified
for

This is of course a schema,
where

person and

j,

S

S.

can be replaced with the name
of a

with any color predicate

to

obtain an Instance of the

schematic principle.
But E?i will not do.

object-in-space when

S

may be visually presented with
a red-

has good reason for believing
he's not actually

looking at a red object.
see,

S

For example, he may have been told,
or may

that a red light is shining on a
white object.

A natural revision is the following
schematic principle, which

294

adds a ^aali^nns
cona.Uon ,o .He previous
p..„e,pi,,
solves the above problem:

„H.cH

least reasonable tor
S Is'such Jhrr^
ly justify for S
®’''arnalthe negation of ?he^
P’"°P°altlon that S
Is looking at a
* object
then Jhe “""sgated
Is externally justified
proposition
for
S.

Again, and In the
following principles as
well, only color
predicates
may be filled in for
(\).

It

should be clear that EP2
Is Immune to the
example EPl Is
vulnerable to. since S does
have good reason to
believe that he Is
not actually looking
at a red object, the
proposition that S Is
looking at a red object
Is not externally
justified for S, according
to EP2.
However. EP2 solves this
problem at too great a cost.
Many
tl.es S will not be externally
justified In believing the
proposition
that he is looking at a
red object, even though
the negation of that

proposition Is not externally
justified for him.

Suppose, for

example, that he Is a subject
In a perceptual experiment
In which, as
he is correctly Informed,
half the time he Is sho>™ a
colored object
and half the time he Is
shown a white object with a
colored light

shining on It.

The perceptual situation
Is such that It Is hard
to

distinguish which event Is occurring
at a given time.
S

In such a case,

Is not externally justified
In believing he Is looking at
a red

object when he is presented with
a red-object-ln-space.

But neither

Is the sec of propositions
which are reasonable for him sufficient
to

externally justify that he Is not looking
at a red object.

So the
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tecedent of EP2 is true,
but the consequent
is false.
This suggests that the
guaUfylng condition In the
antecedent
Should he Changed so that
the evidence against
a dubious extetnal
wotld ptoposltlon need
not be so sttot, that
It iustUles the
negation
of that proposition.
The principle Mght
be thus revised as
follows-

least reasonable

justified

o?

S

as

si'’
proposition is externally

tofr

Where EP2 regulred that the
negation of the external
world proposition be Justified If the
external world proposition
Itself was not to
be justified, EP3 regulres
only that the external world
proposition be
rendered tuireasonable . The
precise conditions under which
one proposition renders another unreasonable
would have to be spelled out
by a
detailed theory of justification.
Intuitively, the Idea Is that
p
renders q unreasonable If, given
p and no other relevant data, S would
be better off eplstemlcally
withholding or rejecting
q rather than
believing q.

Even this Intuitive Idea should
be sufficient

difficulty with EP3.

to

It may be that S Is In a perceptual

reveal the

situation

where It Is just reasonable, but no
more than that, for him
that he Is looking at a red object.

to believe

Suppose he Is In an experimental

situation where he Is looking at a red
object fifty-five percent of
the time, but forty-five percent of the
time he Is looking at a white

object with a red light shining on It.

And S knows about these
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p-........, ...

..

.....

Ich event is occurring.

Then

S

Is presumably not
externally

Justified in believing
he Is looking at a
red object.
It Is not so
reasonable for blm that
It Is beyond reasonable
doubt and potentially
evident. Yet the total
data available to him
Is not sufficient
to
render the proposition
that he Is loohlng at
a red object
treasonable
for him.
In such a case, the
antecedent of EP3 Is true,
but the con-

sequent is false.
This problem suggests a
more radical revision.
The above
principles have all been
Intended to apply to vls.^1
presentation
generally, ^enever S Is
visually presented with a
-object-ln-space.
the principle Is supposed
to be able to be Invoked
to detennlne
Whether the related external
world proposition Is In
fact externally
Justified for S.
The principles formulated
above have all come to

grief because of abnormal
perceptual conditions In which
there Is at
least some reason for S to
doubt that the external world
proposition
In question Is true.
Perhaps we should consider a
more limited principle that does not attempt to
cover all cases In which

presented with a

S

Is visually

-object-ln-space, but which restricts
Itself to nor-

mal perceptual circumstances
where S does not have any evidence
that

anything Is amiss perceptually.

The following principle suggests

itself
EP4:

Necessarily, if S is visually presented
with a cJ)-objectin space, and if no set of propositions
that are reasonable for S casts doubt upon the
proposition that S is
looking at a 0 object, then the latter
proposition is
externally justified for S.
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Before

I

discuss EP4,

I

„euld U,e Co point
out its similari-

ties to Chisholm’s P6
(cf. Chisholm,
1980, p. 555), „hich
was
discussed in the last
chapter.
It has already been
noted that
Chisholm's bridging principle
attempted to establish
that the external

world proposition was
so

e«.

ir ^an be criticised
on those grounds,

have instead been worUlng
with bridging principles
making the
.ore modest conclusion
that the external work
proposition is
nally JuHltled.
Except for this difference,
which is of course an
Lportant one, I belief that P6
and EP4 are virtually
identical.
Like EP4, Chisholm's
principle does not seem to
be Intended to
apply to all cases of visual
presentation.
It appears to be
I

restricted to cases in

*lch

there are no problematic
perceptual cir-

cumstances or in Which, in
Chisholm's te^lnology, the
external world
proposition In question is
eplstemlcally In the clear." Chisholm
notes that such a proposition
is one that is "not
dlsconflrmed by any
set of properties [propositions,
in my terminology] that have
some

presumption In their favor

..."

(ibid., p. 552).

"disconfirmed" performs the same role.
"casts doubt upon" does in EP4.

I

The term

believe, in P6 as the term

We may even consider Chisholm’s

implicit definition of "disconfirm"
as a definition of the term
"casts
doubt upon (for Chisholm's definition
cf
ibid., pp. 552-553):^
.

DCD:

p casts doubt upon q for
externally justified for
externally justified for
unreasonable for S.

S

S
S

=df Necessarily, if p ig
and if everything that is
is entailed by p, then q is

Where P6 requires only that the dlsconf Irmlng
(doubtcasting) proposi-
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tlons have some
presumption In their favor

EP4 re„
requires more strictly
•

" ""
sense Chisholm uses
the term •acceptable."

"-asonahle'. In the same

Cf. Chisholm 1977.
p. 9
and 1980, p. 547 for
his definition of
"acceptable.") This minor
difference does not, I
believe, significantly
detract from the similarity
between P6 and EP4.
Both principles say
that as lo.^ as no
proposlfrons Which have this
favorable eplstemlc status
(however specified)
cast doubt upon (l.e.,
dlsconflrm) the external
world proposition In
Cuestlon. then that
proposition Is justified,
given that the subject
Is having the appropriate
sensory experiences.

and Prospect s
EP4 solves some problems,

raises more, and may help
to suggest

the direction In ,*lch a
fully developed Cartesian
founds tlonall st
theory must go. I shall not
offer such a fully developed
theory here;
too much preliminary
groundwork remains to be done.
I shall Instead
try to suggest—
by way of discussion and further
development of

EP4— some

of

the problems and prospects
that appear,

from this vantage

point, to pertain to the continued
development of Cartesian

foundationalism.
In subsequent sections I shall
consider (1) how EP4 relates to

previous counterexamples that have
worked against other bridging
principles, (2) limitations of EP4 based
on the need for a theory of

justification, (3) EPS,

a

revision of EP4 based on the problem

of con-

ceptual understanding, (4) whether EP4
and EP5 can appropriately be
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called foundatloaaist
principles, and
la
rinaiiy
finally (5) some
concluding
remarks
.

and Previo u s Counterexamples
It should be clear
that FP4
EP4 ^isc Immune to the
counterexamples
CO >*ich EP.s 1-3
„ere yulnerahle. and
that it is also

immune to

Heidelberger's original
counterexample

to

Chisholm's first edition

bridging principles (cf.
Chisholm. 1,66. pp.
45,
A7,

Heidelberger, 1969,

n.

75

)
)•

An
11

sual or tricky perceptual
situations

i-v,
these
counterexamples posit unu-

*ere

some reasonable doubt
is

cast upon the external world
proposition in question.
Hence the antecedent of EP4 will not be
satisfied in these situations.
The objection to Chisholm's
second edition Theory of Knowledee
bridging principle was not
a counterexample.
It noted

instead some

structural difficulties pertaining
to the relation between
that principle and yarlous definitions,
all of which haye since
been reylsed.
These structural difficulties
i-ricuxcies wprp
were, tI believe, specific
to Chisholm's
formulations in that edition, and
do not pertain to EP4.
(Indeed,

Chisholm's related P6 was formulated
in part for the yery purpose
of
avoiding these difficulties.)

The counterexample

discussion in Chapter VI

,

to P6 Itself,

as will be recalled from my

posited a man who correctly belleyes
that he

is appeared whitely to by an
object that is white, although he comes
to this belief through the
unreasonable supposition that the object

suddenly and inexplicably changed from being
red

to being white.

Now
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-is

„as a coan.e.exa„pU

bjaot that is
s

pe

„e wopla no.
„nn.

proposition that he Is
appeared uhltely to by
an

*lte

Is

evl^

result.

tion is

.

believe

eHH-iii

Jus^

believe it and no reason

to

to

this tan.

„e^„ant

tor this tan.

doubt It.

The tan Is visually
presented

Chisholm's principle
had
to say

that this proposi-

He has every reason
to

And EP4 does have
this result.

>rtth a

whlte-object-ln-space, and
since
there are no reasonable
propositions castlr, doubt
on the proposition
that he is looking at
a white Object,
obiect
fh-ic
this proposition is
externally
justified according to EP4
nra, and it ar^ra
6
j
does indeed seem to be
so
•

justified

.

EP4 and Theories of JusMf-too-n
on

have already noted that,
since EP4 Is restricted
to the
externally justified. It does
not give us the sort of
Information „e
would like to have about
the evident or Internally
Justified. This Is
I

an unfortunate limitation.

A perhaps even more unfortunate
limitation

Is that both of these
concepts of justification depend
on a full

fledged theory of justification
that has not been developed
here.
In
Chapter II I tried to make the
concept of external justification
as
clear as possible lacking such
a theory and the definitions
that would
Included as part of It.
But It would of course be
desirable to
have the definitions.

This limitation Is perhaps more
clearly brought out In the
case of EP4 with regard to Its
component concept of one proposition
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part Of an, ade,nate
tHeon, of Jnstlf foatio„=

atte^p.

anch a theon, „onld

Po

explain all sue,
iustificaton, relations-othens
^gHt
include nelations sucH
aa one proposition
defeatins another, oo.
ar^ins another, or rendering
another proposition
evident (or he,ond
reasonable doubt, etc).
Chishol. has offered
definitions of these or
sr.rlar relations, and I
have of course used
one of th™ above to
specify conditions for
casting doubt. However,
I a. not in a
position to
say that the definitions
that form part of
Chisholm's theory of
justification are correct in the
final analysis.
The Chlsholmlan definition DCO is offered here
as an indication of
Chisholm's approach to
the problem and, should
it prove to be inadequate,
as a possible
Starting point for a more
adequate definition.
It may be appropriate
to point out, however,

that the problem
raised by our lack of
definitions for such Justificatory
relations is

just as much a problem for
a coherentlst or other
nonfoundatlonalist
theory as it is for
foundatlonallsm. Any plausible
theory about the

structure of justified propositions
would seem

to

require concepts of

confirming, casting doubt, defeating,
rendering evident, etc.

Adequate definitions of these
concepts would seem

to be

necessary to

properly tie down any structural
theory such as foundatlonallsm
or
coherentlsm. Because this prior work
has not been done, I cannot say
that the structural eplstemlc
principles here formulated are as clear
as they should be.

theory,

But because this work is prior
to anjj structural

it is not a problem solely for
foundatlonallsm, nor is it
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dlrectl, .eleva«

to

the dispute between
founda tlonall s. and

coherentism.
It can also he
noted

that the pattlculat
Justiacatoty concept

e»plo.ed h. HP4-that
oi one ptoposition
castit, doubt on
anothet-is
a taarly co.t.on
concept about which we
have a telatively
cleat
incuitive notion. We can
use these intuitions
to test the adequacy
oi
a definition such
as Chishol.'s.^ The
basic idea behind one
ptopositlcn p casting doubt
on another proposition
, is that
p tends

q

less llhely.

to „ahe

Under nonral circumstances,
if

p ia Justified,
, „iu
be less likely to be
true than when
p is not Justified.
Lacking a
formal definition, this
rought Intuitive notion
can. It

Is to be

hoped, help to clarify EP4.

Just as the concept of
external Justifi-

cation has been of some use
without a fommal definition,
so, perhaps,
can this be true of the
concept of casting doubt.
Let It be noted, however,
that one of the most
Important
directions future work should
take
i<? that of
^
Ke IS
proposing
formal definitions of these concepts of
justification.

E^P4

^
and th e Understanding of
Concepts

It might be objected
against EP4 that it generates
coun-

terexamples when we consider
subjects
Let us assume that
red.

It might be

a

rf,o

do not have color concepts.

prellngulstlc child does not have the
concept

thought that the antecedent of EP4
can be true and

the consequent false In such a
case,

for how can the child be

justified in believing a proposition
for which he does not possess the
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requisite concepts?
This may be a correct
objection, but
UL _LU
It IS
Is not obvious
ob .
that it
is so.
For it may be tha^ a
j
a proposltton
such as that expressed
by "s
looking at a red object"
is externally
justified for
f
S even though
S does not
understand the relevant
concepts.
it may be that
certain
^inds Of relatively
simple perceptual
evidence are available
to subjects who do not understand
the concepts
FLb necessary to express
propositions about that evidence.
>

If so.

then certain kinds of
propositions could be
externally
justified for a person even
if he does not
understand them.l« This
is
Obvious absurdity.
Of course any internally
justified
proposition must be understood
by the subject.
But this may not
n6CGss3.iriXy bg ths
I

-f

a
justification
is merely external.

do not intend to resolve
this debate here.

remark on the relevance of
the debate

to EP4

I

„iu

merely

Tf
i
if simple
perceptual

propositions about the external
work can be externally
justified for
prellngulstlc child, then EP4 is
acceptable as it is.
If, as it

a

would
be very plausible to hold,
evidence cannot be available
and hence
externally justify a proposition
unless one possesses the
relevant
concepts, then EP4 should be
amended.
Since both sides would, I

believe, accept the principle
as amended, and since the view
that it
needs amendatlon is at least a
plausible one, it may be desirable
to
think of our bridging principle
as EPS rather than EP4, where
EPS is
identical to EP4 except that it adds
to the antecedent the condition
that

S

understands the proposition that

S

is looking at a

object.
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A re These Foundat
lonallst Prlnr-fpi^.7
It might be objected
that EP4 and EPS
EP5 are not ^
foundatlonallst
principles at all, on the
following
grounds
S grounds.
Th. require
They
that we

consider other eplste^lc
states of the subject
besides his seUpresentlng or basic states.
Hence It Is not really
his so-called
basic state *lch
Justifies the proposition
about the external

world.
It la rather a large
set o, conditions that
requires us to examine
the
whole of S’s present
eplste^lc situation. The
principle Is upon

reflection really a coherentlst
principle, not a foundatlonallst
one.
The response to this
objection calls for yet another
distinction between types of
foundatlonallst. „e can Itaglne
a type of foundatlonallst that is akin to
phenotenallst. Where phenctenallst
asserts that propositions
about sense data entail
propositions about
physical objects, the associated
type of foundatlonallst
would assert
that a basic proposition would
entail that a proposition about
the
external world Is Justified.

This ••simple" foundatlonallst
was Ini-

tially proposed in Chlsholt's
first edition Theory of Knowledge

and

was shown by Herbert Heldelberger
to be Inadequate, at
least In that
formulation.
But this simple foundational
ism may not exhaust the types of

theories that may properly be called
foundational.

Consider the view

that while there are indeed basic
propositions, and while they must
have a role in justifying any justified
empirical proposition, the

justification relation is not the relatively
simple one of a basic
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proposition., entailing that
a nonbaslc proposition
Is Justified.
Other conditions .ust also
occur before there Is
Justification.

Por

example, the nonbaslc
proposition must not be
defeated by other
propositions.
In other words, we may
contrast two different
types of eplste.Ic principles stating
the conditions ^der
which basic propositions
Justify nonbaslc ones. Ptlnclples
of the relatively simple
type would
fit the following schema:
SEP:

Necessarily, if

p,

then q is justified.

The more complex schema
would then be:
CEP:

Necessarily, If p and set of
conditions
Is Justified.

q

C,’

then

Obviously, EP4 and EPS are
principles of the latter type.

The question Is, of course,
whether principles of type CEP
are

properly to be called foundational!
st principles.

What can be said in favor of the
view that they are
foundationalist?

It seems to me that the only
claim that can be made

against them as foundationalist principles
is that it is necessary,

given such principles, to examine the
whole of the subject's epistemic
system before it can be established
that a nonbasic proposition is
justified.
is,

However,

I

am not sure that this claim is true,
nor, if it

that this shows that such principles
are not foundationalist.

On the first point, is it really the case
that one must examine the whole of S’s epistemic system in
order

to

determine whether,

according to EPS, for example, an external world
proposition is
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Jusuae..
«ons

one nee. on., essnne
.Ha. .He.e a.e no
.easonaHU p.„,oa.eas. .onH. on .He
p.oposU.on
.Ha. s

ob.ec
Of proposl.lons

a

looans

a. a ,

.H.s .oes no. .e,a.e
na .o PooH a. .He

..

*lcH

Have so.e posU.ve
epls.e.lc s.a.es fo. S.
I.
would see. .0 He enougH
.o Inspec. .Hose
p.oposi.lons *lcH s.a.e
S's
expeaences. Hellefs.
Hnowledse. and .e.o.,
pe..aming to .He pe.cepfual sl.ua.lon a. Hand.
THe epls.e.lc s.a.us
of .any proposl.lons
abou. S s experiences,
e.c, would appear .o Have
no bearing on .He
epls.eac s.a.us of .He ex.ernal
world proposl.lon In
gues.lon. THa.
S is sail experiencing
.He .as.e of .He s.rawberry
He Jus. a.e, .Ha.
he doesn t know which
side to take on the
creationist-evolutionist
deba.e, .Ha. He .Hlnks
.He prospec.s for .He Red
Sox .his year are
very poor, would all seem
.o be proposl.lons
tha. do no. have a role
in de.ermlnlng whe.her
.he percep.ual proposition
Is justified for
him.

On the second point,
suppose one Insists that these
propositions do play a role.
I. is conceivable that
even one's beliefs abou.
the Red Sox could In some
circumstances have a role in determining

whether a perceptual proposition
Is Justified.
whom
Vince

(Carl Yastrsemskl, for

has a blind admiration, has
been paid by a coherentlst to
con-

S
S

that a white object is really
green.)
But what can this do to establish
that EP5 is not

foundationalist?

It seems to me that even if we
must in some sense

take account of the whole range of
propositions having some positive

epistemic status for

S,

we are doing so only to establish
that they do
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have an epistemlc efferf nr. t-u
effect on the
proposition In question.

--3flea.
not apply.,

(If r„ey

and the principle

II cHe propositions
do not have any
eplat.lc

effect. It seems entirely
appropriate to say that the
proposition that
S IS presented
..th a ^ohiect-ln-space
Justifies the external
„orld
proposition. The other
propositions do not add to
or contribute to
the justification of
the external world
proposition In question.
It
is rather than they
do not prevent the
justification from golns
through.
This hardly seems to
he a picture of a web
of propositions
each of which is
eplstemlcally supported by
a set of distinct
propositions. One might say
that the self-presentl.^
proposition
justifies the externa world
proposition because there Is
a prlma
facie justification relation
between the two and because.
1„

the spe-

cific situation described,
there Is nothing to stand
In the way of
this prlma facie justification
being an actual justification.
In such
a case. It seems
appropriate to say that the basic
proposition justlfies the nonbasic proposition.
Further, If „e look at the
specific tenets of foundatlonaism,
the essential tenets stated
at the beginning of Chapter

as well as
the tenets of the specific
varieties of foundatlonallsm noted
In
I

Chapter III, it is not clear that
an epistemlc principle of the
CEP
type is incompatible with any
of these tenets, at least not
with those

associated with a Cartesian foundatlonallsm
of the type
defend.

The theory

I

I

wish to

have been discussing posits basic
propositions

that are Intrinsically credible In the
sense that they are, when true.
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-..n.
to be

.o...

,_paUMe

..

..3

..,3

aoHePenUs.

.a..

UseU ae.s

(cf. H.:).

,33,0 ,ppp3,ttons do not auto.atlcaU,
jnstlf, ptoposdtlons
about the extetnad
world. Given that
external world propositions
see» vulnerable to
doubts and countervailing
considerations. It Is hardl,
to be expected
that the relation between
basics and nonbasics
could be this

stralshtforward.

But given a situation
In which there are
no such

countervailing considerations,
it does seem plausible
to say that the
basic proposition Justifies
the nonbaslc one.
And If „e can say
this,
t seems an easy
matter to set up the
traditional foundational!
st
ture, where these basic
P
propositions provide the
ground level
support, do not themselves
need additional support,
and yet provide
justification for the higher level
propositions.

A Cartesian theory using CEP
type bridging principles
also
seems compatible >rtth EF2,
the view

that a nonbaslc proposition
must

derive at least part of Its
justification from some relation
It bears
to a basic proposition.
This tenet does not even require
that the

relation be one of 'exclusive"
justification of nonbaslc by basic
propositions, nor does It appear to

prevent CEP type principles from

being foundatlonallst.

Thus, a theory of the type here
being

discussed does not seem Incompatible
with either of the essential
tenets of foundatlonallsm, and It
seems capable of setting up

a

recognizably foundatlonallst structure
for justified propositions.
Of course, EP4 and EPS,

the CEP principles

concerned with, are extremely limited.

I

am here primarily

They cover only relatively
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simple and straightforward
eplste^lc sltnatlons
It
,
well
be that
"ore complex eplate^lc
principles necessar.
for a foil,
developed
eory of Cartesian
foundatlonalls. will corn
oot to violate
one or
more tenets essential
to that theory.
y
Perhaps further
remaps
furth
consideration

the door on the debate
whether the theory that
Is developing Is
truly
alist.
At the present time
it looks as though
It can

plausibly be so labelled.

But there Is

™ch

here that retains
open

for future discussion.

Conclusion
The same can be said
about the other Issues
raised concerning
EP4 and EPS, as well
as the Issues raised
for Cartesian foun-

datlonallsm In general:

some progress has.

believe, been made, but
there are. If anything,
more questions for future
discussion than
there were at tne
the start.
starr
t
i
I have already
mentioned some of them in

previous sections of this chan^pr•
Chapter.

justification are needed.
extremely narrow.

I

Definitions of various concepts
of

The bridging principles
discussed are

They concern only vision,
and only eplstemlcally

straightforward cases.

Can more complex principles
be formulated, and

will they be recognizably
foundatlonaist?

Also, principles are

needed which state conditions
for Internal justification.!!

well

to

It may be

restate here another unresolved
problem area mentioned in

Chapters III and IV:

Suppose we do arrive at a set of
bridging prin-

ciples which seem to adequately cover
all perceptual situations.

We

310

“ ••“ •.>relations, and will this
resnl

Cartesian foundationalist?

^

«n

»...

have consequences
undesirable to the
v,o,r

Such questions, as well
as others recognized
and unrecognized

answer the question posed
by the title of this
dissertation

confusions that have led some
philosophers

datlonallsm prematurely.

1

to

reject Cartesian foun-

believe that the Chlsholmlan
bridging

principle discussed In the
present chapter Is a
plausible one. and I
hope to have suggested
some directions In which
to proceed fr™ there.
have not offered any
further development myself,
so I cannot
conclude that foundatlonallsm
works
But perhaps I can say
so far. so
good
I

.
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Notes to Chapter VIII

tlon thac\tefe\fa'f"s"^!pi"on

proposlUo'^'
In his views about
Chisholm Is right
such propositlLs’^ r^t
translated back into
»e
referencL
erences tr^Jr
to directf attributions
of properties.
^

noted and discussed
In Chapter^III^
the varieties of
founds tloLlsm a^d
°
that chapter.

Pollock

s

(1974).

tt

varieties of foundational
ism
°£ the outline of
"f
discussion
that follows in

“

account see his Knowledge
and Justif ir;,^^•on

Cornman (1978) and Pastin
recently published articles
favorable I founda tionali
they have not offered
sm
However.
any svftll?
Pt°P°=als of foundatlonallst
theories.
Also Cornman at least
^PP®t^"Ply toJoct a "stable
foundations" Cartesian
foundatloniLH™
toundationallsm ?In favor of a
more moderate
theory.
.

^ ---

justificatLt'L“"h::;^'ri:«i?it"r
.:v“LT:u:hrt^e?r;-td”
^97rp;!^io6-u^T
Justification as

concepts.)

I

have discussed these

Barley, Earl Conee, Gary
Matthews and Rick Wilev

offerpri

and drscu:se11nThrs"::ct°?on''

for Chlsholm“s'concep\'of"tL'ev\d“«

externally Justified

f^

reasonable proposition a fortiori
has some

^™b!;/a"nd“L"ot^^
8This

section.

:ustlfled-p?^;^on^

nrec.^T,rx^,•r..

13^“°"

was pointed out to me by Rick
Wiley,

helpful comments pertaining to this

some

SO
way toward
adoDtin^^°^rhr^-"^"\^"
adopting,
the view that pr econceptual awareness
is necessarily aware-
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Thn"vlerwas'’dlfLss8d"ta^Cha tr"v'
Nonproposltlonal’’''
AwLeness!"^’'?f!"Il3/‘he°dlsr‘'
Chapter IV. These
dlscussjo^rgf ^"^e Jy"J
the view presently
under discussion more
piauslble!''^

th«e

of
’

has
P^‘"=lplos
^^^her investigation. In
Justifying Nonbasic
"On
Statements bv
criticizes Chisholmian
'^"“es
Cornman
ep^Lmic nr^
CEP form.
These criticisL
^nd the
the criticisms by
because,
like
Heidelberger and mJ^elf^'^Cor
show that the antecedents
^ criticisms
only
of the rh/vn Y*
and the nonbasic
es can be true
propositioL Jn
They do not show that
^^bject.
tJe a^tecLpT^'“°^
while the nonbasic
propositions are not externallv
•
especially Cor„an,
1579. p. 140).
-i

of the SEP and CEP forms
to
q

makes p evident for

S

tLse
at

of

<f
JL foL""

*"“

^"^”=1^100

t.

Cornman notes that thi s
suggestion is due to Heidelberger
Cornman, 1979, p. I 4 i;
(cf
Heidelberger, 1969, pp. 73-75).
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